



FASHIONING THE LEGAL CONSTITUTION:
CULTURE, COURTS, AND LAW
Robert C. Post*
"We must seek a conception of law which realism can accept as true."1
B y any measure this last Term has proved remarkable. Confirming
the endless capacity of the Court to astonish and surprise, the
2002 Term has shattered entrenched images of the Rehnquist Court. If
in its early years the Rehnquist Court was commonly tasked for its ex-
cessive deference to "majoritarian" decisionmaking,2 the Court in its
2002 Term sweepingly overruled Bowers v. Hardwick3 to invalidate
antisodomy laws in some thirteen states. 4 If in its more recent incar-
nation the Rehnquist Court has been vehemently denounced for its re-
fusal to defer to congressional power, particularly in matters of struc-
ture and federalism, s the Court in this last Term broadly upheld
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1 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 127 (Gaunt 1998)
(1921).
2 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing Constitu-
tion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 46-47 (1989); see also David M. Burke, The "Presumption of Consti-
tutionality" Doctrine and the Rehnquist Court: A Lethal Combination for Individual Liberty, i8
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 73, 77-79 0994) (emphasizing the Rehnquist Court's partiality to ma-
joritarian democracy).
3 478 U.S. i86 (1986).
4 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481, 2484 (2003).
S See, e.g., Louis D. Bilionis, The New Scrutiny, 51 EMORY L.J. 481, 486 (2002) (discussing
the Rehnquist Court's overzealous "endeavors in the name of federalism and limited national
government"); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, ioo MICH. L. REv. 8o, 83
(2001) ("In acting repeatedly to invalidate federal legislation, the Court is using its authority to
diminish the proper role of Congress."); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2ooo Term-
Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 13-14 (2001) (asserting that "this Court sees no
need to accommodate the political branches at all"). For an illuminating account of the "two"
Rehnquist Courts, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Pre-
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Congress's authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
enact the family leave provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act
of 1993 (FMLA).6 If the Rehnquist Court has been relentlessly criti-
cized for its right-wing agenda,7 the Court in its 2002 Term turned un-
expectedly liberal, forcefully approving the authority of universities to
use affirmative action to select their students.
8
What are we to make of this Court? How are we to assemble these
disparate but momentous decisions into a coherent account? One
common theme is that the 2002 Term suggests a serenely confident
Court, unflinchingly facing the most difficult and intractable questions
of American constitutional lawY This confidence has been growing in
recent years. Whether we contemplate the "activism" of Justices who
are intent on "reviving the structural guarantees of dual sovereignty,",' 0
or instead the alleged "arrogance" of Justices who are determined to
liminary Analysis, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 569, 569-70 (2003). The Court's opinions last Term, how-
ever, defy even Merrill's categories, for they are quite activist in the area of "social issues" like af-
firmative action and the right to privacy. Id. at 570.
6 Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1984 (2003) (upholding the FMLA, 29
U.S.C. § 2612(a)(i)(C) (2000)).
7 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Understanding the Rehnquist Court: An Admiring Reply to
Professor Merrill, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 659, 675 (2003) (concluding that "the Rehnquist Court has
had a consistent majority of conservative Justices, and with overwhelming frequency they have
ruled in a conservative direction").
8 Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003). As reported by Neil A. Lewis, the Court's
decision in Lawrence also angered conservatives:
Some social conservatives expressed white-hot fury today over the Supreme Court's 6-
to-3 ruling striking down a Texas sodomy law and expanding the rights of gay men and
lesbians.
"This has not been a good week for social conservatives," said Jay A. Sekulow, the
legal director of the American Center for Law and Justice, a conservative legal advocacy
group founded by Pat Robertson.
"Both the affirmative action and the gay rights decision reflect a political approach
to the law that we deplore," Mr. Sekulow said ....
Neil A. Lewis, Conservatives Furious Over Court's Direction, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2003, at Ai9.
Charles Lane reported a similar reaction:
[T]he affirmative action and gay rights cases set the tone, and the disappointment at
those rulings among conservatives was palpable - comparable, in its own way, to the
disgust liberals expressed with the [Clourt after Bush v. Gore. The [C]ourt's self-
conscious effort to incorporate modern attitudes on race and sexuality into constitutional
doctrine was, to the right, an unpardonable display of judicial activism.
Charles Lane, Minority Rights Were Term's Big Winner, WASH. POST, June 29, 2003, at Ai.
9 On the self-confidence of the Court, see Laurence H. Tribe, Erog v. Hsub and Its Disguises:
Freeing Bush v. Gorefrom its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170, 288 (2001). Tribe notes
that "[tihe Court's self-confidence in matters constitutional is matched only by its disdain for the
meaningful participation of other actors in constitutional debate." Id.; see also Linda Greenhouse,
In a Momentous Term, Justices Remake the Law, and the Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2003, at Ai
("It is a court that in recent years has displayed a notable institutional self-confidence, striking
down federal statutes at near-record rates.").
10 Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3 d 82o, 893 (4 th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(Wilkinson, C.J., concurring), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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safeguard traditional civil rights and liberties,1 I we find a Court that
may vigorously divide on how and when to exercise the authority of
judicial review, but that no longer seems to question the prerogatives
of that authority as such. In future years this attitude will likely come
to be exemplified by Bush v. Gore,12 a "swaggeringly confident"1 3 deci-
sion reflecting an institution unequivocally embracing its mission to
withdraw "some issues from the battleground of power politics to the
forum of principle.' 4 For those who had in years past urged the War-
ren Court uncompromisingly to extend law's empire, this self-
assurance has produced an unexpectedly bittersweet triumph.1 5
One possible source of the Rehnquist Court's deep confidence is its
announced view of the nature of constitutional law. When judges
invalidate official state action as unconstitutional, they do not function
as "a small group of fortunately situated people with a roving commis-
sion to second-guess Congress, state legislatures, and state and federal
administrative officers concerning what is best for the country.' 6 In-
stead they exercise the authority that has been assigned them to pro-
nounce the law of the Constitution. 7 To the extent that a court under-
11 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 348 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
13 Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE
SUPREME COURT 55, 57 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001).
14 RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 71 (I985).
15 For an insightful account of how the contemporary Court's confidence draws on liberal de-
fenses of the Warren Court, see LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 370-74, on
file with the Harvard Law School Library). Whether the Rehnquist Court is actually more self-
assured than its predecessors, and whether it performs the practice of judicial review in a differ-
ent way than did the Warren or Burger Courts, are fine and complicated questions, but I shall not
address them here. Most analysis of the Rehnquist Court focuses on the many ways in which it
has altered the substantive law of its predecessors, see, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson,
Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV 1045, 1052-56 (2001), rather than on
its methodological practice. But see Larry D. Kramer, No Surprise. It's an Activist Court., N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 2ooo, at A33 ("[C]onservative judicial activism is the order of the day. The War-
ren Court was retiring compared to the present one."); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three
Rule: Reviving Consensus and Deference on the Supreme Court, 37 GA. L. REV 893, 893 (2003)
("Over the past eight years, the Rehnquist Court has waged an activist revolution that is unprece-
dented both in scope and in conflict. Before 1995, the Supreme Court struck down acts of Con-
gress 134 times. Since 1995, the Court has struck down thirty-three more (one-quarter of the pre-
1995 total)." (footnotes omitted)). Analysis of whether the Rehnquist Court in fact practices judi-
cial review in a different way than its predecessors would no doubt have to consider various
structural and sociological factors, such as the proliferation and routinization of federal law, the
bureaucratization of the federal judiciary, and the Court's high approval ratings (especially when
compared to Congress). On the last factor, see Humphrey Taylor, Confidence in Leadership of
Nation's Institutions Slips a Little but Remains Relatively High, THE HARRIS POLL #9 (Feb. 7,
2001), at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris-poll/printerfriend/index.asp?PID=2 I9.
16 William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV 693, 698
(1976).
17 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
[Vol. 117:4
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stands this law as categorically autonomous from the beliefs and val-
ues of nonjudicial actors, it will deploy its authority with the ease of
exclusive prerogative. But to the extent that a court views the sub-
stance of constitutional law as in part dependent upon the outlook of
nonjudicial actors, it will exercise what Felix Frankfurter once called
the "awesome power" '' of judicial review with some attention to the
understandings of those actors.
James B. Thayer, for example, saw this point very clearly. He ar-
gued early on that congressional "determinations" were "entitled to
... respect ... on very solid and significant grounds of policy and
law," because the Constitution gives to Congress the "power, not
merely of enacting laws, but of putting an interpretation on the consti-
tution which shall deeply affect the whole country, enter into, vitally
change, even revolutionize the most serious affairs, except as some in-
dividual may find it for his private interest to carry the matter into
court."1 9  In essence Thayer conceptualized constitutional law as in
part made up of the judgments of Congress,2 0 so that judicial review
on the basis of that law "touches the region of political administration,
and is qualified by the necessities and proprieties of administration."2
For that reason, Thayer argued, the Court should think long and hard
before constructing constitutional law in ways that override the consti-
tutional beliefs of Congress. 22
The Rehnquist Court has announced that it conceives constitu-
tional law very differently than did Thayer. In an important series of
recent decisions, the Rehnquist Court has refused to allow Congress to
interpret the Constitution pursuant to its power to enforce constitu-
tional provisions under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, on
the ground that any such interpretation would threaten the "cardinal
rule of constitutional law" that "ever since Marbury this Court has re-
mained the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text. '23  Whereas
Thayer conceptualized congressional constitutional interpretation as
fundamental and pervasive, the Rehnquist Court has repudiated it as
a danger to the rule of law. This condemnation ultimately rests on the
18 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 128 (i958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
19 James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARV. L. REV. 129, 136 (0893).
20 For a modern commentator taking a similar position, see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING
207-28 ('999).
21 Thayer, supra note ig, at I52.
22 Thayer argued that because judicial review takes "a part... in the political conduct of gov-
ernment," judges "must apply methods and principles that befit their task." Id. "In such a work
there can be no permanent or fitting modus vivendi between the different departments unless
each is sure of the full co-operation of the others, so long as its own action conforms to any rea-
sonable and fairly permissible view of its constitutional power." Id.
23 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000).
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premise that constitutional law is and ought to be autonomous from
the beliefs and values of nonjudicial actors, a premise that could well
contribute to the eerie confidence so characteristic of the Rehnquist
Court.
In this Foreword I shall examine in detail three major cases from
the 2002 Term - Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,24
Grutter v. Bollinger,2s and Lawrence v. Texas26 - to explore the vari-
ous ways in which constitutional law is and is not independent from
the beliefs and values of nonjudicial actors. When I use the term
"constitutional law," I shall be referring to constitutional law as it is
made from the perspective of the judiciary. I shall use the term "cul-
ture" to refer to the beliefs and values of nonjudicial actors. I employ
these stipulative definitions because they correspond to the way in
which most judges and lawyers naturally conceptualize disputes over
constitutional jurisprudence and authority, and it is my project in
this Foreword to consider carefully the implications of this internal
perspective.27
I shall argue that constitutional law and culture are locked in a dia-
lectical relationship, so that constitutional law both arises from and in
turn regulates culture. Although Rehnquist Court decisions construing
the scope of Section 5 power suppress this relationship, analysis of the
2002 Term will demonstrate that the Court in fact commonly con-
structs constitutional law in the context of an ongoing dialogue with
culture, so that culture is inevitably (and properly) incorporated into
the warp and woof of constitutional law. It follows that to the extent
that the Rehnquist Court actually draws confidence from its an-
nounced belief that constitutional law is autonomous from culture, that
confidence is quite misplaced. Properly read, Hibbs, Grutter, and
Lawrence each reveals a Court that defines the substance of constitu-
tional law in the context of the beliefs and values of nonjudicial actors.
Of course culture comes in a myriad different guises. We can iden-
tify, for example, a specific subset of culture that encompasses extraju-
dicial beliefs about the substance of the Constitution. I shall call this
subset constitutional culture. The boundary between culture and con-
stitutional culture is quite indistinct, because lay persons typically do
24 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003).
25 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
26 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
27 For different purposes I would use different definitions. If I were studying constitutional
law from the perspective of executive or legislative decisionmakers, for example, or if I were writ-
ing a history of American constitutional law, I would most certainly include in my definition of
constitutional law the beliefs, actions, and decisions of nonjudicial actors. If I were writing a his-
tory of American culture, moreover, I would most certainly include the decisions of judges in my
definition of culture. What counts as law or as culture very much depends upon why one is ask-
ing the question.
[VOL. 117:4
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not frame their beliefs in terms that admit of ready classification.
They can fervently believe that the federal government ought to have
plenary power, or that abortion is murder, without ever connecting
these views to a conclusion about the nature of the Constitution. It is
useful to retain the concept of constitutional culture, however, because
the legitimacy of constitutional law depends in part upon what extra-
judicial actors explicitly believe about the Constitution.
The tense but inescapable relationship between constitutional law
and constitutional culture is the theme of Part I of this Foreword,
which discusses Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,2" a
startling and fascinating decision upholding the constitutionality of the
FMLA. Although Hibbs emphatically reaffirms the Court's view that
Congress may not independently interpret the Constitution when en-
acting legislation pursuant to its authority under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment,29 the decision nevertheless discreetly but essen-
tially modifies the Court's own constitutional understandings in order
to align them with constitutional culture.
Hibbs suggests that the Court's claims for the autonomy of consti-
tutional law reveal more about how the Court wants constitutional law
to be regarded than about how constitutional law actually functions.
Because the authority of the Constitution flows both from its status as
our highest law and from its status as the repository of our "fundamen-
tal nature as a people" that "is sacred and demands our respectful ac-
knowledgement, '30 constitutional law always reflects both the specific
professional requirements of the legal system and our constitutional
culture.
With this insight firmly in hand, Part II turns to scrutinize how the
Court constructs the membrane separating constitutional law from
constitutional culture. Normally the Court allows this membrane to
remain quite porous, facilitating a free and continuous exchange be-
tween constitutional law and constitutional culture. Part II illustrates
this process by examining decisions construing the scope of congres-
sional power, focusing particularly on the Court's opinion last Term in
Eldred v. Ashcroft.31  The Court can stiffen the membrane dividing
constitutional law from constitutional culture whenever it perceives
that constitutional culture threatens constitutional values that the
28 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003).
29 Id. at 1977-78.
30 Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 169 (1987).
Pitkin writes that although our Constitution is something that we can make, "how we are able to
constitute ourselves is profoundly tied to how we are already constituted by our own distinctive
history." Id. "Thus," she concludes, "there is a sense ... in which our constitution is sacred and
demands our respectful acknowledgement. If we mistake who we are, our efforts at constitutive
action will fail." Id.
31 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003).
2003]
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Court wishes to protect. This occurs typically, but not exclusively, in
the context of constitutional rights.
Even when safeguarding precious constitutional rights, however,
constitutional law will nevertheless both reflect and regulate constitu-
tional culture, because rights protect constitutional values that are
themselves rooted in constitutional culture. I develop this point in the
context of a detailed consideration of Grutter v. Bollinger,32 a case that
applies "strict scrutiny" to affirmative action programs for student ad-
missions at the University of Michigan. 33 Although Grutter regulates
affirmative action to implement the legal requirements of the Constitu-
tion, the opinion plainly derives its understanding of these require-
ments in part from the constitutional beliefs and values of nonjudicial
actors.
Part III widens the scope of analysis to consider the relationship
between constitutional law and culture. It argues that constitutional
law could not plausibly proceed without incorporating the values and
beliefs of nonjudicial actors. A necessary consequence is that constitu-
tional law will be as dynamic and as contested as the cultural values
and beliefs that inevitably form part of the substance of constitutional
law. Unless the Court were to cease protecting constitutional values
altogether, it cannot avoid entanglement in the "culture wars" that
sometimes sweep the country.34  I discuss the resulting challenges to
the legal authority of the Court in the context of the recent history of
substantive due process doctrine, which was radically revised last
Term in Lawrence.
The Court in Lawrence intervened in an intense national debate
about the regulation of sexual orientation by dramatically overruling
Bowers.3s Because Lawrence embroiled the Court in "the passions of
the day" by adopting the views of one side to this debate, the opinion
is vulnerable to the charge that it is merely an improper effort by the
Court to impose its cultural beliefs on the nation.36 The Court's vul-
nerability is compounded by the genuine uncertainty expressed by
Lawrence about the exact nature of the constitutional values the Court
wishes to protect. Lawrence thus poses the question of how constitu-
tional law can distinguish itself from culture and assume a distinc-
tively legal authority.
32 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
33 Id. at 2337-39.
34 But see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 62o, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I think it no busi-
ness of the courts (as opposed to the political branches) to take sides in this culture war.").
35 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
36 "History teaches that the independence of the judiciary is jeopardized when courts become
embroiled in the passions of the day and assume primary responsibility in choosing between com-
peting political, economic and social pressures." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (I95i)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment).
[VoI. 1 17:4
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If Part II emphasizes the many ways in which constitutional law
depends upon constitutional culture for its orientation and substance,
the discussion of Lawrence in Part III focuses on the opposite phase of
the dialectical relationship between constitutional law and culture. It
explores the dynamic processes by which constitutional law comes into
being as an institutional force capable of regulating culture. It argues
that Lawrence is best interpreted as an opening bid in a conversation
between the Court and the American public. The legal authority of
Lawrence will emerge as that conversation unfolds, both because of
changes in constitutional culture and because of the progressive inte-
gration of Lawrence into the institutional practices of constitutional
adjudication.
Part IV offers brief concluding thoughts. It summarizes the generic
tensions that the Court must characteristically negotiate. The Court
must maintain the distinctly legal authority of constitutional law, and
yet it must also embed constitutional law within the beliefs and values
of nonjudicial actors. To put the point epigrammatically and provoca-
tively, the Court must find a way to articulate constitutional law that
the nation can accept as its own.
If constitutional law emerges from an ongoing dialectic between
constitutional culture and the institutional practices of constitutional
adjudication, it is neither autonomous nor fixed. Judges and lawyers
will continue to appeal to the autonomy of constitutional law, however,
precisely to the extent that they believe that an independent and de-
terminate constitutional law is the necessary foundation for judicial
authority to constrain democratic legislation. That is why the auton-
omy of constitutional law still haunts constitutional jurisprudence,
even though academics have long repudiated it as a descriptively or
theoretically adequate account of our constitutional order. Part IV
concludes by suggesting that judicial authority might best be recon-
ceived as a relationship of trust that courts forge with the American
people. Constitutional law is not the ground of this relationship, but
rather its consequence.
I.
Beginning in 1997 in City of Boerne v. Flores,37 and culminating
last Term in Hibbs,38 the Rehnquist Court has introduced an entirely
new framework for analyzing the scope of Congress's power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment "to enforce, by appropriate
37 521 U.S. 507 (i997).
38 Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003).
2003]
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legislation, the provisions of this article. '39 The essential premise of
this framework is that Congress can enact Section 5 legislation "to en-
force" rights that the judiciary would protect in litigation pursuant to
Section i of the Fourteenth Amendment, 40 but that Congress cannot
use its Section 5 power to enforce Congress's own independent inter-
pretation of Section i. As Hibbs announced last Term, it "falls to this
Court, not Congress, to define the substance of constitutional guaran-
tees,"'4' because "[t]he ultimate interpretation and determination of the
Fourteenth Amendment's substantive meaning remains the province of
the Judicial Branch. '42
I shall call this framework of analysis the "enforcement model. '43
The purpose of the enforcement model is to prevent Congress from
trespassing into the domain of constitutional law. The enforcement
model holds that Congress can use its Section 5 power to create statu-
tory rights which "enforce" constitutional rights that courts are pre-
pared to enforce, but that Congress cannot use its Section 5 power to
enforce constitutional rights that Congress independently believes
merit protection. 44
39 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5. For cases applying this framework, see Board of Trustees of
the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2ooo); Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2ooo); and Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (999).
40 Section i of the Fourteenth Amendment, in its relevant part, provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § i.
41 Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1977. The Court added:
Section 5 legislation reaching beyond the scope of § i's actual guarantees must be an
appropriate remedy for identified constitutional violations, not "an attempt to substan-
tively redefine the States' legal obligations." We distinguish appropriate prophylactic
legislation from "substantive redefinition of the Fourteenth Amendment right at issue,"
by applying the test set forth in City of Boerne: Valid § 5 legislation must exhibit "con-
gruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end."
Id. at 1977-78 (citations omitted) (quoting Kimel, 528 U.S. at 8i, 88; and Boerne, 521 U.S. at 52o).
42 Id. at 1977 (quoting Kimel, 528 U.S. at 8i) (internal quotation marks omitted).
43 Reva Siegel and I use this terminology in Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Con-
stitutionalism and Section Five Power.- Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical
Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1946, 1952-66 (2003) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Legislative Consti-
tutionalism].
44 Reva Siegel and I have introduced the following nomenclature, which is designed to sim-
plify discussion of these questions. We use the term "R," to represent rights contained in Section 5
legislation; "Rj" to represent constitutional rights that a court would enforce in adjudication to
implement Section i of the Fourteenth Amendment; and "R," to represent constitutional rights
that Congress independently believes merit legal protection. Using this terminology, the enforce-
ment model can be succinctly summarized to provide that Congress can enact R, to enforce Rj,
but not to enforce R,. Id. at 1953-54.
[Vol. 117:4
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The Court offers a potentially generous account of the power to
"enforce," holding that Congress can use its Section 5 power to create
statutory rights that remedy the present effects of past violations of ju-
dicially enforceable rights, or that prophylactically prevent present or
future violations of such rights. 45 But the Court insists that Section 5
empowers Congress only to enact legislation that is theoretically expli-
cable in terms of rights protected in constitutional adjudication. Con-
gress cannot use its Section 5 power to enforce its own interpretation
of the Constitution. Ultimately the enforcement model expresses the
Rehnquist Court's belief that constitutional law must be strictly sepa-
rated from constitutional culture.
The Rehnquist Court has created two doctrinal tests designed to
"distinguish appropriate prophylactic legislation from 'substantive re-
definition of the Fourteenth Amendment right at issue.' ' 46 The first,
articulated two Terms ago in Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama v. Garrett,47 is that Congress cannot enact Section 5 legisla-
tion unless it has first "identified a history and pattern of unconstitu-
tional ... state transgressions. '48  I shall refer to this as the Garrett re-
quirement. It holds that a prerequisite of Section 5 power is a
documented record of state violations of judicially protected rights.
The second test, first articulated in 1997 in Boerne, is that Section 5
legislation must be congruent and proportional to rights that a court
would protect in constitutional adjudication. 49  "Lacking such a con-
nection," the Court fears, "legislation may become substantive in op-
eration and effect. °50 In the years since Boerne the Court has applied
these tests with devastating effect, closely binding Congress's Section 5
power to the Court's interpretations of Section I.51
At issue in Hibbs was a private action for damages against the
State of Nevada to enforce the family leave provisions of the FMLA.
5 2
45 See id. at i96o-64. Reva Siegel and I term these justifications for Rs, respectively, the "re-
medial" principle and the "prophylactic" principle. The Court is even prepared to permit Con-
gress to use its Section 5 power to enact R s that congressional factfinding establishes are equiva-
lent to R. Siegel and I call this justification for R, the "identity" principle. Id. at 1961.
46 Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1977-78 (quoting Kimel, 528 U.S. at 8i).
47 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
48 Id. at 368.
49 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) ("There must be a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedies and the means adopted to that
end.").
50 Id.
51 Several cases are especially noteworthy in this regard. See Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)
(preventing Congress from using its Section 5 power to remedy disability discrimination); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (preventing Congress from using its Section 5 power to
regulate nonstate actors); Kimel, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (preventing Congress from using its Section 5
power to remedy age discrimination).
52 The plaintiff in the case had sued the state of Nevada for alleged violations of 29 U.S.C.
§ 2612(a)(i)(C) (2000), which provides that "an eligible employee shall be entitled to a total of 12
2003]
HeinOnline -- 117 Harv. L. Rev. 13 2003-2004
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
These provisions require employers, including states, to provide eligi-
ble employees with up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave in order to care
for ill family members. 53 In past decisions the Court has held that the
Eleventh Amendment prohibits Congress from authorizing private
damage actions against unconsenting states except when Congress is
legislating pursuant to its powers under the enforcement clauses of the
Reconstruction Amendments, like Section 5.54 Nevada sought to de-
fend against the action by invoking its Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity, even though Congress had explicitly invoked its authority under
Section 5 in enacting the FMLA. 55 Nevada accordingly argued that
the family leave provisions of the FMLA were beyond the Section 5
power of Congress.
5 6
The Court in Hibbs analyzed the case within the framework of the
enforcement model, reasoning that "Section 5 legislation must be an
appropriate remedy for identified constitutional violations, not 'an at-
tempt to substantively redefine the States' legal obligations.' '5 The
opinion applied both the Garrett requirement and the congruence and
proportionality test of Boerne. It stated that Congress can use its Sec-
tion 5 power only if it first "show[s] a pattern of state constitutional
violations, '58 and that Section 5 legislation must exhibit "congruence
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied
and the means adopted to that end. '5 9
In a six to three decision authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Hibbs held that the family leave provisions of the FMLA were "con-
gruent and proportional to [their] remedial object," and that they could
"be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitu-
tional behavior. '60  The holding was unanticipated, because in the
workweeks of leave during any i2-month period ... [i]n order to care for the spouse, or a son,
daughter, or parent, of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health
condition." Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1976 (2003).
53 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(i)(C).
54 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 7o6, 756 (1999) (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445
(1976)). Section 5 power has thus become the boundary of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The
scope of Section 5 power is also important because it offers an alternate source of authority for
federal civil rights legislation as the Court cuts back on the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause
power. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (i995).
55 See 29 U.S.C. § 26oi(b) (2000); S. REP. No. 103-3, at 16 (1993) ("[Section 5 of the FMLA] is
based not only on the Commerce Clause, but also on the guarantees of equal protection and due
process embodied in the I 4 th Amendment."); H.R. REP. No. 103-8, pt. I, at 29 (1993).
56 See Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1977.
57 Id. (quoting Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2ooo)). By "constitutional
violations," the Court means violations that a court will remedy in litigation (R).
58 Id. at 1982.
59 Id. at 1978 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 52i U.S. 507, 520 (I997)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
60 Id. at 1984 (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532) (internal quotation marks omitted). Hibbs is
ambiguous concerning exactly how the FMLA relates to violations of Rj. Under the prophylactic
[Vol. 117:4
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years since Boerne the Court had invalidated every exercise of Section
5 power that it had confronted. 61 Indeed, in the 2oo0 Term Rehnquist
had authored the Court's opinion in Board of Trustees of the Univer-
sity of Alabama v. Garrett6 2 holding that Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 199o (ADA) 63 was not a proper exercise of Section 5
power, even though Congress had compiled an extensive record of dis-
crimination against the disabled. 64
Garrett scrutinized the legislative history of the ADA and pro-
nounced it inadequate to justify Section 5 legislation, despite the fact
that Congress had enacted the ADA only after it had "compiled a vast
legislative record documenting 'massive, society-wide discrimination'
against persons with disabilities. '65 Congress had held thirteen sepa-
rate congressional hearings and created a special task force that "held
principle, see supra note 45 and accompanying text, the FMLA would be valid Section S legisla-
tion if it were justified as required to prevent present or future violations of R, which are con-
ceived as sex-based discriminations in the provision of family leave. Most of the time, Hibbs rea-
sons within the framework of the prophylactic principle. It argues that the FMLA is necessary
"to protect the right to be free from gender-based discrimination in the workplace." Hibbs, 123 S.
Ct. at 1978; see also id. at 1979 ("[Tlhe persistence of such unconstitutional discrimination by the
States justifies Congress' passage of prophylactic § 5 legislation."). At other times, however,
Hibbs gestures toward the remedial principle, see supra note 45 and accompanying text, noting
that the sex-neutral requirements of the FMLA are necessary "to combat the stereotypes about the
roles of male and female employees" that are the legacy of past constitutional violations. Hibbs,
123 S. Ct. at 1981; see also id. ("Congress was justified in enacting the FMLA as remedial legisla-
tion."); id. at 1981 n.io ("Congress sought to adjust family leave policies in order to eliminate their
reliance on and perpetuation of invalid stereotypes, and thereby dismantle persisting gender-based
barriers to the hiring, retention, and promotion of women in the workplace."). When reasoning
from the remedial principle, Hibbs justifies the FMLA as valid Section 5 legislation on the ground
that it is required to eliminate the present effects of past violations of R, which are conceived as
prior sex-based discriminations in the provision of family leave.
61 See supra note 51 and accompanying text; Greenhouse, supra note 9, at Ai8 ("[Hibbs was]
an unexpected turn in the court's federalism revolution.").
62 531 U.S. 356 (2ooi).
63 Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (I99O) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,soi-
12,213) (2ooo)). Title I prohibits states from discriminating against persons with disabilities in the
employment context.
64 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374. On the Court's treatment of congressional evidence in Garrett,
see Pamela Brandwein, Constitutional Doctrine as Paring Tool: The Struggle for "Relevant" Evi-
dence in University of Alabama v. Garrett, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 37, 56-57 (2002); Judith
Olans Brown & Wendy E. Parmet, The Imperial Sovereign: Sovereign Immunity and the ADA, 35
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM I, 13 (2002); and David S. Day, Essay, New Dimensions of the Section 5
Enforcement Power, 47 S.D. L. REV 366, 38o (2002). See also Melissa Hart, Conflating Scope of
Right with Standard of Review: The Supreme Court's "Strict Scrutiny" of Congressional Efforts
To Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 VILL. L. REV. io9i, i1o nn.55-56 (2oo1). Hart
writes: "The Court's aggressive re-evaluation of the legislative record is remarkable. By discount-
ing the legislative fact-finding and by calling it 'out-of-context,' the Court seems to suggest that
even the institutional benefits of Congress as a fact-finder are irrelevant to its analysis." Id. at
iioi n.55.
65 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 377 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting S. REP. No. ios-ii6, at 8-9 (1989)
(quoting testimony of Justin Dart, chairperson of the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment
of Americans with Disabilities)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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hearings in every State, attended by more than 30,000 people, includ-
ing thousands who had experienced discrimination first hand. '66 The
Court in Garrett unsympathetically sifted through this mountain of
evidence and concluded that it contained only "half a dozen examples"
of unconstitutional state discrimination against disabled persons.
67
The legislative record of "unconstitutional behavior" documented
by Congress before enacting the FMLA, by contrast, was far weaker.68
It consisted chiefly of evidence suggesting that states granted maternity
leave far more generously than they granted paternity leave, 6 9 and two
scraps of general testimony to the effect that in both public and pri-
vate sectors parental leave tended to be distributed unequally between
the sexes. 70 Not only did the Court make no effort to demonstrate that
these inequalities were unconstitutional, 7' but the evidence entirely
concerned sex discrimination in the provision of parental and mater-
nity leave, so that there was no evidence whatever of constitutional
violations in the provision of the kind of leave to care for sick family
members specifically at issue in Hibbs.72  Measured by the standards
applied by Rehnquist in Garrett, the legislative record in Hibbs was
virtually barren of specific allegations or examples of relevant uncon-
stitutional state discrimination.
In Hibbs, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist was undeterred by the
weakness of the legislative record. He explained that whereas the
ADA had sought to remedy disability discrimination, which in Four-
teenth Amendment litigation merits only rational basis review, 73 the
FMLA sought instead to prevent gender discrimination,7 4 which in
Fourteenth Amendment litigation "triggers a heightened level of scru-
tiny.175 "Because the standard for demonstrating the constitutionality
of a gender-based classification is more difficult to meet than our ra-
tional-basis test[,] ... it was easier for Congress to show a pattern of
66 Id.; see also TASK FORCE ON THE RIGHTS AND EMPOWERMENT OF AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES, FROM ADA TO EMPOWERMENT i6 (Oct. 12, 1990).
67 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369.
68 In his Hibbs dissent, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, Justice Kennedy ruthlessly at-
tacks Rehnquist's conclusion that the legislative record of the FMLA meets the Garrett require-
ment. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1987-90 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dis-
senting).
69 See Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1979.
70 See id. at i988 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
71 For a powerful doctrinal argument that they were in fact constitutional, see id. at 199o-9i;
and infra note 99.
72 See supra pp. 13-14. For a distinction among the different kinds of leave authorized by the
FMLA, see 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(i) (2000).
73 For a discussion of Garrett's appeal to rational basis review, see Robert C. Post & Reva B.
Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five
Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 3-I2 (2003) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Protecting the Constitution].
74 See supra note 6o and accompanying text.
75 Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1982.
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state constitutional violations. ' '76 The logic of Hibbs thus reflects the
premise of the enforcement model. Hibbs reasoned that Congress can
more easily demonstrate the existence of unconstitutional gender dis-
crimination because the Court, in its own Section i jurisprudence, pre-
sumes that gender-based classifications are unconstitutional. 77
Hibbs is truly startling, however, for a second and ultimately less
easily explicable reason. The opinion offers an extraordinarily gener-
ous account of the constitutional harm of sex discrimination, which it
locates in "firmly rooted" "stereotype-based beliefs about the allocation
of family duties" s78 that operate to the disadvantage of women in
"situations in which work and family responsibilities conflict. '79 Hibbs
holds that in enacting the FMLA Congress properly sought "to adjust
family leave policies in order to eliminate their reliance on and per-
petuation of invalid stereotypes, and thereby dismantle persisting gen-
der-based barriers to the hiring, retention, and promotion of women in
the workplace."' 0 This conception of the relevant constitutional viola-
tion is quite distant from narrower formulations, which the Court
tends to use in Section i litigation, and which associate the constitu-
tional prohibition of sex discrimination either with explicit classifica-
tions based upon sex or with neutral government actions taken "'be-
cause of,' not merely 'in spite of,' [their] adverse effects upon"
women.8 ' Although Hibbs refers time and again to the pervasive
76 Id. I should note that Rehnquist's argument is slightly misleading, because sex-based dis-
crimination is not "easier" to demonstrate in the context of discrimination that is facially neutral,
see, e.g., Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-72 (I979), and yet Rehnquist seeks to demon-
strate that Congress has met the Garrett requirement in part because "Congress had evidence
that, even where state laws and policies were not facially discriminatory, they were applied in dis-
criminatory ways." Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at i98o.
77 The Court has held that in litigation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, classifications
based upon sex are to receive elevated scrutiny because "[r]ather than resting on meaningful con-
siderations, statutes distributing benefits and burdens between the sexes in different ways very
likely reflect outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men and women." City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985); see also Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1979 ("The
long and extensive history of sex discrimination prompted us to hold that measures that differen-
tiate on the basis of gender warrant heightened scrutiny .... ). This assumption of widespread
gender stereotyping surely underlies the ease with which Hibbs is prepared to accept the claim
that the FMLA properly addresses "a 'difficult and intractable proble[m],"' manifested by "subtle
discrimination that may be difficult to detect on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 1982 (alteration in
original) (quoting Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000)).
78 Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1979.
79 Id. at 1979 n.5.
80 Id. at 1981 n.io; see also id. at 1981 (noting that Congress sought to "combat the stereotypes
about the roles of male and female employees"). Hibbs explicitly held that the elimination of such
stereotypes represents "a 'difficult and intractable proble[m]."' Id. at 1982 (alteration in original)
(quoting Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88).
81 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279. This very Term the Court has reiterated that "[w]e have made
clear that '[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required' to show a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause." City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 123 S. Ct.
2003]
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harms of sex stereotyping, it never demonstrates a pattern of vio-lations that a court would find violates Section i of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The view of sex discrimination advanced by Hibbs is particularly
unexpected because Rehnquist had previously authored opinions for
the Court upholding legislation embodying sex stereotypes in the con-
text of statutory rape82 and of the military draft.83 As a young Assis-
tant Attorney General in the Justice Department, Rehnquist had even
expressed reservations about some supporters of the Equal RightsAmendment (ERA) because of their "dislike and distaste for the tradi-
tional difference between men and women in the family unit. '8 4  Of
1389, 1394 (2003) (second alteration in original) (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265, (i977) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.229, 239 0976))). Hence the puzzlement in Justice Kennedy's dissent:
Considered in its entirety, the evidence fails to document a pattern of unconstitu-tional conduct sufficient to justify the abrogation of States' sovereign immunity. Thefew incidents identified by the Court "fall far short of even suggesting the pattern of un-
constitutional discrimination on which § 5 legislation must be based."...Our concern with gender discrimination, which is subjected to heightened scrutiny,
as opposed to age- or disability-based distinctions, which are reviewed under rational
standard, does not alter this conclusion. The application of heightened scrutiny is de-
signed to ensure gender-based classifications are not based on the entrenched and perva-
sive stereotypes which inhibit women's progress in the workplace. This considerationdoes not divest respondents of their burden to show that "Congress identified a history
and pattern of unconstitutional employment discrimination by the States."... Given theinsufficiency of the evidence that States discriminated in the provision of family leave,the unfortunate fact that stereotypes about women continue to be a serious and perva-
sive social problem would not alone support the charge that a State has engaged in apractice designed to deny its citizens the equal protection of the laws.
The paucity of evidence to support the case the Court tries to make demonstrates
that Congress was not responding with a congruent and proportional remedy to a per-
ceived course of unconstitutional conduct. Instead, it enacted a substantive entitlement
program of its own.
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1991-92 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
82 See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 471-73 (198i) (plurality opinion) (holdingthat a statutory rape law that applies only when the victim is female does not violate the EqualProtection Clause because "[o]nly women may become pregnant, and they suffer disproportion-
ately the profound physical, emotional, and psychological consequences of sexual activity").
83 See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 82-83 (i98i) (holding that an act authorizing thePresident to require men, but not women, to register for a military service draft does not violate
the Fifth Amendment).
84 Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, to Leonard Garment, Special Consultant to the President, reprinted in Rehnquist: ERAWould Threaten Family Unit, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 15, x986, at 4. Rehnquist noted:I cannot help thinking that there is also present somewhere within this movement a vir-tually fanatical desire to obscure not only legal differentiation between men and women,but insofar as possible, physical distinctions between the sexes. I think there are over-tones of dislike and distaste for the traditional difference between men and women in
the family unit, and in some cases very probably a complete rejection of the woman's
traditionally different role in this regard.
Id. Rehnquist warned that the ERA itself threatened the transformation of "holy wedlock" into
"holy deadlock," in part because of its potentially "adverse effect on the family unit as we have
known it." Id.
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course it is possible that in recent years Rehnquist may have funda-
mentally altered his view of sex discrimination, 8s but a more plausible
explanation of Hibbs is that Rehnquist was concerned to write the
opinion in a way that would avoid a major constitutional controversy
over the constitutional status of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,86 which prohibits sex discrimination and which Congress used
its Section 5 power to apply to the states in the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 (EEOA).87
The Court well appreciated at the time it was considering Hibbs
that its decision would have important implications for the constitu-
tionality of the EEOA. 8s If the Court were to decide Hibbs by using
the same harsh doctrinal tests that it had applied in Garrett to con-
clude that Title I of the ADA was not within the Section 5 authority of
Congress, 9 it is likely that important provisions of Title VII would be
struck down as beyond Congress's Section 5 power.
Title VII, for example, prohibits certain facially neutral govern-
ment regulations that have a "disparate impact" on women, 90 even
On the other side of the ledger, it is also appropriate to note that Rehnquist did testify on
behalf of the Nixon administration in favor of the ERA, albeit with a noticeable degree of am-
bivalence. Equal Rights for Men and Women 197r: Hearings on H.J. Res. 35, 208, and Related
Bills and H.R. 916 and Related Bills Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 92d Cong. 324 (1971) (statement of William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, Office
of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice); see also Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutional-
ism, supra note 43, at 1992 n.146.
85 Evidence exists for and against this hypothesis. See Linda Greenhouse, Evolving Opinions:
Heartfelt Words From the Rehnquist Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2003, § 4, at 3 ("And what of
[C]hief [Jiustice Rehnquist's solicitude for the usefulness of the Family and Medical Leave Act in
erasing the 'pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family members is women's work'? His
daughter, Janet, is a single mother who until recently held a high-pressure job and sometimes had
child-care problems. Several times this term, the 78-year-old Chief Justice of the United States
left work early to pick up his granddaughters from school. Not evolution, perhaps, but life.").
Compare United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 558, 565-66 (j996) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)
(concluding that Virginia's maintenance of an all-male military academy violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, although suggesting that integration was unnecessary if an equivalent female
academy was created), with Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 59-60, 73 (2001) (joining Justice Ken-
nedy's majority opinion upholding a statute that makes it easier for a child born overseas, out of
wedlock, and with only one parent who is a U.S. national, to gain U.S. citizenship if the mother is
a citizen than if the father is a citizen).
86 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe (2000).
87 Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103, 103 (1972). The constitutionality of the EEOA was
upheld in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 447-48, 453 n.9 (1976).
88 The relationship between the FMLA and Title VII virtually dominated the oral argument of
Hibbs. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct.
1972 (2003) (No. 01-1368), available in 2003 U.S. TRANS LEXIS, at *10-20 (Jan 15, 2003) (dis-
cussing whether Nevada's position was consistent with the constitutionality of Title VII).
89 Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368, 374 (200).
90 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(k)(i)(A) (2000). Congress codified the disparate impact standard in the
Civil Rights Act of I99I, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074-75, which was meant to re-
verse the Court's interpretation of Title VII in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642,
659-6o (1989). See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 5o DUKE L.J. i215,
2003]
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though the Court has held that in constitutional adjudication such
neutral regulations are legitimate unless they are motivated by a dis-
criminatory purpose. 91 Whereas the Court has held that classifications
based upon pregnancy are not classifications based upon sex for pur-
poses of judicial enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause, 92 Con-
gress in 1978 enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), 93
which provides that discrimination based upon pregnancy is prohib-
ited discrimination based upon sex for purposes of Title VII. 9 4 Neither
in its enactment of Title VII in 1964, nor in its enactment of the EEOA
in 1972, did Congress document "a history and pattern of unconstitu-
tional ... state transgressions '95  in a manner that would
1238-39 (2001); Serena J. Hoy, Interpreting Equal Protection: Congress, the Court, and the Civil
Rights Acts, 16 J.L. & POL. 381, 387 (2ooo). For a general discussion of the relationship between
Congress's Section 5 power and civil rights statutes that prohibit disparate impact, see Robert C.
Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After
Morrison and Kimel, i1o YALE L.J. 441, 468-73 (2ooo) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Equal Protec-
tion by Law].
91 See Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979) (citing Swan v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education, 402 U.S. i, 16 (197)); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). On the
disparity between Title VII and judicially enforced constitutional standards, see Nanda v. Board
of Trustees, 303 F.3 d 817, 828-31 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Employment Discrimination Litigation
Against Alabama, 198 F.3d 1305, 1319-22 (iith Cir. 1999); John Alan Doran & Christopher Mi-
chael Mason, Disproportionate Incongruity: State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federal
Employment Discrimination Law, 2003 L. REV MICH. ST. U. DETROIT C.L. i, 31-36; Roger C.
Hartley, Enforcing Federal Civil Rights Against Public Entities After Garrett, 28 J.C. & U.L. 41,
86-89 (2001); John Arthur Laufer, Note, Alexander v. Sandoval and Its Implications for Disparate
Impact Regimes, 1o2 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1641-58 (2002).
92 Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974); see also Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 271 (I993).
93 Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076, 2076 (978).
94 Id. Congress passed the PDA to overrule the Court's conclusion in General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136-37 (976), that the constitutional reasoning of Geduldig should apply to
Title VII. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 670 (1983).
Because the Court has already upheld Congress's Section 5 power to apply Title VII to the states,
see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976), the PDA is now enforceable against states even
though it was explicitly enacted to create a different and more encompassing rule of sex discrimi-
nation than that currently articulated by the Court in litigation to enforce the Equal Protection
Clause. On the resulting tension, see Doran & Mason, supra note 91, at 41-43; and Hartley, supra
note 91, at 88-89.
95 Bd. ofIrs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001). Although Title VII was based on Congress's
Section 5 power as well as on its commerce power, see Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1964), its prohibition of discrimination based upon sex was added at
the last moment without a legislative record of any kind. See County of Washington v. Gunther,
452 U.S. 161, 19o n.4 (I98i) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA
WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE 115-6 (,985). Congress's extension of Title VII to the
states in 1972, see supra p. i9, also lacked the specific findings required by Garrett. Both the
House Committee on Education and Labor and the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Wel-
fare issued reports addressing the extension of Title VII to state and local government employers
under the EEOA. In urging passage of the Act, both Committees cited the Civil Rights Commis-
sion's 1969 report, For All the People .. .By All the People, for evidence of racial discrimination
[V61. 117:4
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satisfy the Garrett requirement. 96
There are many indications that Rehnquist crafted the Hibbs opin-
ion precisely to foreclose these challenges to Title VII. Rehnquist's dif-
fuse definition of the constitutional harm of sex discrimination, which
focuses on policies that incorporate and perpetuate "invalid stereo-
types" and that create "gender-based barriers to the hiring, retention,
and promotion of women in the workplace," 97 blurs the constitutional
distinction between intentional discrimination and facially neutral
government regulations that have a disparate impact on women. 98
Rehnquist goes out of his way to characterize the PDA as an unsuc-
cessful effort "to address" the "problem" of "mutually reinforcing
stereotypes" that cause "subtle discrimination that may be diffi-
cult to detect on a case-by-case basis."99  Rehnquist pointedly
in state and local government employment. See H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 17-19 (971); S. REP
NO. 91-1137, at 7-8 (197o). But neither report cites specific evidence of states discriminating
against women. Whenever employment discrimination against women was addressed - both in
the Committee reports and in floor debates - aggregate national statistics were used. See, e.g.,
H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 4-5 (1971); S. REP. No. 91-1137, at 5-6 (1970); 117 CONG. REC. 31,96o,
31,975 (197I).
96 Thus a month after the Hibbs decision, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled
that Title VII's prohibition of discrimination on the basis of religion was not a valid exercise of
Section 5 authority. Endres v. Ind. State Police, 334 F.3 d 618, 628-30 (7th Cir. 2003). The Court
of Appeals argued:
[Whereas Hibbs had] stressed that, before enacting the FMLA, Congress had compiled a
record of subtle sex discrimination reflected in employers' leave policies[, b]efore enact-
ing Title VII, Congress had not compiled such a record of subtle discrimination against
religious practices. In 1964 the legislature concentrated on race discrimination; religion
and sex were afterthoughts. There was no legislative record at all in the Senate, where
the bill was not referred to committee, lest it be bottled up by opponents.
Id. at 629.
97 Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1981 n.io (2003); see also supra note 80
and accompanying text.
98 Hence Justice Kennedy's frustration in dissent:
Even if there were evidence that individual state employers, in the absence of clear
statutory guidelines, discriminated in the administration of leave benefits, this circum-
stance alone would not support a finding of a state-sponsored pattern of discrimination.
The evidence could perhaps support the charge of disparate impact, but not a charge
that States have engaged in a pattern of intentional discrimination prohibited by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1989 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372-73 (citing Wash-
ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976))).
99 Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1982. The passage reads:
Stereotypes about women's domestic roles are reinforced by parallel stereotypes
presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for men. Because employers continued to
regard the family as the woman's domain, they often denied men similar accommoda-
tions or discouraged them from taking leave. These mutually reinforcing stereotypes
created a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination that forced women to continue to assume
the role of primary family caregiver, and fostered employers' stereotypical views about
women's commitment to work and their value as employees. Those perceptions, in turn,
Congress reasoned, lead to subtle discrimination that may be difficult to detect on a
case-by-case basis.
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describes Title VII as an effort to respond to a long and uncontrover-
sially documented history of official sex discrimination:
The history of the many state laws limiting women's employment op-
portunities is chronicled in - and, until relatively recently, was sanctioned
by - this Court's own opinions.... Congress responded to this history of
discrimination by abrogating States' sovereign immunity in Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, . . . and we sustained this abrogation in Fitz-
patrick. But state gender discrimination did not cease. "[I]t can hardly be
doubted that ... women still face pervasive, although at times more sub-
tle, discrimination ... in the job market." . . . The long and extensive his-
tory of sex discrimination prompted us to hold that measures that differen-
tiate on the basis of gender warrant heightened scrutiny; here, as in
Fitzpatrick, the persistence of such unconstitutional discrimination by the
States justifies Congress' passage of prophylactic § 5 legislation.10 0
If the "pervasive" fact of sex discrimination means that state constitu-
tional violations "can hardly be doubted," then Hibbs simultaneous-
ly vindicates both the FMLA and Title VII as proper Section 5
legislation.
It is clear that the Court would provoke a major political confron-
tation were it to hold that the application of important aspects of Title
We believe that Congress' chosen remedy, the family-care leave provision of the
FMLA, is "congruent and proportional to the targeted violation," Garrett, [531 U.S.] at
374. Congress had already tried unsuccessfully to address this problem through Title
VII and the amendment of Title VII by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2oooe(k). Here, as in Katzenbach, Congress again confronted a "difficult and intracta-
ble proble[m]," [Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000)], where previous leg-
islative attempts had failed. [See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313
(1966)] (upholding the Voting Rights Act). Such problems may justify added prophylac-
tic measures in response. Kimel, [528 U.S.] at 88.
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1982 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted).
Justice Kennedy, by contrast, was concerned to insist that "[o]ur cases make clear that a
State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause by granting pregnancy disability leave to
women without providing for a grant of parenting leave to men." Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 199o (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy therefore discounted most of the Court's evidence of state
constitutional violations, observing that they merely reflected differential treatment based upon
pregnancy. Id. Justice Kennedy argued, for example:
The Court treats the pregnancy disability scheme of . .. Louisiana ... [as] a disguised
gender-discriminatory provision of parenting leave because the scheme would permit
leave in excess of the period Congress believed to be medically necessary for pregnancy
disability. The Louisiana statute, however, granted leave only for "that period during
which the female employee is disabled on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions." [LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:ioo8(A)(2)(b) (West Supp. 1993) (re-
pealed 1997)]. Properly administered, the scheme, despite its generous maximum, would
not transform into a discriminatory "4-month maternity leave for female employees
only."
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at i99o (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
100 Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 5978-79 (citations omitted) (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 686 0973)).
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VII to states was an illegitimate exercise of Section 5 authority.'0 1 In
,the years since Boerne the Court has used its new enforcement model
of Section 5 power primarily to invalidate statutes of relatively low po-
litical salience.10 2 The nation's conviction that an essential mission of
the federal government is the prevention of racial and gender dis-
crimination is an enduring legacy of the civil rights revolution of the
I96Os and of the feminist transformation of the 1970s. 1° 3 This convic-
tion would be forcefully challenged were the Court to hold that impor-
tant dimensions of Title VII were beyond Congress's Section 5 power.
Hibbs is carefully written to avoid the firestorm of protest that would
surely result from such a challenge.
Even as Hibbs explicitly announces that "[t]he ultimate interpreta-
tion and determination of the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive
meaning remains the province of the Judicial Branch, °10 4 and even as
it propounds doctrine designed to exclude Congress from the province
of constitutional interpretation, Hibbs is written in a way that bends
the Court's own Section 5 jurisprudence to accommodate, rather than
override, a deep-seated popular understanding, embodied in the
EEOA, that a central task of the federal government is the elimination
of race- and sex-based discrimination.10 5 Hibbs blurs the Court's own
101 We might take as a measure of this confrontation the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
i991, which has properly been termed "a massive rebuke to the" Court's efforts to dilute the pro-
tections of Title VII. Merrill, supra note 5, at 631.
102 See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360 (prohibiting suits for monetary damages against states un-
der Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,111-12,117 (2000));
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 6oi-o2 (2000) (striking down the private cause of action
created by the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13,981 (2003)); Kimel, 528 U.S.
at 66-67 (prohibiting suits for monetary damages against states under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (I994 & Supp. III 1997)); Fla. Prepaid Postsec-
ondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999) (striking down the state
liability sections of the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, 35 U.S.C.
§§ 27 i(h), 296(a) (20o0)). For a discussion, see Neal Devins, Congress and the Making of the Sec-
ond Rehnquist Court, 47 ST. LouIs U. LJ. 773, 776-79 (2003).
103 The origins in the civil rights revolution of the belief that the federal government ought to
combat racial discrimination are recounted in Post & Siegel, Equal Protection by Law, supra note
9o, at 486-502; the origins in the triumph of second wave feminism of the belief that the federal
government ought to combat sex discrimination are recounted in Post & Siegel, Legislative Consti-
tutionalism, supra note 43, at 1984-2004. Although United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2ooo), also involved the question of sex discrimination, the Court's holding in the case did not in
any way threaten the scope or reach of Title VII. This is because Morrison concerned Congress's
ability to define state action in a way that differed from the Court's definition. Morrison did not
endanger Title VII's authority to regulate private sex discrimination, which remains securely
grounded in Congress's Commerce Clause power, nor did it concern Title VII's authority to regu-
late public sex discrimination.
104 Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1977 (quoting Kimel, 528 U.S. at 8i) (internal quotation marks omitted).
105 Justice Stevens was so disturbed by this approach that he concurred separately "[b]ecause I
have never been convinced that an Act of Congress can amend the Constitution and because I am
uncertain whether the congressional enactment before us was truly 'needed to secure the guaran-
tees of the Fourteenth Amendment."' Id. at 1984 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Fitzpatrick v.
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account of unconstitutional sex discrimination in order to facilitate
congressional legislation that evidences a different understanding of
unconstitutional sex discrimination. If Hibbs on the surface uncom-
promisingly reaffirms the central premise of the enforcement model,
which is that constitutional law is to be made by the Court alone and
is to be strictly autonomous from Congress's understanding of the
Constitution, the actual holding of Hibbs seems to suggest the contrary
message that the Court's capacity to establish effective constitutional
law is dialectically connected to constitutional culture.10 6
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 458 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Ste-
vens argued that Hibbs should have been decided on the ground that Congress can abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity when acting pursuant to its Commerce Clause power. Id. at
1985. This conclusion, of course, would immunize both the FMLA and Title VII from constitu-
tional challenge.
Justice Kennedy, in a dissent joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, avoided the potential
controversy over Title VII in a different way. Kennedy shifted the focus of analysis from separa-
tion of powers to federalism. Id. at 1986 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997), and in every subsequent decision concerning the power of Congress un-
der Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has explained the function of the congru-
ence and proportionality test in terms of distinguishing Section 5 legislation that enforces Rj from
Section 5 legislation that enforces R,. The congruence and proportionality test asks whether the
R. established by Section 5 legislation are sufficiently connected to Ri to permit the conclusion
that R, are enforcing R, thereby safeguarding the "cardinal rule of constitutional law" that "ever
since Marbury this Court has remained the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text." Morri-
son, 529 U.S. at 616 n.7; see also Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism, supra note 43, at
Ig6o-65; supra note 44. The Court has thus explained the test in terms of the constitutional val-
ues of separation of powers, not those of federalism.
In his dissent in Hibbs, however, Justice Kennedy explicitly restated the congruence and
proportionality test to ask "whether subjecting States and their treasuries to monetary liability at
the insistence of private litigants is a congruent and proportional response to a demonstrated pat-
tern of unconstitutional conduct by the States." Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1986 (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing). This reformulation of the test subtly but fundamentally shifts the focus of analysis from the
question of whether Rs are sufficiently connected to Ri to permit the conclusion that R, are en-
forcing R, to the question of whether R, are sufficiently connected to Rj to justify the burdens
that R, place upon states. In Hibbs, Kennedy used the congruence and proportionality test to ask
whether "States have engaged in a pattern of unlawful conduct which warrants the remedy of
opening state treasuries to private suits." Id. at 1987. He accordingly transformed the test into a
means of balancing the protection of constitutional rights against the burdens imposed on states
by Section 5 legislation. This balancing test enabled Kennedy to condemn the FMLA while at the
same time upholding Title VII. Kennedy concluded that the FMLA's requirement of twelve
weeks of unpaid leave was not a congruent and proportional response to state sex discrimination,
whereas "the abrogation of state sovereign immunity pursuant to Title VII was a legitimate con-
gressional response to a pattern of gender-based discrimination in employment." Id. at 1994.
106 The literature describing this dialectical connection is quite large. For a sampling, see
NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES: ELECTED GOVERNMENT, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND THE ABORTION DEBATE 7, 41-55 (1996); LOUIS FISHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 273 (1988);
STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS 45
(1996); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword:
Law as Equilibrium, io8 HARV. L. REV. 26, 28-29 (i994); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial
Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 58o-8i (993); and Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitu-
tional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 8o N.C. L. REV. 773, 848 (2002).
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We can appreciate the power of the latter message if we inquire
into the origins of the sex discrimination jurisprudence that the Court
claims to apply in Hibbs. The Court came to conclude that gender
classifications should receive elevated scrutiny because it was educated
by the evolving constitutional beliefs and values of nonlegal actors, as
manifested by congressional legislation. 10 7 At a time when the Court
was still subjecting gender classifications to rational basis review, 10 8
Congress was using its Section 5 power to pass the EEOA prohibiting
states from discriminating on the basis of sex.10 9 In response to the po-
litical mobilization of second wave feminism, which transformed the
ways in which Americans constitutionally regarded equality between
the sexes, Congress came to conclude that "[d]iscrimination against
women is no less serious than other forms of prohibited employment
practices and is to be accorded the same degree of social concern given
to any type of unlawful discrimination.",10
The Court eventually reformed its own conception of constitutional
law to reflect the change in constitutional culture evidenced by statutes
like the EEOA, 1 ' in the process graciously acknowledging in Justice
Brennan's plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson1 2 the Court's
107 The context of the Court's conclusion is explored in detail in Post & Siegel, Legislative Con-
stitutionalism, supra note 43, at 1984-2004.
108 See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (97I) ("The question presented by this case, then, is
whether a difference in the sex of competing applicants for letters of administration bears a ra-
tional relationship to a state objective .... We hold that it does not."); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S.
464, 466 (1948) (holding that although the Constitution "precludes irrational discrimination,
... [t]his Court is certainly not in a position to gainsay such belief by the Michigan legislature"
that no woman can work as a bartender unless she is the wife or daughter of the male owner); see
also Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1978 ("The history of the many state laws limiting women's employment
opportunities is chronicled in - and, until relatively recently, was sanctioned by - this Court's
own opinions.... Until our decision in Reed . . . , 'it remained the prevailing doctrine that gov-
ernment, both federal and state, could withhold from women opportunities accorded men so long
as any "basis in reason"' - such as the above beliefs - 'could be conceived for the discrimina-
tion."' (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 5i8 U.S. 515, 531 (1996)).
109 See supra note 87.
110 H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 5 (971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2141; see also S.
REP. No. 92-415, at 7-8 (97) (emphasizing the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare's view
that discrimination against women is just as serious as other forms of discrimination by discussing
parallels and correlations between racial discrimination and discrimination based on sex).
111 In the words of Justice Ginsburg:
What caused the Court's understanding to dawn and grow? Judges do read the news-
papers and are affected, not by the weather of the day, as distinguished Constitutional
Law Professor Paul Freund once said, but by the climate of the era. Supreme Court
Justices, and lower court judges as well, were becoming aware of a sea change in United
States society. Their enlightenment was advanced publicly by the briefs filed in Court
and privately, I suspect, by the aspirations of the women, particularly the daughters and
granddaughters, in their own families and communities.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Constitutional Adjudication in the United States as a Means of Advancing
the Equal Stature of Men and Women Under the Law, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 263, 268-69 (1997).
112 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (Brennan, J.) (plurality opinion).
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debt to Congress's articulation of the transformation in national un-
derstandings of the significance of sex discrimination. 13  Far from
claiming that equal protection doctrine should be autonomous from
constitutional culture, the plurality opinion in Frontiero openly de-
fended its decision to look to the changing constitutional beliefs of
Congress as a source for its own reconstruction of constitutional law.
It is striking, therefore, that although Hibbs purports to employ the
enforcement model to compel Congress to conform to the Court's own
jurisprudence of sex discrimination, that jurisprudence itself derives
from changes in constitutional culture reflected in Congress's innova-
tive constitutional interpretations. If Rehnquist's obfuscation of that
jurisprudence in Hibbs can perhaps be explained as an effort to avoid
confrontation and so conserve the Court's "exhaustible" supply of
"prestige and institutional capital,"'1 14 Frontiero's explicit incorporation
of popular understandings into the Court's own doctrine cannot. The
Court's decision in the 1970s to alter its equal protection doctrine to
disfavor gender classifications was not a mere attempt to escape con-
troversy. It was an effort to understand the legal requirements of the
constitutional equality principle, and it used as one source of that un-
derstanding the evolving constitutional culture of the nation.
It is precisely this effort, however, that the Rehnquist Court has
constructed the enforcement model to suppress. "If Congress could de-
fine its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's mean-
ing," Boerne declares:
no longer would the Constitution be "superior paramount law, unchange-
able by ordinary means." It would be "on a level with ordinary legislative
acts, and, like other acts, .. . alterable when the legislature shall please to
alter it." . . . Under this approach, it is difficult to conceive of a principle
that would limit congressional power.... Shifting legislative majorities
113 Justice Brennan explained:
We might also note that, over the past decade, Congress has itself manifested an in-
creasing sensitivity to sex-based classifications. In Tit. VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, for example, Congress expressly declared that no employer, labor union, or other
organization subject to the provisions of the Act shall discriminate against any individ-
ual on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Similarly, the Equal Pay
Act of 1963 provides that no employer... "shall discriminate ... between employees on
the basis of sex." And § i of the Equal Rights Amendment, passed by Congress on
March 22, 1972, and submitted to the legislatures of the States for ratification, declares
that "[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of sex." Thus, Congress itself has concluded that clas-
sifications based upon sex are inherently invidious, and this conclusion of a coequal
branch of Government is not without significance to the question presently under con-
sideration.
Id. at 687-88 (alteration and second omission in original) (final emphasis added) (footnotes omit-
ted). Needless to say, this kind of acknowledgment of congressional influence is directly contrary
to the spirit of the Court's post-Boerne jurisprudence.
114 JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 139-40 (98O).
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could change the Constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult and
detailed amendment process contained in Article V. 1 5
This is superficially a passage about self-interest and the nature of
constitutional limitations. If Congress could make constitutional law,
Boerne argues, the Constitution would no longer function to "limit
congressional power," and thus the competence to make constitutional
law must lie instead in the judiciary. But if one asks why congres-
sional interpretive power would "effectively circumvent the difficult
and detailed amendment process contained in Article V," the passage
begins to tell a different tale. From a purely logical point of view,
Congress can use its interpretations of the Constitution to limit its own
legislative power, just as the Court uses its interpretations of Article
III to limit its own judicial power. So if congressional interpretive au-
thority would disable constitutional restraints, it must not be merely
because Congress would be setting the limits of its own power. 11 6
It seems rather that Boerne is implying that Congress ought not to
interpret the Constitution because Congress would read the Constitu-
tion in a certain kind of way, in a political manner driven by the winds
of "shifting legislative majorities." The Constitution, Boerne asserts, is
meant to establish legal limits on representative government, and le-
gality necessitates the informed and sober judgments that the judiciary
alone is designed to provide." 7 The Court must remain "the ultimate
expositor of the constitutional text"' 1 8 because it embodies a steady
and professional form of reason that is immune from the gusts of po-
litical passion that shake institutions like Congress.
What, then, do we make of a decision like Frontiero, in which a
plurality opinion of the Court self-consciously, in the exercise of its le-
115 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (I997) (first omission in original) (citations omit-
ted) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137, 177 0803)). This passage is analyzed in
detail in Post & Siegel, Protecting the Constitution, supra note 73, at 18-30.
116 But see Ruth Bader Ginsburg, An Overview of Court Review for Constitutionality in the
United States, 57 LA. L. REV. IOI9, 1022 (1997) (referring to "the important idea (expressed by
James Madison in Federalist No. io) that '[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause.'
Congress, one could conclude following that principle, cannot say with finality whether its own
acts are constitutional. That function is properly committed to a separate department - a de-
tached, impartial, life-tenured judiciary that is not judging its own cause." (alteration in origi-
nal)).
117 Hence the important distinction between the judge and the legislator, which we express by
saying that the duty of a judge is "to uphold the law and to follow the dictates of the Constitu-
tion," not to "serve a constituency." Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528, 2547
(2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2551 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Legislative and ex-
ecutive officials serve in representative capacities. They are agents of the people; their primary
function is to advance the interests of their constituencies .... Judges, however, are not political
actors. They do not sit as representatives of particular persons, communities, or parties; they
serve no faction or constituency.... They must strive to do what is legally right, all the more so
when the result is not the one 'the home crowd' wants.").
118 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 1)7 n.7 (2ooo).
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gal and professional judgment, incorporates into its view of constitu-
tional law the "shifting" view of sex discrimination that was revealed
in the political enactments of Congress? There are two possibilities:
either the Court in the exercise of its professional reason is to be
trusted to pick and choose among the evolving forms of constitutional
culture manifested in congressional legislation, 1 9 or it is not. The first
alternative denies the autonomy of constitutional law, the second af-
firms it. Boerne was itself a "transitional case"1 20 that equivocated be-
tween these alternatives.
The Court's subsequent Section 5 opinions, however, have come
down heavily on the side of affirming the autonomy of constitutional
law. The natural implication of the plurality opinion's reasoning in
Frontiero is that Section 5 legislation should be encouraged, because it
offers resources to the Court in its ongoing effort to incorporate the
best of constitutional culture into the construction of a vibrant and le-
gitimate constitutional law.121  But the Court's decisions in the after-
119 In performing this task, the Court might function according to the model of common law
constitutional adjudication lucidly explained by David A. Strauss. See David A. Strauss, Com-
mon Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 900-03 (1996) (describing how
the common law model explains the role of moral judgments in constitutional interpretation); see
also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 767-68 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (asserting that
substantive due process "calls for a court to assess the relative 'weights' or dignities of the con-
tending interests, and to this extent the judicial method is familiar to the common law"); John
Paul Stevens, The Bill of Rights: A Century of Progress, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 13, 35-36 (1992) [here-
inafter Stevens, Bill of Rights] ("I firmly believe that the Framers of the Constitution expected
and intended the vast open spaces in our charter of government to be filled not only by legislative
enactment but also by the common-law process of step-by-step adjudication that was largely re-
sponsible for the development of the law at the time this nation was conceived. That process has
largely eliminated the use of coerced confessions in criminal trials, curtailed racial discrimination
in the selection of juries, and extended First Amendment protection to artistic protection as well
as to political speech." (footnotes omitted)); John Paul Stevens, The Meaning of Judicial Activism,
Address Before the Chicago Bar Association (Sept. 16, 1998), in CBA RECORD, Oct. 1998, at 40,
44, 47; id. at 44 (noting that "judge-made law is as old as the common law itself"); cf. David A.
Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1476-78 (2001)
(detailing how the Court chose to adopt gender equality jurisprudence from constitutional culture
without new textual support). But see Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitu-
tion from a Social Movement Perspective, 15o U. PA. L. REV. 297, 298 (2001) (arguing that the
Constitution's text plays a more significant role in our constitutional tradition than Strauss con-
tends).
120 William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REV. 87,
112 (2OOl); Post & Siegel, Protecting the Constitution, supra note 73, at 5-6 (quoting Buzbee &
Schapiro, supra, at I12).
121 It is for this reason that Reva Siegel and I have recently argued that the enforcement model
of Garrett and Hibbs is fundamentally misguided. See Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutional-
ism, supra note 43. I will not repeat those arguments here, but suffice it to say that the dialectical
relationship between constitutional law and popular constitutional culture suggests that the Court
should understand Section 5 as "a structural device that fosters the democratic legitimacy of our
constitutional order." Id. at 1945. This understanding strongly supports the recognition of inde-
pendent congressional authority to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 2026-32. The
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math of Boerne have moved in the opposite direction; they have so
stringently bound Congress to the Court's own views of constitutional
law as to imply that the Court firmly understands the enforcement
model to entail the autonomy of constitutional law. The Court's recent
decisions suggest that the Court believes that it has nothing to learn
from Congress.
These decisions break decisively with the Court's pre-Boerne
precedents. Without sacrificing "the basic principle that the federal
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitu-
tion, '122 both the Warren and the Burger Courts had established a Sec-
tion 5 jurisprudence that recognized and encouraged Congress's capac-
ity to interpret the Constitution in ways that might prove helpful to
the Court. In decisions like Katzenbach v. Morgan1 23 and City of
Rome v. United States,1 24 the Court consistently held that Congress
was to be accorded such substantial "discretion ' 125 in exercising its "re-
sponsibility for implementing the Amendment"'126 that dissenters com-
plained that the Court had effectively ceded to Congress the power to
"determine as a matter of substantive constitutional law what situa-
tions fall within the ambit" of the Equal Protection Clause. 127  Essen-
tially the Court in the years before Boerne modeled its Section 5 juris-
prudence on the premise that there was a dialectical relationship
between constitutional law and constitutional culture. In its decisions
after Boerne the Court has forcefully repudiated this premise. 128
primary objection to recognizing such authority - that it would undermine judicial protection for
rights - is false. Id. at 203 2-39.
122 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (i958).
123 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
124 446 U.S. i56 (i98o); see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (i98o).
125 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 65i.
126 Id. at 648; see also City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 176. Although Rome technically concerned
Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, "the nature of the enforcement powers conferred by the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments has always been treated as coextensive." Id. at 207 n.I
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
127 City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112, 296 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also id. at 219-20 ("The result reached by the Court today can be sustained only
upon the theory that Congress was empowered to determine that structural changes with a dispa-
rate impact on a minority group's ability to elect a candidate of their race violates the Fourteenth
or Fifteenth Amendment."); Morgan, 384 U.S. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("In effect the Court
reads § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as giving Congress the power to define the substantive
scope of the Amendment.").
128 See Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism, supra note 43, at i96o-66. To appreciate
the enormity of the transformation that the Rehnquist Court has wrought in its post-Boerne ju-
risprudence, consider how fundamentally the Garrett requirement, which requires Congress to
document a "pattern of unconstitutional ... state transgressions" before exercising its Section 5
power, differs from Justice Powell's understanding of Congress's prerogatives:
Congress is not an adjudicatory body called upon to resolve specific disputes be-
tween competing adversaries. Its constitutional role is to be representative rather than
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At stake in our characterization of the autonomy of constitutional
law is how we understand the nature of the Constitution itself. The
belief that constitutional law ought to be independent from constitu-
tional culture implies that the Constitution is also independent of con-
stitutional culture. Chief Justice Rehnquist, for example, who has
been a primary author of the stringent version of the enforcement
model, 129 has been clear that the Constitution should be regarded as a
document of positive law, without connections to the beliefs and values
of the American people. If a democratic society "adopts a constitution
and incorporates in that constitution safeguards for individual liberty,"
then, in Rehnquist's view:
[W]e must understand that such safeguards possess value neither because
of any intrinsic worth nor because of any unique origins in someone's idea
of natural justice but instead simply because they have been incorporated
in a constitution by the people .... The laws that emerge after a typical
political struggle in which various individual value judgments are debated
likewise take on a form of moral goodness because they have been enacted
into positive law. It is the fact of their enactment that gives them what-
ever moral claim they have upon us as a society, however, and not any in-
dependent virtue they may have in any particular citizen's own scale of
values.
Beyond the Constitution and the laws in our society, there simply is no
basis other than the individual conscience of the citizen that may serve as
a platform for the launching of moral judgments. There is no conceivable
way in which I can logically demonstrate to you that the judgments of my
impartial, to make policy rather than to apply settled principles of law. The petitioners'
contention that this Court should treat the debates on § i03(f)(2) as the complete "re-
cord" of congressional decisionmaking underlying that statute is essentially a plea that
we treat Congress as if it were a lower federal court. But Congress is not expected to act
as though it were duty bound to find facts and make conclusions of law. The creation of
national rules for the governance of our society simply does not entail the same concept
of recordmaking that is appropriate to a judicial or administrative proceeding. Congress
has no responsibility to confine its vision to the facts and evidence adduced by particular
parties. Instead, its special attribute as a legislative body lies in its broader mission to
investigate and consider all facts and opinions that may be relevant to the resolution of
an issue....
Acceptance of petitioners' argument would force Congress to make specific factual
findings with respect to each legislative action. Such a requirement would mark an un-
precedented imposition of adjudicatory procedures upon a coordinate branch of Gov-
ernment. Neither the Constitution nor our democratic tradition warrants such a con-
straint on the legislative process.
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 502-03 (Powell, J., concurring); see also FullUilove, 448 U.S. at 478 (opinion
of Burger, C.J.) ("Congress, of course, may legislate without compiling the kind of 'record' appro-
priate with respect to judicial or administrative proceedings.").
129 Rehnquist was the author of the Court's opinions in Garrett and Morrison. See Bd. of Trs.
v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 36o (2001); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 6oi (2000).
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conscience are superior to the judgments of your conscience, and vice
versa. 130
If there are no common social values, but only conflicting preferences,
some of which manage to find enactment in positive law, then indeed
constitutional law can have nothing to learn from culture. 13 1
Of all the members of the contemporary Court, it is Justice Scalia
who is most theoretically and temperamentally committed to preserv-
ing the sharpest separation of constitutional law from culture. Scalia
derives this position from his understanding of the Constitution,
which, he asserts, "is in its nature the sort of 'law' that is the business
of the courts - an enactment that has a fixed meaning ascertainable
through the usual devices familiar to those learned in the law.''1 32
Scalia believes that judicial review would be incomprehensible "[i]f the
Constitution were not that sort of a 'law,' but [instead] a novel invita-
tion to apply current societal values.' 1 33
Indeed, Scalia argues, it is precisely because the Constitution is
autonomous from culture that it can fulfill its "whole purpose," which
130 Rehnquist, supra note 16, at 704; see also SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE
CONSTITUTION 152 (1989) (asserting that Rehnquist believes in a "moral relativism" that "holds
that no value is more legitimate than any other until it is enacted into the positive law"); Linda
Greenhouse, The Last Days of the Rehnquist Court: The Rewards of Patience and Power, 45
ARIz. L. REV. 251, 259 (2003) (agreeing with Davis's observations).
131 Robert Bork also takes this position. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. i, 9 (097) ("Every clash between a minority claiming
freedom and a majority claiming power to regulate involves a choice between the gratifications of
the two groups. When the Constitution has not spoken, the Court will be able to find no scale,
other than its own value preferences, upon which to weigh the respective claims to pleasure.").
For a detailed discussion of the implications of Bork's view for the broader concept of constitu-
tional culture, see Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, REPRESENTATIONS,
Spring 199o, at 13, 33.
132 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854 (1989). The com-
plete passage reads:
Nothing in the text of the Constitution confers upon the courts the power to inquire into,
rather than passively assume, the constitutionality of federal statutes. That power is,
however, reasonably implicit because, as Marshall said in Marbury v. Madison, (i) "[iut is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,"
(2) "[i]f two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of
each," and (3) "the constitution is to be considered, in court, as a paramount law." Cen-
tral to that analysis, it seems to me, is the perception that the Constitution, though it has
an effect superior to other laws, is in its nature the sort of "law" that is the business of
the courts - an enactment that has a fixed meaning ascertainable through the usual de-
vices familiar to those learned in the law. If the Constitution were not that sort of a
"law," but a novel invitation to apply current societal values, what reason would there
be to believe that the invitation was addressed to the courts rather than to the legisla-
ture? One simply cannot say, regarding that sort of novel enactment, that "[i]t is em-
phatically the province and duty of the judicial department" to determine its content.
Quite to the contrary, the legislature would seem a much more appropriate expositor of
social values, and its determination that a statute is compatible with the Constitution
should, as in England, prevail.
Id. (alterations in original) (first emphasis added).
133 Id.
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"is to prevent change - to embed certain rights in such a manner that
future generations cannot readily take them away."1 34  Courts that
consider "current societal values" in formulating constitutional law
contradict this "antievolutionary purpose '1 35 by creating "what is
called The Living Constitution, a body of law that ... grows and
changes from age to age, in order to meet the needs of a changing soci-
ety."' 136 Such courts also risk undermining the democratic will of those
who ratified the Constitution, 137 substituting "their own predilections
for the law.' 38 Scalia advocates originalism as a philosophy of consti-
tutional interpretation because it avoids these consequences, and be-
cause it emphasizes that the "interpretation of the Constitution ... is
... essentially lawyers' work - requiring a close examination of text,
history of the text, traditional understanding of the text, judicial
precedent, and so forth."'139
Scalia counts as a distinct advantage of his approach that it will
"embolden" judges "to be courageous" and to "stand up to what is gen-
erally supreme in a democracy: the popular will.' 4 "If the courts are
134 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 40 (1997); see also THOMAS MACINTYRE COOLEY, 1 A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF
THE AMERICAN UNION 124 (8th ed. 1927) ("A principal share of the benefit expected from writ-
ten constitutions would be lost if the rules they established were so flexible as to bend to circum-
stances or be modified by public opinion. It is with special reference to the varying moods of
public opinion, and with a view to putting the fundamentals of government beyond their control,
that these instruments are framed; and there can be no such steady and imperceptible change in
their rules as inheres in the principles of the common law.").
135 SCALIA, supra note 134, at 44.
136 Id. at 38.
137 Id. at 40.
138 Scalia, supra note 132, at 863. Scalia continues:
Avoiding this error is the hardest part of being a conscientious judge; perhaps no consci-
entious judge ever succeeds entirely Nonoriginalism, which under one or another for-
mulation invokes "fundamental values" as the touchstone of constitutionality, plays pre-
cisely to this weakness. It is very difficult for a person to discern a difference between
those political values that he personally thinks most important, and those political val-
ues that are "fundamental to our society."
Id. These considerations also underlie Scalia's well-known penchant for rules rather than flexible
standards. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as the Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
11179, 1185 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, The Rule of Law].
139 SCALIA, supra note 134, at 46.
140 Scalia, The Rule of Law, supra note 138, at 1 i8o. Chief Justice Rehnquist has reflected on
whether "judges respond to public opinion" in William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and
Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 751, 752, 768-69 (1986). Rehnquist writes:
[If the] tides of public opinion are sufficiently great and sufficiently sustained, they will
very likely have an effect upon the decision of some of the cases decided within the
courthouse. This is not a case of judges "knuckling under" to public opinion, and cra-
venly abandoning their oaths of office. Judges, so long as they are relatively normal
human beings, can no more escape being influenced by public opinion in the long run
than can people working at other jobs.
Id. at 768.
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free to write the Constitution anew," Scalia acidly observes, "they will,
by God, write it the way the majority wants; the appointment and
confirmation process will see to that. This, of course, is the end of the
Bill of Rights .... "141 By sharply distinguishing constitutional law
from "current societal values," by insisting that constitutional meaning
is a matter for the technical and professional reason of lawyers and not
for the culture of "We the People," by holding "it no business of the
courts (as opposed to the political branches) to take sides in" cultural
disagreements, 14 2 Scalia is able to demand that courts exercise an abso-
lutely uncompromising independence that is indifferent to popular op-
position. This unbending professional autonomy is surely one reason
why Scalia is the only Justice in Hibbs to author an opinion that is en-
tirely unconcerned about the possibility of intense political controversy
over Title VII.143
Writing for himself alone, Scalia argues in Hibbs that Congress can
enact "prophylactic" legislation "to 'enforce' the Fourteenth Amend-
ment" against a state only if it is first shown that there "is a violation
by the State against which the enforcement action is taken."'1 44 Scalia
believes that this strict rule is necessary because "[lt]here is no guilt by
association, enabling the sovereignty of one State to be abridged under
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because of violations by another
State, or by most other States, or even by 49 other States.' 145  This is
an extraordinarily harsh and provocative rule, so excessive that
Rehnquist does not even bother to respond to it. It is almost certainly
141 SCALIA, supra note 134, at 47. Scalia queries whether we have noticed that "increasingly,
the 'individual rights' favored by the courts tend to be the same 'individual rights' favored by
popular majoritarian legislation? Women's rights, for example; racial minority rights; homosexual
rights; abortion rights; rights against political favoritism?" Id. Scalia continues:
The glorious days of the Warren Court, when the judges knew that the Constitution
means whatever it ought to, but the people had not yet caught on to the new game (and
selected their judges accordingly), are gone forever. Those were the days when genu-
inely unpopular new minority rights could be created - notably, rights of criminal de-
fendants and prisoners. That era of public naivet6 is past, and for individual rights dis-
favored by the majority I think there are hard times ahead.
Id. at 149.
142 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 62o, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
143 See supra note 1o5.
144 Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1985 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Scalia writes that "[Section] 5 prophylactic legislation" can be "applied against a State" only if it is
first shown that "the State has itself engaged in discrimination sufficient to support the exercise of
Congress's prophylactic power." Id. at 1986.
145 Id. at 1985 Thus Scalia writes:
Today's opinion for the Court does not even attempt to demonstrate that each one
of the 50 States covered by [the family leave provisions of the FMLA] was in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. It treats "the States" as some sort of collective entity
which is guilty or innocent as a body... This will not do. Prophylaxis in the sense of
extending the remedy beyond the violation is one thing; prophylaxis in the sense of ex-
tending the remedy beyond the violator is something else.
2003]
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incorrect on the merits, because it confuses the judicial power of allo-
cating individual blame and responsibility with the legislative power
granted to Congress by Section 5.146 Apart from the merits of Scalia's
position, however, it is noteworthy that he advances a rule that virtu-
ally invites vigorous confrontation over the validity of Title VII as le-
gitimate Section 5 legislation.
Scalia is an extreme case, of course, primarily because he is so con-
spicuously committed to the logical implications of his own jurispru-
dence, regardless of political consequences. To the extent that the
Rehnquist Court has adopted a central premise of Scalia's jurispru-
dence, 147 however, we can learn a good deal from his example.
Scalia's separate dissent reveals the inner logic of the conviction that
constitutional law should be independent from constitutional culture.
The dissent reminds us that severing constitutional law from constitu-
tional culture can have subtle but palpable consequences for the con-
duct of judicial review. If the Rehnquist Court now seems more confi-
dent and less deferential to the popular branches of government than
its predecessors, 14 one cause may perhaps be the influence of this ju-
risprudential perspective, which underlies the Court's development of
the enforcement model in its recent Section 5 jurisprudence.
We should be clear, however, that while Hibbs says one thing, it ac-
tually does another. Even as Hibbs announces that only the Court has
the prerogative to enunciate constitutional law, it applies a form of sex
discrimination jurisprudence that the Court learned from changes in
constitutional culture reflected in Congress's constitutional interpreta-
tions. Even as Hibbs reaffirms doctrinal tests designed to sever consti-
tutional law from constitutional culture, it interprets the Court's own
Section 5 jurisprudence in a way that manifests the interdependence of
146 Judicial power exists to adjudicate controversies, and it typically involves the assignment of
individual guilt and liability. Because we believe in principles of individual responsibility, we re-
quire courts to function in a way that precludes guilt by association. Legislatures, by contrast, are
forbidden from allocating individual guilt and responsibility. The essence of legislative power
instead lies in the establishment of general rules of conduct. It is therefore misguided to under-
stand Section 5 legislation as accusing particular states of wrongdoing, or as punishing them for
past misconduct. Instead Section 5 legislation, like all legislation, seeks to vindicate public values.
For this reason Section 5 legislation, like all legislation, is not to be restricted by rules appropriate
for the proper functioning of a court. See Post & Siegel, Protecting the Constitution, supra note
73, at 13-16 (criticizing the Garrett Court for failing to draw this distinction); cf. South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 330 (1966) ("Congress is clearly not bound by the rules relating to
statutory presumptions in criminal cases when it prescribes civil remedies against other organs of
government under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment."). In essence, Scalia's argument boils down
to the proposition that Section 5 power is to be understood on the model of a judicial remedy.
This proposition fails to appreciate that Section 5 is a grant of legislative power, not judicial
power. See Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism, supra note 43, at 1969-70.
147 For a powerful argument concerning the extent to which the Rehnquist Court has adopted
this premise, see Kramer, supra note 5, at 54.
148 See supra note 9.
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judicial doctrine and popular constitutional beliefs. These contradic-
tions depict a Court that is implicitly forced to retreat from what it is
anxious to explicitly announce, a Court that declares but cannot estab-
lish that constitutional law is categorically distinct from constitutional
culture. The claimed autonomy of constitutional law, in other words,
should not be taken as an accurate description of how the Court actu-
ally functions. It should instead be understood as an ideological asser-
tion about how the Court desires constitutional law to be regarded.
Political scientists and historians who study the Court from an ex-
ternal perspective have little patience with this assertion. They regard
the notion that constitutional law is independent of the general consti-
tutional culture of the nation as little more than a "legal fiction."'1 49
Even the slightest glance at the historical development of American
constitutional law confirms H. Jefferson Powell's conclusion that our
"[c]onstitutional law is historically conditioned and politically
shaped.' 150 Our constitutional law has continuously evolved to reflect
the changing beliefs of the nation. 15 1 Even though the text of the
Equal Protection Clause "has been as immutable as the Stonehenge
monument,' 152 its meaning has altered dramatically. The most telling
example is Brown v. Board of Education,5 3 in which the Court "burst
asunder the shackles of original intent"'5 4 to express a new vision of
149 CHARLES A. BEARD & WILLIAM BEARD, THE AMERICAN LEVIATHAN: THE
REPUBLIC IN THE MACHINE AGE 39 (1930) ("[Tjhe theory that the Constitution is a written
document is a legal fiction. The idea that it can be understood by a study of its language and the
history of its past development is equally mythical. It is what the Government and the people
who count in public affairs recognize and respect as such, what they think it is."). Political scien-
tists have expressed similar views on this topic. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND
ITS CRITICS i9o (1989) ("[T]he views of a majority of justices of the Supreme Court are never out
of line for very long with the views prevailing among the lawmaking majorities of the country.");
TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 8o-132 (i999) (arguing
that political motivations should, and do, play a role in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence);
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL 72-73 (1993) (presenting the "attitudinal" model of judicial decisionmaking, in which
outcomes are based primarily on the ideologies of each judge); Keith E. Whittington, Taking What
They Give Us: Explaining the Court's Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477, 480-86 (2001) (set-
ting forth attitudinal and institutional models of judicial decisionmaking).
150 H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN
HISTORY AND POLITICS 6 (2002).
151 Justice O'Connor has recently emphasized this point in her discussion of the history of con-
stitutional sex discrimination law, noting that change in constitutional law comes "principally
from attitudinal shifts in the population at large. Rare indeed is the legal victory - in court or
legislature - that is not a careful by-product of an emerging social consensus. Courts, in particu-
lar, are mainly reactive institutions." SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW
166 (2003).
152 Stevens, Bill of Rights, supra note i i9, at 27.
153 347 U.S. 483 (954).
154 Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 9o MICH. L. REV
213, 253 (I991).
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equal protection that was based upon its own appreciation of the "pre-
sent" nature of "American life throughout the Nation." ' s
This history suggests an account of the Constitution that differs
fundamentally from that expressed by Rehnquist or Scalia. The Con-
stitution is not a document only of positive law. It is not primarily a
"lawyer's contract,"1156 nor is it even chiefly a constraint on majori-
tarian enactments. 15 7  It is rather an expression of the deepest beliefs
and convictions of the American nation, of our "fundamental princi-
ples as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and
our law.' 5 8  Woodrow Wilson expressed this conception of the
Constitution when he observed that "the Constitution of the United
155 Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-93. On Brown's response to 195os America, see PHILIP A.
KLINKNER & ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF
RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 238 (ig9); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE
HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR
EQUALITY 748 (I977); and Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution,
147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 67-69 (1998). At the time of the Brown decision, the New York Times wrote:
[Tihe decision "does not necessarily mean that the justices are of finer judicial clay than
their predecessors .... It merely means that they .. . have felt behind them the solid
weight of public opinion established at vastly higher levels of humaneness and democ-
ratic understanding. It is that state of public opinion, even more than the decision that
interpreted it, which gives us our feeling of [hopefulness] regarding prospects for tomor-
row's better living."
Public Gets Credit for School Bias Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1954, at io (quoting Lester
Granger, then-Executive Director of the National Urban League). Reflecting on the evolution
of equal protection doctrine, the Court has explained:
[T]he Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a particular era.
In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never been
confined to historic notions of equality .... Notions of what constitutes equal treatment
for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change. This Court in 1896 held that
laws providing for separate public facilities for white and Negro citizens did not deprive
the latter of the equal protection and treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment com-
mands. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 [(1896)]. Seven of the eight Justices then sitting
subscribed to the Court's opinion, thus joining in expressions of what constituted un-
equal and discriminatory treatment that sound strange to a contemporary ear. When,
in 1954 - more than a half-century later - we repudiated the "separate-but-equal" doc-
trine of Plessy as respects public education we stated: "In approaching this problem, we
cannot turn the clock back to i868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896
when Plessy v. Ferguson was written." Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492
[(1954)].
Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1966) (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted).
156 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, The Constitution of the United States Was a Layman's Docu-
ment, Not a Lawyer's Contract, Address on Constitution Day, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 17, 1937),
in 6 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT. THE
CONSTITUTION PREVAILS: 1937, at 359 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 194) (reissued 1969, Russell
& Russell).
157 See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 44 (2OO1)
("Constitutions do not merely limit government; they also establish it.").
158 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Anthony M.
Kennedy, The Impact of Experience on Judicial Decisionmaking, L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 3, 1993, at 6
("The law is the story of human history. The meaning of the common law system is that the rules
of law, the principles of obligation and duty, arise from our shared experience, our common heri-
tage.").
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States is not a mere lawyers' document: it is a vehicle of life, and its
spirit is always the spirit of the age.'
15 9
To fashion constitutional law based on this understanding of the
Constitution is to reject the autonomy of constitutional law. It is to
approach the Constitution in a way that at most allows the Court to
"speak before all others" about the nation's "constitutional ideals. 1 60
These ideals are the principles that "give our society an identity and
inner coherence"' 61 because they represent "our whole experience"
162
as a nation.' 63 It is virtually unimaginable that the Court's articula-
tion of these principles should find their ground exclusively in the pro-
fessional opinions of judges, without some dialectical connection to the
actual political self-conception of the nation. 64 The articulation of
constitutional law thus requires "that judges play an interdependent
part in our democracy. They do not alone shape legal doctrine but
... they participate in a dialogue with other organs of government,
and with the people as well.' 65
The dependence of constitutional law on this continuing dialogue
counsels restraint in the exercise of judicial review. 166 This is because
the legitimacy of judicially fashioned constitutional law is understood
to depend upon its grounding in constitutional culture. Alexander
Bickel, for example, has noted that because "coherent, stable - and
morally supportable - government is possible only on the basis of con-
sent," and because "the secret of consent is the sense of common ven-
ture fostered by institutions that reflect and represent us and that we
can call to account,' 67 constitutional law can never in the end rest
simply on the pronouncements of the Court. Instead, "[v]irtually all
important decisions of the Supreme Court are the beginnings of con-
versations between the Court and the people and their representa-
159 WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 69
(igo8).
160 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992).
161 Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV.
L. REV. I, I I (1979).
162 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
163 See Post, supra note 131, at 23-26, 28-35.
164 The literature describing this dialectical connection is quite extensive. For a sampling, see
supra note io6. For a powerful demonstration of the dependence of constitutional law on popular
understandings, see i BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (i99i); and 2
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998). For an argument that
Marbury-style judicial review presupposes that judges are enforcing the People's document, not
their own deviations, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Foreword: The
Document and the Doctrine, 14 HARV. L. REV. 26, 84 (2000).
165 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. ii85, 1198 (1992).
166 See id. at 1205-09 (criticizing Roe v. Wade because it "invited no dialogue with legislators,"
but "[ilnstead ... seemed entirely to remove the ball from the legislators' court").
167 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 20 (2d ed. 1986).
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tives.' 68 Bickel observes that the Court's decisions must be taken up
by the public before they can become fully law:
[T]o say that the Supreme Court lays down the law of the land is to state
the ultimate result, following upon a complex series of events, in some
cases, and in others it is a form of speech only. The effectiveness of the
judgment universalized depends on consent and administration.
The Court is often incapable of generating the necessary consent by it-
self, and it does not command the resources of administration. 169
Bickel does not suggest that it is improper for the Court to seek to
inspire or transform popular constitutional understandings, as it did in
Brown. His point is rather that in the long run judicial interpretations
of the Constitution will persist and acquire legitimacy only if the na-
tion's commitments have in fact been altered.' 70 The Warren Court
thoroughly understood this point, which is why from its very inception
it sought to enlist the representative branches of the federal govern-
ment in a common effort to alter constitutional culture.17' As Robert
Burt notes, "[t]he Justices acknowledged among themselves that, in
pragmatic terms at least, nothing would follow from the Brown deci-
sion unless support voluntarily came from the President and Con-
gress."' 7 2 The Court in Brown accordingly asked for briefing on the
question whether "future Congresses might, in the exercise of their
power under Section 5 of the Amendment, abolish" school segregation,
even if "neither the Congress in submitting nor the States in ratifying
the Fourteenth Amendment understood that compliance with it would
require the immediate abolition of segregation in public schools."'' 7 3
Archibald Cox was thus exactly right to remark that "the principle of
Brown v. Board of Education became more firmly law after its incor-
poration into ... the Civil Rights Act of 1964."' 1 4
If Brown illustrates how the Court can successfully provoke the
transformation of constitutional culture, Frontiero illustrates how the
Court can modify its own doctrine to accommodate changes in consti-
tutional culture.7 5  The Court in the 197os recognized that the norm
168 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 91
(Yale Univ. Press 1978) (970).
169 Id. at 9i-92.
170 See id. at 91-94. As Justice Scalia observes, "the appointment and confirmation process
will see to that." SCALIA, supra note 134, at 47.
171 See, e.g., Post & Siegel, Protecting the Constitution, supra note 73, at 30-32, 34-39 (discuss-
ing the Warren Court's interbranch diplomacy in Brown v. Board of Education and Katzenbach
v. Morgan).
172 ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 295 (992).
173 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 972, 972 (1953).
174 Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication
and the Promotion of Human Rights, 8o HARv. L. REV. 91, 94 (1966).
175 See supra pp. 25-26.
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of equality had altered in American constitutional culture,17 6 and in
the progeny of Frontiero it invented a new constitutional jurispru-
dence of sex discrimination to express the legal implications of this
change.177 In this way the Court maintained a rough alignment be-
tween its equal protection doctrine and the evolving constitutional
convictions of the country.178 It is clear enough, I think, that if this
alignment between constitutional law and constitutional culture is not
maintained, if the Court attempts to enforce constitutional principles
that seriously diverge from popular constitutional beliefs, its authority
will soon be challenged. In the most extreme circumstances, persistent
judicial efforts to impose principles that are seriously at odds with the
constitutional understandings of the nation risk creating significant
crises, as occurred during the New Deal era or at the time of Dred
Scott.179
From this historical and structural perspective, it seems most im-
plausible to claim that constitutional law is or should be autonomous
from constitutional culture. The claim sets itself against the felt neces-
sities of judging, which is why the Court's opinion in Hibbs seems so
filled with internal contradictions. The Court wants to place strict
limits on Congress's Section 5 lawmaking power in order to affirm the
autonomy of constitutional law, and yet, because the legitimacy of the
Court's own doctrine depends upon constitutional culture, the Court
cannot bring itself to threaten the constitutionality of the EEOA. Only
176 For an argument that legal norms of equality are themselves cultural practices that reflect
cultural understandings, see ROBERT C. POST ET AL., PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE
LOGIC OF AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 22-41 (2001).
177 Scalia would presumably disagree with this invention. He writes:
[W]hat constitutes a denial of equal protection [is]... the "time-dated" meaning of equal
protection in 1868. Unisex toilets and women assault troops may be ideas whose time
has come, and the people are certainly free to require them by legislation; but refusing to
do so does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, because that is not what "equal pro-
tection of the laws" ever meant.
SCALIA, supra note 134, at 148-49.
178 For an account of how equal protection jurisprudence changes in response to constitutional
culture, see Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassifica-
tion or Antisubordination, in 2 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: THE ORIGINS AND FATE OF
ANTISUBORDINATION THEORY II, 14-15 (2003), at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/artl1.
Balkin and Siegel note that "application of the anticlassification principle often depends on judg-
ments concerning the presence, absence, or degree of status-harm .... These judgments may be
conscious or unconscious, explicit or implicit, and they shift in time, in response to social mobili-
zations and other developments." Id.; see also Reva B. Siegel, A Short History of Sexual Harass-
ment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B.
Siegel eds.) (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 11-18, on file with the Harvard Law School Li-
brary) ("Judgments about whether practices discriminate 'on the basis' of sex or race may depend
on evolving social intuitions about whether a practice unjustly perpetuates a status regime, rather
than formal characteristics of the practice itself, as antidiscrimination discourse leads us to be-
lieve.").
179 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 6o U.S. (19 How.) 393 (857).
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Scalia is willing to let the chips fall where they may, but the pressure
of maintaining that position forces him to adopt an intemperate and
unconvincing position. Scalia may display the virtue of carrying
"things to their logical conclusion,"' 80 but his opinion lacks wisdom.
For most members of the Court, the autonomy of constitutional law
remains an ideological conviction that is subject to modification as
statesmanship requires. 8"
The conviction matters, however, because it underwrites the
Court's ongoing efforts to construe narrowly the scope and nature of
congressional Section 5 power. These efforts have led the Court to in-
validate legislation that previously would have been upheld. 1 82 They
have also signaled Congress that it cannot independently interpret the
Constitution, which affects the roles, expectations, and behavior of
members of Congress. They have suffocated Congress's constitutional
participation and innovation, and discouraged forms of citizen mobili-
zation that might seek to find expression in Section 5 legislation.
Most importantly, however, the ideological conviction of autonomy
can make the Court oblivious to the complex and dialectical relation-
ship between constitutional law and constitutional culture. Even if
one adopts the strong position that the values of nonlegal actors should
be incorporated into constitutional law if and only if this incorporation
is necessary for the legitimacy and integrity of the law, there are still a
myriad of ways in which this incorporation can occur. Some are rou-
tine and ordinary, while others are highly controversial. To claim that
constitutional law must remain entirely autonomous from constitu-
tional culture is to occlude clear thinking on exactly how the relation-
ship between constitutional law and constitutional culture is actually
constructed.
180 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2497 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
181 On Brandeis's view of the necessity for statesmanship in the creation of constitutional law,
see Melvin I. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 299, 314.
William Howard Taft also found statesmanship imperative. In a letter congratulating George
Sutherland on his appointment to the Supreme Court, Taft wrote:
I do not minimize at all the importance of having Judges of learning in the law on the
Supreme Bench, but the functions performed by us are of such a peculiar character that
something in addition is much needed to round out a man for service upon that Bench,
and that is a sense of proportion derived from a knowledge of how Government is car-
ried on, and how higher politics are conducted in the State. A Supreme Judge must
needs keep abreast of the actual situation in the country so as to understand all the
phases of important issues which arise, with a view to the proper application of the Con-
stitution, which is a political instrument in a way, to new conditions.
Letter from William Howard Taft to George Sutherland (Sept. 1o, 1922), microformed on William
H. Taft Papers, Reel 245 (Library of Cong., 1969).
182 See sources cited supra note 102. I believe that these statutes should in fact have been up-
held as legitimate exercises of Congress's Section 5 power. See supra note 121 and accompanying
text.
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The question is not whether constitutional culture ought to be a
source of constitutional law, because as a matter of history and struc-
ture constitutional interpretation is possible only because the Court
engages in a continuous dialogue with the constitutional beliefs and
values of nonjudicial actors. The useful question is instead how con-
stitutional culture functions as a source for constitutional law. In Part
II we shall examine in detail some of the many ways in which the
Court constructs the membrane that separates constitutional law from
constitutional culture. That membrane is in most situations highly po-
rous, so that constitutional law is continuously infused with the consti-
tutional beliefs and values of nonjudicial actors. But the Court can
render the boundary between constitutional law and constitutional cul-
ture more impermeable if it comes to believe that popular attitudes
threaten significant constitutional values, as is frequently the case
when the Court protects constitutional rights. Even in such circum-
stances, however, even in the core precincts of constitutional rights,
constitutional law and constitutional culture remain in continuous dia-
logue, as we shall see in our discussion of Grutter v. Bollinger.8 3
II.
Hibbs involves the relationship between constitutional law and
constitutional culture. Constitutional culture comes in many forms,
ranging from the convictions of ordinary citizens about the meaning of
their Constitution to the considered constitutional interpretations of
those authorized to make law based upon these interpretations. Sec-
tion 5 legislation is a form of constitutional culture that lies at the ex-
treme end of this spectrum. Congress enacts Section 5 legislation
based upon its textually granted power "to enforce" the Fourteenth
Amendment, so that Congress is on virtually equal footing with the
Court, which also claims power to make constitutional law because of
its authority to enforce the Constitution. 1 4
For this reason Section 5 legislation can potentially challenge the
Court's authority to make constitutional law, even though Section 5
legislation differs fundamentally from judicial reasoning because stat-
utes represent a form of constitutional interpretation that is neither
bound by stare decisis nor embedded within a practice of discursive
justification. 8 5 It is therefore the rare occasion, like the plurality opin-
ion in Frontiero, when the Court will feel secure enough to acknowl-
183 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
184 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("Those who apply the rule to
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.").
185 For a discussion of the distinctions between judicial and legislative constitutional interpreta-
tion, see Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism, supra note 43, at 2005-07.
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edge frankly the direct influence of Section 5 legislation on its own
resolution of a disputed question of constitutional law. Far more typi-
cally the Court will attempt to disguise this influence, as it does in
Hibbs.
Section 5 legislation, however, is not the only circumstance in
which Congress interprets the Constitution with the force of law.
Every statute enacted by Congress rests on an implicit congressional
judgment that the statute both is within Congress's constitutional
power and does not violate constitutional rights. Not only does the
Court appear comfortable with such judgments, but it has actually
promulgated various doctrines designed to facilitate their incorporation
into the Court's own articulation of constitutional law. Quietly but
pervasively, these doctrines use the constitutional beliefs of Congress
as a source of judicially constructed constitutional law.
Exemplary is the Court's decision last Term in Eldred v.
Ashcroft. 186 At issue in Eldred was the constitutionality of the Copy-
right Term Extension Act (CTEA),1 7 which prolonged the duration of
existing and future copyrights by twenty years. In deciding that Con-
gress could apply a copyright extension to existing copyrights, the
Court candidly acknowledged the influence of "an unbroken congres-
sional practice of granting to authors of works with existing copyrights
the benefit of term extensions."18 The Court held that "[s]uch consis-
tent congressional practice is entitled to 'very great weight."' 18 9
A consistent congressional practice represents an enduring congres-
sional judgment about the constitutionality of a particular rule. Be-
cause, as Thayer noted, the representative branches of government can
act only by putting "an interpretation on the constitution," and because
such interpretations may survive for long periods before being chal-
lenged in court, if they are ever challenged at all, 190 a Court consider-
ing the legality of enduring interpretations must set its own independ-
186 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003).
187 Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 282 7-28 (1998).
188 Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 778; see also Note, Should the Supreme Court Presume that Congress
Acts Constitutionally? The Role of the Canon of Avoidance and Reliance on Early Legislative
Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, ii6 HARv L. REV. 1798, i818 (2003).
189 Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 785 (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, iii U.S. 53, 57
(1884)); see also Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 123 S. Ct. 2200, 22o n.9 (2003) ("Judicial
deference is particularly warranted where, as here, we deal with a congressional judgment that
has remained essentially unchanged throughout a century of 'careful legislative adjustment."'
(quoting Federal Election Commission v. National Right To Work Committee, 459 U.S. 197, 209
(1992))); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929) ("Long settled and established practice is
a consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions."); cf Nixon
v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000) ("The quantum of empirical evidence needed
to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the nov-
elty and plausibility of the justification raised.").
190 Thayer, supra note 89, at 135-36.
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ent construction of the Constitution against the historically settled
convictions of the country. Although the Court always retains the pre-
rogative to overturn these convictions,19 1 upsetting the entrenched
constitutional beliefs of nonjudicial actors entails costs in terms of both
stability and legitimacy.192 When dealing with consistent past congres-
sional interpretations of the Constitution, the Court must balance these
costs against whatever inclination it may have to articulate its own in-
dependent constitutional view. The doctrinal rule that consistent past
congressional practices are entitled to "very great weight" is in essence
a codification of this balance. It is a measure of how much constitu-
tional culture should matter to the substantive formulation of constitu-
tional law.
An analogous issue faces the Court whenever it reviews the consti-
tutionality of congressional legislation. In such circumstances the
Court must set its view of the Constitution's meaning against the un-
derstanding of Congress. Because this potential conflict is iterative,
the ongoing relationship between the branches will be very much af-
fected by the way in which the Court chooses to align its own view of
constitutional law with the constitutional culture of Congress. If the
Court gives no weight at all to that culture, considerable and perhaps
even debilitating friction between the branches will inevitably develop.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Court has sought to avoid
this friction by a doctrinal rule analogous to that which it has applied
to consistent past congressional practices. In the absence of specific
countervailing considerations, like the potential violation of a constitu-
tional right, the Court recognizes "the heavy presumption of constitu-
tionality to which a 'carefully considered decision of a coequal and
representative branch of our Government' is entitled. ' 193 This pre-
sumption establishes what Thayer calls a "fitting modus vivendi be-
191 The Court has said that "historical acceptance" does not alone guarantee the constitutional-
ity of a given practice, because "no one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the
Constitution by long use." Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792 (1973) (quoting
Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]hat Congress has repeatedly acted on a mis-
taken interpretation of the Constitution does not qualify our duty to invalidate an unconstitu-
tional practice when it is finally challenged.").
192 The Court has asserted that "an unbroken practice ... is not something to be lightly cast
aside." Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983) (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 678).
193 U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 721 (i99o) (quoting Walters v. National Ass'n
of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 319 (1985)). Given his forceful denial of any relationship
between constitutional law and constitutional culture, it is not surprising that Justice Scalia has
recently discussed the possibility of eliminating this presumption. He has observed that "[m]y
court is fond of saying that acts of Congress come to the court with the presumption of constitu-
tionality.... [Ijf Congress is going to take the attitude that it will do anything it can get away
with and let the Supreme Court worry about the Constitution[,] ... then perhaps that presump-
tion is unwarranted." Editorial, A Shot from Justice Scalia, WASH. POST, May 2, 2ooo, at A22
(quoting Justice Scalia) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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tween the different departments," which allows for "full co-
operation."' 94 It means that the Court will not disturb the constitu-
tional judgment of Congress unless it has good reason. The presump-
tion of constitutionality is thus also a measure of how much constitu-
tional culture matters to the formulation of constitutional law.195
The presumption of constitutionality is sometimes justified as the
"deference due to deliberate judgment by constitutional majorities of
the two Houses of Congress that an Act is within their delegated
power or is necessary and proper to execution of that power."'1 96 When
used in this way, "deference" seems to be a synonym for "respect."' 197
There are a number of explanations for why the Court ought to "re-
spect" the constitutional judgment of Congress. One is that interpreta-
tion of the Constitution ought to be responsive to democratic will, and
Congress is more democratically accountable than the Court. Not only
does this argument explicitly repudiate the autonomy of constitutional
law, it implies that constitutional culture ought to inform the articula-
tion of constitutional law unless the Court has good reason to think
otherwise.
A second and slightly less far-reaching explanation for why the
Court ought to "respect" the constitutional conclusions of Congress is
that the Court should defer to the particular kinds of judgments that
are peculiarly within the competence of Congress.198 The logic of such
deference is roughly that although the Court may retain authority to
articulate the rule of law governing the constitutionality of a statute, it
may for various reasons cede to Congress discretion to implement that
rule. 199 Thus even if the Court holds as a matter of law that congres-
194 Thayer, supra note ig, at 152.
195 See Kramer, supra note 5, at 122 (noting that deference to Congress characteristic of the
New Deal settlement "restored to politics questions respecting the definition or scope of the pow-
ers delegated by the Constitution to Congress and the Executive").
196 United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 449 (1953); see also Walters, 473 U.S.
at 319 (noting the "deference ... we customarily must pay to the duly enacted and carefully con-
sidered decision of a coequal and representative branch of our Government").
197 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 18o, 196 (1997) ("We owe Congress' find-
ings an additional measure of deference out of respect for its authority to exercise the legislative
power."); cf. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 531 (1997) ("Judicial deference, in most cases,
is based not on the state of the legislative record Congress compiles but 'on due regard for the
decision of the body constitutionally appointed to decide."' (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112, 207 (1970) (opinion of Harlan, J.))).
198 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 604 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[Judicial
deference] to rationally based legislative judgments ... reflects our respect for the institutional
competence of the Congress on a subject expressly assigned to it by the Constitution and our ap-
preciation of the legitimacy that comes from Congress's political accountability in dealing with
matters open to a wide range of possible choices." (citation omitted)).
199 For a discussion of the general logic of deference, see Robert C. Post, Between Governance
and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, i8io-i6
(1987).
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sional Commerce Clause power can be exercised to regulate intrastate
transactions only if those transactions substantially affect interstate
commerce, the Court may nevertheless "defer" to Congress's factfind-
ing competence on the issue whether particular transactions do, in fact,
substantially affect interstate commerce. 20 0  Deference in this sense
should be distinguished from "delegation," in which the Court cedes to
Congress the authority to articulate the rule of law that defines consti-
tutionality. 01
Eldred well illustrates the logic of deference. Having determined
that CTEA does not categorically violate the "'limited Times' prescrip-
tion '20 2 of the Copyright Clause,20 3 a legal question as to which Eldred
gives "very great weight" to consistent past congressional practice, 20 4
Eldred turns to the distinct question of whether CTEA is "a rational
exercise of the legislative authority conferred by the Copyright
Clause." 2 5  Eldred announces that "we defer substantially to Con-
gress" on this constitutional question.20 6 Because implementing the le-
gal requirements of the Copyright Clause involves the question of how
"an important public purpose may be achieved,"20 7 Eldred explains
200 See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1981). In
Hodel, the Court noted:
The task of a court that is asked to determine whether a particular exercise of congres-
sional power is valid under the Commerce Clause is relatively narrow. The court must
defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce, if
there is any rational basis for such a finding.
... Here, the District Court properly deferred to Congress' express findings, set out
in the Act itself, about the effects of surface coal mining on interstate commerce.
Id. (citations omitted).
201 On the distinction between deference and delegation, see Robert C. Post, The Management
of Speech: Discretion and Rights, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 169, 215. Political question doctrine is the
most conspicuous example of delegation. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228
(1993) (stating that if there is "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department," then it is that department, rather than the judiciary, which
must decide the controversy (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
202 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 781 (2003).
203 The Copyright Clause of the Constitution provides that "Congress shall have Power ... [t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cls. 1, 8.
204 Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 785.
205 Id. at 781.
206 Id.
207 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). Sony conceptualizes
the determination of the purpose of the Copyright Clause as a legal question, whereas it views the
determination of how that purpose is to be achieved as a matter committed to legislative discre-
tion. Sony explains that the purpose of the Copyright Clause is "to motivate the creative activity
of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to
the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired." Id. It ob-
serves that "this task involves a difficult balance between the interests of authors and inventors in
the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society's com-
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that it entails "judgments of a kind Congress typically makes."2 0
"[W]e are not at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations
and policy judgments of this order, however debatable or arguably
unwise they may be."'20 9  Deference is justified in such cases because
the kinds of judgments necessary to apply the relevant constitutional
rule either are better made by Congress or are beyond the institutional
competence of the Court.2 1 0
If the relationship between the Court and Congress is characterized
as one of deference, it may seem that the Court retains control of con-
stitutional law and excludes the influence of constitutional culture,
which is relegated to the subordinate role of implementation. But this
appearance is illusory, because the meaning of a legal rule cannot be
easily distinguished from the scope of its implementation.2 11
Eldred illustrates this point in a startling passage that seeks to ex-
plain why the Court defers to Congress's exercise of Article I powers,
like the power to create copyrights, but not to Congress's Section 5
power, to which the Court applies Boerne's rigorous congruence and
proportionality test. "Section 5," the Court explains, "authorizes Con-
gress to enforce commands contained in and incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment," whereas "[t]he Copyright Clause, in contrast,
empowers Congress to define the scope of the substantive right. Judi-
cial deference to such congressional definition is 'but a corollary to the
grant to Congress of any Article I power.'
2 12
peting interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand." Id. Sony
states that maintaining this balance is largely in legislative hands, because "it is Congress that has
been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to
authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate access to their work product." Id.
208 Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 781. In Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2003), a case last
Term concerning habeas corpus appeals, the Court articulated a distinct ground for deference:
"Deference is necessary because a reviewing court, which analyzes only the transcripts from voir
dire, is not as well positioned as the trial court is to make credibility determinations." Id.
209 Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 782-83.
210 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. i8o, 195-96 (1997) ("We owe Congress'
findings deference in part because the institution 'is far better equipped than the judiciary to
"amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data" bearing upon' legislative questions." (citations
omitted) (quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665-66 (1994) (opinion
of Kennedy, J.) (quoting Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 331 n.12
(1985)))); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 3o8 (1997) ("[T]he Court is institutionally un-
suited to gather the facts upon which economic predictions can be made, and professionally un-
trained to make them."); cf Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 123 S. Ct. 1965, 1971 (2003)
("Intelligent resolution of the question whether routine deference to the opinion of a claimant's
treating physician would yield more accurate disability determinations, it thus appears, might be
aided by empirical investigation of the kind courts are ill equipped to conduct.").
211 Cf Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and Decoupling in the Design of Li-
ability Rules, Ioo MICH. L. REV. 1, 17 n.38 (2001) (noting that "changing the type of 'protection'
for an entitlement also actually changes the content of the entitlement").
212 Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 788 (citation omitted) (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6
(1966)).
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This passage is remarkable not only because it utterly fails to ex-
plain why the congruence and proportionality test is appropriate for
Section 5 legislation,2 13 but also because it seems to retreat from the
Court's claim to be "the ultimate expositor of the constitutional
text."214  It appears to say that the Court delegates to Congress the
power "to define" the nature of its own Article I powers. Because I
very much doubt that the Court intends this implication, 2 15 I am in-
clined to read the passage as asserting merely that Congress can define
the substantive scope of copyrights within the legal limits set by the
Court,2 16 even if on this narrow interpretation Eldred does not eluci-
date why the Court defers to Congress's exercise of Article I powers
but not to the exercise of its Section 5 power.21 7
The point I wish to stress, however, is that the Court's misstep
graphically illustrates the instability of distinguishing between the sub-
stance of a legal rule and the scope of its application. As the Court
unconsciously but powerfully indicates in this passage, to control the
implementation of a rule is in a very real sense to "define" its meaning.
This implies that the analytic framework of deference, like that of the
"presumption of constitutionality" and the "very great weight" ac-
corded to consistent congressional practice, affords ample room for
213 The Copyright Clause does not give Congress the authority to define the copyright power; it
gives Congress the power to authorize copyrights. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. If this empowers
Congress to define what can and cannot be a copyright, it would follow in pari materia that Sec-
tion 5 authorizes Congress to define what does and does not count as enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment. But of course, this is precisely what the congruence and proportionality test is
meant to deny. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 52 1 U.S. 507, 5 19-20 (1997).
214 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 n.7 (2000).
215 Read in this way, the passage would be inconsistent with the Court's recent decisions that
define and limit Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., id. at 627 (holding that
a federal civil remedy for gender-motivated violence exceeds Congress's power under the Com-
merce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 5 14 U.S. 549,
551 (995) (holding that federal prohibition of firearms in a school zone exceeds Congress's au-
thority under the Commerce Clause).
216 This interpretation of the passage is consistent with the overall structure of Eldred, as well
as with the languagv of Graham, 383 U.S. at 6, from which the passage quotes.
217 If Article I powers, like Section 5 power, must be exercised within the legal limits defined by
the Court, then the relevant question is why the Court has chosen to impose stringent limits on
the latter, but not the former. The answer to that question, I think, is that the Court perceives the
exercise of Section 5 power as a threat to its interpretive monopoly, see Post & Siegel, Protecting
the Constitution, supra note 73, at 17, whereas it does not perceive the exercise of Article I powers
as threatening in the same way. This is not because Congress interprets the Constitution any less
in exercising its Article I powers, but because the Court believes that congressional interpretation
of Fourteenth Amendment rights is closer to the kind of constitutional interpretation routinely
practiced by courts. Cf. Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism, supra note 43, at 2033 (quot-
ing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 668 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (recounting Justice
Harlan's objection to allowing Congress to define the substantive scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment). Reva Siegel and I have argued that the Court's perception of the danger of con-
gressional interpretation of the Constitution in the exercise of its Section 5 power is largely mis-
placed. See id. at 2032-39.
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constitutional culture to infiltrate and influence the substance of con-
stitutional law.
Those who defend the autonomy of constitutional law are most
likely to focus on protecting constitutional rights, rather than limiting
congressional power, because the very purpose of constitutional rights
is to defend constitutional values against the depredations of popular
sentiments that may inform constitutional culture. 218 Footnote 4 of
Carolene Products thus suggests that "[t]here may be narrower scope
for operation of the presumption of constitutionality 219 in the protec-
tion of constitutional rights, precisely because such rights should be
rendered impervious to constitutional culture.
This distinction between rights and powers, however, is far too
coarse. The legal articulation of a right can include great room for
presumptions of constitutionality. In First Amendment jurisprudence,
for example, the Court sometimes defers to neutral time, place, and
manner regulations of speech 220 because it believes, wrongly in my
view,2 2 ' that such regulations do not sufficiently endanger First
Amendment values as to warrant more stringent review. 222 The Court
218 See, e.g., supra pp. 3 1-33.
219 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
220 See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 8o0 (1989) (finding that the lower
court "erred in failing to defer" to the city's sound-amplification guideline); see also Hill v. Colo-
rado, 530 U.S. 703, 727 (2000) (counseling "a measure of deference to the judgment of the Colo-
rado Legislature" regarding its regulation of the speech-related conduct of abortion protestors);
Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 18o, 195-96 (,997) (noting in a case concerning "must carry"
provisions for cable television companies that "deference to Congress is in one respect akin to def-
erence owed to administrative agencies").
221 See Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1260-70,
12 76-78 (1995).
222 See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting, 52o U.S. at 641-42 (explaining that as distinct from the "most
exacting scrutiny" applied to content-based restrictions, "regulations that are unrelated to the con-
tent of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny" (citations omitted)). Similarly, the
Court in Eldred rejected the idea that "a copyright scheme" should be subject to "uncommonly
strict scrutiny." Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 788 (2003). The Court concluded, wrongly in
my view, that the "idea/expression dichotomy," coupled with "the 'fair use' defense," rendered
"further First Amendment scrutiny ... unnecessary" to determine whether copyright legislation
unduly impairs First Amendment values. Id. at 788-90. For an argument that the Court's con-
clusion was incorrect, see Brief of Jack M. Balkin et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Peti-
tioners, Eldred (No. ol-6i8), available in 2002 WL 1041899, at *15-21. The First Amendment
values at issue in Eldred concern the protection of public discourse, a structure of communication
that "engenders the sense of participation, identification, and legitimacy necessary to reconcile
individual with collective autonomy." Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy
and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1134 (1993). The Court is gener-
ally astute to apprehend the tension between the individual autonomy required by public dis-
course and legislation that seeks to embed persons within communitarian norms. See, e.g., Robert
C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Delib-
eration, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 6oi, 603 (199o) [hereinafter Post,
Constitutional Concept] (discussing how Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988),
asserts that public discourse must be kept free from the domination of community norms). But if
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will engage in stricter scrutiny, and hence fashion constitutional law to
be more impervious to constitutional culture, when it believes that im-
portant First Amendment principles are more directly threatened.
2 2 3
The Court nicely articulated the point last Term in Federal Election
Commission v. Beaumont,2 2 4 a decision upholding a federal ban on di-
rect corporate contributions "in connection with" certain federal elec-
tions . 2 2  The Court observed that "the basic premise we have followed
in setting First Amendment standards for reviewing political financial
restrictions" is that "the level of scrutiny is based on the importance of
the 'political activity at issue' to effective speech or political associa-
tion. '2 2 6  The more salient the First Amendment value threatened by
government regulation, the higher the degree of scrutiny the Court will
apply, and the more autonomous constitutional law will become from
constitutional culture.
The Court will thus vary the permeability of the membrane sepa-
rating constitutional law from constitutional culture depending upon
the importance of the constitutional value at stake and the degree to
government regulations presuppose the same individual autonomy as does the First Amendment,
the Court is quite erratic in its ability to evaluate their potential damage to the structure of public
discourse. Cf Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and Appropria-
tion, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647, 665 n.94 (199) (noting that courts are not careful to apply
First Amendment protections when property rights are at stake, because property rights, like the
First Amendment, conceptualize persons as autonomous). The Court does have the capacity and
sometimes the will to make such an evaluation. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n,
514 U.S. 334, 347 (i995) ("When a law burdens core political speech, we apply 'exacting scrutiny,'
and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest."
(citation omitted)). But the Court is frequently reluctant to conceive public discourse as a vulner-
able sociological structure of communication that at times needs judicial protection in order to
fulfill its constitutional function. Eldred accordingly declined even to inquire whether CTEA's
extended term burdened core political speech. My best guess is that this is because CTEA pre-
supposes the same autonomy as does public discourse itself.
223 This is true, for example, when it reviews statutes that are content-based. See, e.g., Turner
Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 641-42 ("Our precedents thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to regu-
lations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its con-
tent."); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
ii5-I6 (i99i) ("A statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if it imposes a
financial burden on speakers because of the content of their speech.").
224 123 S. Ct. 2200 (2003).
225 Id. at 2203 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2000)).
226 Id. at 2210 (quoting Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.,
479 U.S. 238, 259 (1986)). The Court noted that "restrictions on political contributions have been
treated as merely 'marginal' speech restrictions subject to relatively complaisant review under the
First Amendment, because contributions lie closer to the edges than to the core of political expres-
sion." Id.; see also United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297, 2310 (2003) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (stating that a statute which "directly restricts the public's receipt of
information" should "[flor that reason" receive greater scrutiny than rational basis review); id.
("[Wle should not examine the statute's constitutionality as if it raised no special First Amend-
ment concern - as if, like tax or economic regulation, the First Amendment demanded only a
'rational basis' for imposing a restriction. Nor should we accept the Government's suggestion
that a presumption in favor of the statute's constitutionality applies.").
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which the value is imperiled.2 2 7 This dynamic is plainly visible in the
structure of equal protection doctrine. The Court is clear that "[t]he
general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sus-
tained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to
a legitimate state interest. '228  When applying this so called "rational-
basis review," as the Court reminded us last Term:
[T]he Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is a plausible
policy reason for the classification, the legislative facts on which the classi-
fication is apparently based rationally may have been considered to be
true by the governmental decisionmaker, and the relationship of the classi-
fication to its goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbi-
trary or irrational. 229
This standard of review allows constitutional culture to influence con-
stitutional law at least as much as in the context of the Court's review
of Congress's copyright power. The Court will apply "more exacting
judicial scrutiny, ' 230 however, when it believes that state action threat-
ens a constitutional value specifically protected by the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.23 3 1
The point can be illustrated by Justice O'Connor's separate opinion
in Lawrence v. Texas,232 in which she concludes that the level of judi-
cial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause should vary depending
upon circumstances:
227 This analysis suggests that the Court has typically allowed constitutional law and constitu-
tional culture to commingle freely in the construction of federal power because the Court does not
in that context typically perceive constitutional values to be threatened by constitutional culture.
When the Court does perceive such threats, as for example when it concludes that Section 5 legis-
lation endangers values associated with separation of powers, the Court will use doctrine like the
congruence and proportionality test to suppress the influence of constitutional culture. The con-
gruence and proportionality test thus functions just like strict scrutiny in the context of judicial
protection of rights. See Stephen M. Griffin, Judicial Supremacy and Equal Protection in a De-
mocracy of Rights, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 281, 310-I (2002).
228 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
229 Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa, 123 S. Ct. 2156, 2 159 (2003) (alteration in original)
(quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. i, ii (1992) (citations omitted)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
230 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 0938).
231 An analogous structure is visible in the Court's due process doctrine. Sometimes the Court
has interpreted the Due Process Clause to require that "a challenged state action implicate a fun-
damental right[]before requirin'g more than a reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest to
justify the action." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997). At other times, however,
the Court has conceived the Clause as balancing the significance of the constitutional liberty in-
terest at stake against the strength of the state's interest in regulation. See id. at 765-68 (Souter,
J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (i96I) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting)); see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982) (balancing the individual interest
in freedom of movement against the state interest in ensuring safety of mentally retarded pa-
tients). In either case, however, the strictness of the Court's scrutiny will vary with the constitu-
tional value perceived to be at risk.
232 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Laws such as economic or tax legislation that are scrutinized under ra-
tional basis review normally pass constitutional muster, since "the Consti-
tution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be recti-
fied by the democratic processes." We have consistently held, however,
that some objectives, such as "a bare . . . desire to harm a politically un-
popular group," are not legitimate state interests. When a law exhibits
such a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a
more searching form of rational basis review to strike down such laws un-
der the Equal Protection Clause.
2 3 3
O'Connor postulates that different levels of judicial scrutiny are justi-
fied because some laws are more likely than others to be "rectified by
the democratic processes." But this seems highly implausible. A more
convincing explanation is that when legislation potentially trenches on
a value specifically protected by the Equal Protection Clause, like the
right not to be harmed merely because one belongs to an unpopular
group, equal protection doctrine should become "more searching" in
order to protect this constitutional value.
The Court has offered an analogous account of why it will engage
in elevated scrutiny of classifications based upon race or gender. The
Court has explained that it will more carefully review legislation in-
volving race- or sex-based classifications because such legislation more
directly threatens constitutional values. Classifications based upon
"race, alienage, or national origin" receive strict scrutiny because
[t]hese factors are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate
state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to re-
flect prejudice and antipathy - a view that those in the burdened class
are not as worthy or deserving as others .... Legislative classifications
based on gender also call for a heightened standard of review. That factor
generally provides no sensible ground for differential treatment. "[W]hat
differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical
disability ... is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to
ability to perform or contribute to society." Rather than resting on mean-
ingful considerations, statutes distributing benefits and burdens between
the sexes in different ways very likely reflect outmoded notions of the rela-
tive capabilities of men and women.2 34
The doctrine of elevated scrutiny is designed to detect and elimi-
nate racial "antipathy" and "outmoded notions" of gender because leg-
islation based upon these perspectives is inconsistent with the constitu-
tional values of the Equal Protection Clause, and because these
233 Id. at 2484-85 (omission in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440;
and U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
234 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41 (alteration and second omission in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion)).
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perspectives suffuse constitutional culture. 3s Elevated scrutiny thus
constructs constitutional law as independent from a constitutional cul-
ture that may well reflect the very perspectives which the Court fash-
ions elevated scrutiny to alter.
It is precisely in such circumstances, when doctrine is deployed as
an instrument for the transformation of popular values, that we are
most tempted to accept an account of constitutional law as autono-
mous from constitutional culture. This account captures a certain
truth. Unlike rational basis review, where equal protection doctrine
accepts and merges with constitutional culture, strict scrutiny estab-
lishes a fierce tension between constitutional law and constitutional
culture. But the account is also misleading, because it obscures the
question of how the Court acquires the constitutional values that it
uses strict scrutiny to protect. We need to recall that the Court came
to regard racial "antipathy" and "outmoded notions" of gender as in-
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause not because of changes in
the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor because of changes in the
intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, but because
American constitutional culture evolved in such a way as to render
these practices intolerable.2 3 6
We are thus brought face to face with a seeming paradox. If strict
scrutiny protects values that originate in constitutional culture, why
would strict scrutiny define itself in opposition to that culture? How
can strict scrutiny be so independent from constitutional culture as to
be an instrument for the modification of that culture, when strict scru-
tiny simultaneously seeks to instantiate values that derive from that
culture? This conundrum importantly underlies Scalia's defense of the
autonomy of constitutional law. Scalia suggests that constitutional law
either can reflect popular attitudes, or it can restrain them, but it can-
not do both. 237 Given this choice, we had better conceive constitu-
tional law as autonomous from constitutional culture if we wish to
protect constitutional rights.
The force of this argument depends upon the way in which it imag-
ines the relationship between constitutional law and constitutional cul-
235 On the use of American antidiscrimination law as an instrument for the reshaping of exist-
ing social practices, see POST ET AL., supra note 176, at 22-41.
236 On gender, see supra pp. 24-26; on race, see supra pp. 35-36 and note 155.
237 See supra pp. 3 1-32. Justice Scalia writes:
A democratic society does not, by and large, need constitutional guarantees to in-
sure that its laws will reflect "current values." Elections take care of that quite well.
The purpose of constitutional guarantees - and in particular those constitutional guar-
antees of individual rights [-] ... is precisely to prevent the law from reflecting certain
changes in original values that the society adopting the Constitution thinks fundamen-
tally undesirable.
Scalia, supra note 132, at 862.
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ture. It assumes that constitutional culture is singular, so that constitu-
tional law is put to the choice of either expressing that culture or op-
posing it. The Court sometimes explicitly fashions constitutional law
on this assumption, as for example when it holds that the Eighth
Amendment should be interpreted to implement "the evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,"238 or
when it reads the Due Process Clause to protect "the basic values that
underlie our society. '23 9 Justice Kennedy last Term elegantly expressed
this assumption about the relationship between constitutional law and
constitutional culture when he read the Fifth Amendment to express
"the ultimate moral sense of the community. '240
There may be circumstances in which it suffices to regard constitu-
tional culture as singular in this way. But constitutional culture does
not as a general matter have this character. Constitutional culture,
like all culture, evolves in time.2 4 1  Even the second Justice Harlan,
surely one of the greatest proponents of maintaining an intimate rela-
238 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, ioi
(1958) (plurality opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even Scalia seems to recognize the
force of such standards, as for example when he remarks that he would be untrue to his original-
ism to the extent that "I cannot imagine myself, any more than any other federal judge, upholding
a statute that imposes the punishment of flogging." Scalia, supra note 132, at 864; see also Robert
Post, Justice for Scalia, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June i 1, 1998, at 57, 6o (discussing the significance of
Scalia's concession). Scalia adds, not implausibly, "[b]ut then I cannot imagine such a case's aris-
ing either." Scalia, supra note 132, at 864.
239 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion) (quoting Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). This view of the relationship between law and culture has deep roots in the common
law tradition. Commentators across generations have understood the common law as expressing
the "custom" and "experience" of the surrounding community. See CHARLES B. GOODRICH,
LOWELL LECTURES: THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT AS EXHIBITED IN THE INSTITU-
TIONS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 239 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1853); 2
FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 6.2 (956); WILLIAM J.
NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA 38-42 (1996); i ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF
CONNECTICUT 40 (Arno Press 1972) (795); 1 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON 184, 348 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967); see also Robert Post, Law and Cultural
Conflict, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 485, 486-87 (2003) (discussing this phenomenon). For a modern
expression of the unity of culture, see Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion in Rice v. Cayetano, 528
U.S. 495, 527 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting), which supports the need to preserve a "distinct, in-
digenous culture." Id. at 528.
240 Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994, 2015 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (quoting ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 73 (1955)).
Justice Kennedy observed that "[a] Constitution survives over time because the people share a
common, historic commitment to certain simple but fundamental principles." Id.
241 From an anthropological point of view, culture "is not a passive inheritance but an active
process of creating meaning, not given but constantly redefined and reconstituted." BHIKHU
PAREKH, RETHINKING MULTICULTURALISM: CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND POLITICAL
THEORY 152-53 (2000). Culture is "a dynamic process of self-understanding." Kirsten Hastrup
& Karen Fog Olwig, Introduction to SITING CULTURE: THE SHIFTING ANTHROPOLOGICAL
OBJECT I, 3 (Karen Fog Olwig & Kirsten Hastrup eds., 1997) (emphasis added).
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tionship between constitutional law and constitutional culture,2 42
clearly recognized that the Due Process Clause should reflect a "tradi-
tion" that must be conceived as "a living thing. '2 43 Constitutional law
can therefore enforce constitutional culture only by intervening in an
ongoing process of historical development, so that constitutional law is
always faced with the choice of encouraging or retarding these evolu-
tionary changes.2 44  In such circumstances constitutional law neither
transparently expresses nor autonomously regulates constitutional cul-
ture. Instead it intervenes to shape the development of that culture on
the basis of its understanding of that culture. In this way constitu-
tional law simultaneously reflects and restrains popular values.
If constitutional culture is not diachronically singular, it is also not
synchronically singular. At any given moment in time, American con-
stitutional culture, like all culture, 245 is typically etched with deep divi-
sions. It has even been observed that our constitutional culture con-
sists of "an historically extended tradition of argument" whose
"integrity and coherence ... are to be found in, not apart from, con-
troversy. '246 We can certainly trace the origins of strict scrutiny doc-
242 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 762 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in the judg-
ment).
243 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (i96i) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan writes that "[a] de-
cision of this Court which radically departs from [that tradition] could not long survive, while a
decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound." Id.
244 It is noteworthy that Scalia has attempted to interpret the Due Process Clause in a way de-
signed to escape this choice. He does not read the Due Process Clause as reflecting a living tradi-
tion, but instead as enforcing static values implicit in "the historic practices of our society." Mi-
chael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989) (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion). The "purpose" of
the Due Process Clause, Scalia writes, "is to prevent future generations from lightly casting aside
important traditional values - not to enable this Court to invent new ones." Id. at 122 n.2.
"[Tihe Constitution that I interpret and apply," Scalia has announced, "is not living but dead."
Antonin Scalia, God's Justice and Ours, FIRST THINGS, May 2002, at 17, 17. In Scalia's hands,
therefore, due process doctrine need not choose between encouraging or retarding processes of
cultural change, because the doctrine does not seek to express constitutional culture in the full
complexity of its evolutionary nature. It instead aspires only to reflect past versions of that cul-
ture. Scalia opts for this approach because of his fear that judicial efforts to interpret culture
would reflect merely "the predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of this
Court." Michael H., 491 U.S. at 121 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502
(1977)). The cost of Scalia's approach is that the point and function of due process doctrine are
rendered obscure. For a discussion, see infra pp. 93-95.
245 Recent anthropological theory portrays culture as "a site of social differences and struggles,"
Richard Johnson, What Is Cultural Studies Anyway?, SOC. TEXT, Winter 1986/1987, at 38, 39, so
that it is impossible "to conceive of cultural identity apart from the arenas of contest in which
questions of identity arise and are perforce answered," Carol J. Greenhouse, Constructive Ap-
proaches to Law, Culture, and Identity, 28 LAW & SOclY REv. 1231, 1240 (1994). See also Sally
Engle Merry, Law, Culture, and Cultural Appropriation, io YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 575, 582-84
(1998) (discussing the "polyvalent, contestable messages" contained in the concept of culture).
246 POWELL, supra note 15o, at 6. More generally, it has been said that "[a] living tradi-
tion . . . is an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in
part about the goods which constitute that tradition." ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER
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trine to such fierce arguments. In deciding Brown, for example, the
Court essentially was imposing the constitutional culture of the North
upon that of the South.147  In deciding Frontiero the Court was inter-
vening into a controversy about the nature of gender that was so in-
tense that (as we are now likely to forget) the proposed Equal Rights
Amendment was actually defeated.2 48 To the extent that constitutional
VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 207 (Am. ed., Univ. of Notre Dame Press I981); see also
HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA, at xxi-
xxxiii (1988). On the resources of culture for maintaining internal division and critique, see
MICHAEL WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 33-66 (1987).
247 See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 490 (2000).
The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were quite aware of sectional differences in constitu-
tional culture. In the words of Senator Charles Sumner: "Give me the centralism of Liberty. Give
me the imperialism of Equal Rights." CONG. GLOBE, 4 2d Cong., ist Sess. 651 (1871).
If in the past geographical divisions of constitutional culture were particularly salient, last
Term divisions of class seem to have assumed unusual prominence. Compare, e.g., Grutter v. Bol-
linger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2340 (2003) ("[Mlajor American businesses have made clear that the skills
needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to
widely diverse people .... "), id. at 2341 ("[U]niversities, and in particular, law schools, represent
the training ground for a large number of our Nation's leaders."), and id. ("In order to cultivate a
set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership
be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity."), with id. at 2350
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The majority upholds the Law School's
racial discrimination not by interpreting the people's Constitution, but by responding to a faddish
slogan of the cognoscenti."), id. at 2355 (arguing that "there is nothing compelling about elite
status"), id. at 2359 ("Apparently where the status quo being defended is that of the elite estab-
lishment ... rather than a less fashionable Southern military institution, the Court will defer
without serious inquiry ... "), and id. at 2362 n.ii ("[A]ll the Law School cares about is its own
image among know-it-all elites .... "). See also Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2496-97
(2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court as "the product of a law-profession culture"
characteristic of "a governing caste that knows best"); cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652-53
(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("When the Court takes sides in the culture wars, it tends to be with
the knights rather than the villeins - and more specifically with the Templars, reflecting the
views and values of the lawyer class from which the Court's Members are drawn.... [The] law-
school view of what 'prejudices' must be stamped out may be contrasted with the more plebeian
attitudes that apparently still prevail in the United States Congress, which has been unresponsive
to repeated attempts to extend to homosexuals the protections of federal civil rights laws ... 
(citations omitted)).
One register f the shift from sectional to class differences is the fact that the geographical
origins of the Justices, which used to be a matter of pressing political concern, are today a matter
almost of indifference.
248 On the defeat of the ERA, see JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986).
Much of the substance of the ERA, which provided that "[e]quality of rights under the law shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex," Proposed
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, H.R.J. Res. 2o8, 9 2d Cong., 2d Sess., 86
Stat. 1523 (1972), has essentially been incorporated into the Court's contemporary equal protec-
tion doctrine. See Brannon P. Denning & John R. Vile, Necromancing the Equal Rights Amend-
ment, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 593, 598 (2000) (referring to "judicial victories that seemed to ren-
der the ERA superfluous"); Joan A. Lukey & Jeffrey A. Smagula, Do We Still Need a Federal
Equal Rights Amendment?, BOSTON B.J., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at io, Io (stating that the "new height-
ened intermediate scrutiny standard" for gender "indicates that the goals of the Equal Rights
Amendment have survived and have been incorporated into judicial analysis of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution"). This history
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culture is divided, a Court seeking to safeguard the values of constitu-
tional culture must decide which version of constitutional culture it
will support.2 49 It must decide whether to side with the constitutional
culture of the North or of the South; it must choose to support either
those who promote or those who oppose traditional gender stereo-
types.2 5 0
If the relationship between constitutional law and constitutional
culture is modeled in this way, constitutional law can simultaneously
reflect and regulate constitutional culture. When constitutional law
intervenes in an ongoing cultural dispute about the meaning of the
Constitution, it both draws strength from those who agree with the
Court's vision of the Constitution and displaces the views of those who
disagree with the Court's understanding. That is why even in the area
of strict scrutiny, where constitutional law is most concerned to protect
constitutional values from the encroachment of popular attitudes, con-
stitutional law can without internal contradiction express values de-
rived from constitutional culture and yet also seek to modify constitu-
tional culture.
Seen from this angle, it is apparent that constitutional rights bear
an exceedingly complex relationship to constitutional culture. We
might imagine a spectrum in which, at one end, rational basis review
allows constitutional law and constitutional culture freely to commin-
gle, and in which, at the other end, strict scrutiny both reflects consti-
tutional culture and authorizes constitutional law to reshape that cul-
ture.
The complexity of strict scrutiny was well illustrated last Term in
the important case of Grutter v. Bollinger,25 1 in which Justice
O'Connor authored an opinion for five Justices upholding the affirma-
tive action program of the law school of the University of Michigan
(Law School).25 2  The program employed racial classifications, and
O'Connor accordingly began her analysis by reiterating:
illustrates how the Court can incorporate changes in constitutional culture into its doctrinal un-
derstandings, even when these changes have been explicitly rejected by the formal mechanism of
an Article V amendment. There can be no cleaner illustration of the theoretical and historical
inadequacy of Rehnquist's version of positivism, described supra pp. 30-3 I.
249 See Sarah Harding, Introduction: Law and Cultural Conflict, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV 479,
481 (2003) ("[N]eutrality is illusory... In mediating between competing cultural perspectives,
legal determinations are never without cultural meaning - there are always winners and losers
on issues mediated through law and in the public realm.").
250 When intervening in cultural controversies of this kind, the Court must gamble on the fu-
ture development of the American constitutional order. The Court predicted correctly in both
Brown and Frontiero, but it stumbled badly during the crisis of the New Deal, when it failed ut-
terly to predict the actual evolution of the American polity.
251 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
252 Id. at 2347. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy dissented from O'Connor's opin-
ion on the ground that the Law School's affirmative action program was not narrowly tailored.
[Vol. Ii17: 4
HeinOnline -- 117 Harv. L. Rev. 56 2003-2004
CULTURE, COURTS, AND LAW
Because the Fourteenth Amendment "protect[s] persons, not groups," all
"governmental action based on race - a group classification long recog-
nized as in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited -
should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal
right to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed." 25 3
To protect this constitutional value of equality of individual treat-
ment, Grutter holds that racial classifications should be subject to
"strict scrutiny, '254 which "means that such classifications are constitu-
tional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling govern-
mental interests. '255 The opinion explains that strict scrutiny is de-
signed to facilitate "searching judicial inquiry 256 because race is an
inherently "suspect classification.
'25 7
See id. at 2365 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented on the ground
"that racial classifications are per se harmful and that almost no amount of benefit in the eye of
the beholder can justify such classifications." Id. at 2361 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
253 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337 (alteration in original) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 5,5 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (emphasis in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).
254 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337 (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227). The implications of this
point are controversial. See id. at 2348 n.* (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("This case ... does not re-
quire the Court to revisit whether all governmental classifications by race, whether designed to
benefit or to burden a historically disadvantaged group, should be subject to the same standard of
judicial review."); Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2434 (2003) (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("I agree with Justice Ginsburg that, in implementing the Constitution's equality in-
struction, government decisionmakers may properly distinguish between policies of inclusion and
exclusion ...." (citation omitted)); id. at 2444 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("In implementing this
equality instruction, as I see it, government decisionmakers may properly distinguish between
policies of exclusion and inclusion .... Our jurisprudence ranks race a 'suspect' category, 'not
because [race] is inevitably an impermissible classification, but because it is one which usually, to
our national shame, has been drawn for the purpose of maintaining racial inequality."' (alteration
in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395
F.2d 920, 931-32 (2d Cir. 1968) (footnote omitted)). O'Connor's opinion in Grutter seeks to blur
this controversy. It states:
Context matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal
Protection Clause.... Not every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable and
strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully examining the impor-
tance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental decisionmaker for
the use of race in that particular context.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338 (citation omitted).
255 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337-38.
256 Id. at 2338 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (I989 )).
257 Croson, 488 U.S. at 500. It is odd, therefore, that at one point Grutter states "that 'good
faith' on the part of a university is 'presumed' absent 'a showing to the contrary."' Grutter, 123
S. Ct. at 2339 (quoting Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-i9 0978)
(opinion of Powell, J.)). It is not clear how a presumption of good faith is meant to cohere with
the basic idea of strict scrutiny, which is designed aggressively to interrogate racial classifications
because they are inherently "suspicious." See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST.
A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 145-48 (ig8o) (arguing that the "compelling interest" and
"narrowly tailored" prongs of strict scrutiny analysis should be understood as tools for "determin-
ing whether the initial suspicions aroused by the classification are well founded or rather on fuller
exploration can be allayed"); see also Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338 ("[Sltrict scrutiny is designed to
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It is no accident that strict scrutiny doctrine is framed in terms that
are opaque to common usage. Whether a classification serves a "com-
pelling" governmental interest or is "narrowly tailored" are questions
that must be answered primarily by reference to the legal precedents of
the Court. By deliberately formulating the question of constitutional-
ity in this technical legal way, which is conspicuously impervious to
the terms in which the debate over affirmative action is framed in con-
stitutional culture, the Court facilitates its own control over the use of
race by state actors. The Court can shape the intense controversies
about affirmative action by manipulating the definition of a "compel-
ling" state interest or by construing the meaning of "narrow tailor-
ing."258
It does not follow, however, that Grutter uses strict scrutiny to ex-
press values that are autonomous from contemporary constitutional
culture. In fact quite the reverse is true, as evidenced by Grutter's in-
terpretation of the "compelling interest" test. Grutter holds "that the
Law School has a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student
body, '25 9 and it rests this conclusion on "our view that attaining a di-
verse student body is at the heart of the Law School's proper institu-
tional mission. 2 60  Although Grutter does not offer a clear account of
the Law School's "proper institutional mission, '261 the Court appears
to attribute to the Law School at least three distinct objectives:
i. The mission of the Law School is to provide an educational
process that "promotes learning outcomes 2 62 by producing stu-
provide a framework for carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons ad-
vanced by the governmental decisionmaker for the use of race in that particular context."); id. at
2350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the "deference the Court
gives to the Law School" is "inconsistent with the very concept of 'strict scrutiny"'); id. at 2366
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Although the Court recites the language of our strict scrutiny analy-
sis, its application of that review is unprecedented in its deference.").
258 The Court can also shape such controversies by subtly shifting the criteria for determining
which practices count as racial classifications that trigger strict scrutiny. Positive judgments
about whether practices classify on the basis of race may frequently be driven by normative
judgments about whether they have a legitimate and benign social purpose. See Balkin & Siegel,
supra note 178, at 4 ("Courts must make a variety of implementing decisions in order to apply the
anticlassification principle; and, as we show, they do not make such implementing decisions in
any consistent manner. Inconsistency in the ways that courts have implemented the anticlassifica-
tion principle, over time and in different parts of the law, suggests that the discourse of anticlassi-
fication conceals other values that do much of the work in determining which practices antidis-
crimination law enjoins."); id. at 14-15 (comparing the ways in which equal protection doctrine
defines what counts as a racial classification in the cases of criminal suspect descriptions and af-
firmative action).
259 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
260 Id.
261 The opinion veers instead into a recitation of the "benefits" of diversity. Id. at 2339-41.
262 Id. at 2340.
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dents who are trained to function "as professionals. '263  A di-
verse student body is essential to this mission because profes-
sionals must be prepared to work within "an increasingly di-
verse workforce, '264 which requires that law school education
facilitate "cross-racial understanding. '265
2. The mission of the Law School is to prepare "students for
... citizenship" as part of its "fundamental role in maintaining
the fabric of society. ' 2 6 6  A diverse student body is indispensa-
ble to this mission because "[e]ffective participation by mem-
bers of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Na-
tion is essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be
realized. 267
3. The mission of the Law School is to train "our Nation's lead-
ers. '2 68 A diverse student body is necessary to this mission be-
cause, "[i]n order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in
the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leader-
ship be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of
every race and ethnicity. '269
Although Grutter casts itself as merely endorsing Justice Powell's
opinion in Bakke, 27 0 Grutter's analysis of diversity actually differs
quite dramatically from Powell's. Powell conceptualized diversity as a
263 Id. (quoting Brief of American Educational Research Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in sup-
port of Respondents, Grutter (No. 02-241), available in 2003 WL 398292, at *3).
264 Id.
265 Id. at 2339.
266 Id. at 2340.
267 Id. at 2340-41. The Court states:
[T]he diffusion of knowledge and opportunity through public institutions of higher edu-
cation must be accessible to all individuals regardless of race or ethnicity. The United
States, as amicus curiae, affirms that "[e]nsuring that public institutions are open and
available to all segments of American society, including people of all races and ethnici-
ties, represents a paramount government objective." . . . And, "[n]owhere is the impor-
tance of such openness more acute than in the context of higher education."
Id. at 2340 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Grutter (No. 02 -24), available in 2003 WL 176635, at * 13).
For an argument that affirmative action should be justified by the mission of American higher
education to create a public culture capable of sustaining democratic legitimacy, see Robert Post,
Introduction: After Bakke, in RACE AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 13, 22-24
(Robert Post & Michael Rogin eds., 1998). It is a measure of Grutter's innovation that in 1998 it
was "uncertain whether this justification for affirmative action, if candidly expressed, would pass
constitutional muster." Id. at 24.
268 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341.
269 Id. The Court continues: "All members of our heterogeneous society must have confidence
in the openness and integrity of the educational institutions that provide this training." Id.
270 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269-324 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.); see
also Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337 ("[T]oday we endorse Justice Powell's view that student body di-
versity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions.").
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value intrinsic to the educational process itself. He regarded diversity
as essential to "the quality of higher education, '27 I because education
was a practice of enlightenment, "of 'speculation, experiment and crea-
tion' ' 2 72 that thrived on the "robust exchange of ideas"2 73 characteristi-
cally provoked by confrontation between persons of distinct life ex-
periences. 274 Powell understood diversity as necessary to facilitate this
process of education. The state had a compelling interest in diversity
insofar as it had a compelling interest in maintaining this educational
process.2 75 But because most institutions in American life do not exist
to promote this kind of education, 276 Powell's explanation of the com-
pelling interest of diversity did not reach very far beyond the specific
context of higher education.
In contrast to Powell's opinion in Bakke, Grutter does not offer an
account of the intrinsic value of the educational process. It instead
conceives of education as instrumental for the achievement of extrinsic
social goods like professionalism, citizenship, or leadership. It follows
from this way of conceptualizing the problem that the Law School can
have a compelling interest in using diversity to facilitate the attain-
ment of these social goods only if there is an independently compelling
interest in the actual attainment of these goods. Grutter's justifications
for diversity thus potentially reach far more widely than do Powell's.
This becomes clear if we examine Grutter's argument that diversity
is a compelling interest because it is necessary for the Law School to
fulfill its essential mission of providing the education necessary to "sus-
taining our political and cultural heritage. ' 277  The State's interest in
providing the education required to maintain "the fabric of society"
can be no more compelling than the State's interest in actually pre-
271 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-13.
272 Id. (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 0957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring
in the judgment)).
273 Id. (quoting Keyishan v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (I967)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
274 Id. at 312-13.
275 Powell explained:
Thus, in arguing that its universities must be accorded the right to select those stu-
dents who will contribute the most to the "robust exchange of ideas," petitioner invokes
a countervailing constitutional interest, that of the First Amendment. In this light, peti-
tioner must be viewed as seeking to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance in
the fulfillment of its mission.
Id. at 313.
276 Some have argued that the broadcast media, like universities, also have this purpose. See,
e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 567 (599o) ("Safeguarding the public's right
to receive a diversity of views and information over the airwaves is therefore an integral compo-
nent of the FCC's mission.").
277 Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2340 (2003) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225
(1982)).
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serving "our political and cultural heritage. '27 8  And because Grutter
affirms that "the civic life of our Nation" will lose legitimacy unless
there is "[e]ffective participation by members of all racial and ethnic
groups, 2 7 9 an equally compelling interest exists in ensuring that mem-
bers of all racial and ethnic groups actually participate in civic life.
This implies that each American institution that serves as a forum for
participation in civic life has a compelling interest in ensuring the par-
ticipation of "all racial and ethnic groups."280
Similarly, if the Law School has a compelling interest in establish-
ing a "training ground for a large number of our Nation's leaders,"'2 8 '
the state must have an equally compelling interest in maintaining the
quality of its leadership. From a constitutional perspective, it is not
enough that "the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and
qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity," but the nation must
also possess "a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citi-
zenry."282  It is possible that such legitimacy can be assured merely by
instilling confidence that all citizens, regardless of race or ethnicity, can
become leaders. But it is also possible that such legitimacy requires
that there be in addition some measure of actual diversity among
American leaders. If that were true, then each American institution
has a compelling interest in assembling a diverse and therefore legiti-
mate set of leaders. If police are "leaders" in their communities, there
is a compelling interest in ensuring diverse police departments; if doc-





281 Id. at 2341.
282 Id.
283 The argument with respect to the training of professionals has a potentially different form.
Grutter does not explicitly assert that the legal profession must be diverse in order to fulfill its
function. It argues instead that the Law School requires diversity in order to create the "cross-
racial understanding" that will enable legal professionals to work effectively in an increasingly
diverse workforce and marketplace. Id. at 2339. Ambiguity is created, however, when immedi-
ately after this argument Grutter observes:
What is more, high-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders of the United States mili-
tary assert that, "[biased on [their] decades of experience," a "highly qualified, racially
diverse officer corps ... is essential to the military's ability to fulfill its princip[al] mis-
sion to provide national security."... At present, "the military cannot achieve an officer
corps that is both highly qualified and racially diverse unless the service academies and
the ROTC used limited race-conscious recruiting and admissions policies." . .. To fulfill
its mission, the military "must be selective in admissions for training and education for
the officer corps, and it must train and educate a highly qualified, racially diverse officer
corps in a racially diverse setting." ... We agree that "[i]t requires only a small step from
this analysis to conclude that our country's other most selective institutions must remain
both diverse and selective."
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Whether the Court is actually ready to embrace the far-reaching
implications of its own reasoning is quite uncertain.18 4 These implica-
tions are in serious tension not only with Grutter's deliberate assertion
that "outright racial balancing" would be "patently unconstitu-
tional, '285 but also, as we shall see, with Grutter's exposition of the
"narrowly tailored" prong of strict scrutiny. They are also seemingly
inconsistent with O'Connor's past judgments, like her separate opinion
in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education28 6 concluding that a school
board's desire to retain minority teachers in order to provide "role
models" for its students does not constitute a compelling interest.
287
Id. at 2340 (alterations in original) (quoting Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et
al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutter (No. 02-241), Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct.
2411 (No. 02-516), available in 2003 WL 1787554, at *5, 27, 29). This passage seems to imply that
if the military needs to be racially diverse in order to fulfill its principal mission, so also does the
legal profession need to be racially diverse in order to fulfill its principal mission. If this were
true, Grutter would establish that the need for diversity in the legal profession is a compelling in-
terest.
284 Of course it is somewhat of a fiction to speak of the Court as though it possesses unified
agency. It is evident that members of the Court differ widely among themselves on the constitu-
tional issues raised by affirmative action, so that the Court's message on these issues will to some
extent be divided and uncertain. This can be seen in the tension between Grutter and its compan-
ion case, Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003), in which the Court struck down the under-
graduate affirmative action program of the University of Michigan. Gratz and Grutter offer
seemingly inconsistent accounts of the nature of strict scrutiny. Grutter states:
Context matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal
Protection Clause.... Not every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable and
strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully examining the impor-
tance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental decisionmaker for
the use of race in that particular context.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338. In Gratz, however, the Court appears to suggest that strict scrutiny is
always the same regardless of context:
It is by now well established that "all racial classifications reviewable under the
Equal Protection Clause must be strictly scrutinized." ... This "standard of review ... is
not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification."
Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2427 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (i995);
and Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (plurality opinion)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). This difference is so stark that Breyer, who joins Grutter, and who agrees with
the Court's judgment in Gratz, refuses to join the latter opinion, writing separately to note that "I
agree with Justice [Ginsburg's dissent] that, in implementing the Constitution's equality instruc-
tion, government decisionmakers may properly distinguish between policies of inclusion and ex-
clusion, . . . for the former are more likely to prove consistent with the basic constitutional obliga-
tion that the law respect each individual equally." Id. at 2434 (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment). For a discussion of strict scrutiny, see supra note 254.
285 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
286 476 U.S. 267, 284 (1986).
287 Id. at 288 n.*. The "role model" rationale is quite close to Grutter's argument that the state
has a compelling interest in maintaining "a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citi-
zenry." Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341. If teachers are "leaders" to their students, and if leadership
must be diverse in order to retain legitimacy, then the reasoning of Grutter appears to suggest that
there is a compelling interest in a school board's retaining a diverse faculty. O'Connor's opinion
is also in tension with other past opinions. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S.
547, 613 (I99O) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for "too casually extend[ing] the
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Grutter was so dramatic in part because of the striking and unex-
pected disparity between the generosity of its exposition of the compel-
ling interest standard and the Court's previous hostility to affirmative
action, as evidenced in such past decisions as Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena288 and Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.289
We may ask, therefore, how the Court came to embrace this par-
ticular explanation of the interests served by affirmative action. Al-
though Powell's exposition of the compelling educational interest of
diversity had been intellectually elegant and precise, it had displayed
little or no relationship to the actual reasons why affirmative action
had become prominent in American higher education. These reasons
were based almost entirely on the felt need to remedy deep social dis-
locations associated with race.2 90  Grutter, by contrast, far more accu-
justifications that might support racial classifications, beyond that of remedying past discrimina-
tion"); Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 ("Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm.
Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial
inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility."). For an interpretation of Justice O'Connor's
previous opinions that anticipates her decision in Grutter, see Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar
Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. I745, 1763-67 (1996).
288 515 U.S. 200 (i995).
289 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
290 The origins of affirmative action in university admissions reflect a fundamentally remedial
impulse. The very first sentence of the argument in the brief of the University of California in
Bakke frames the issue quite precisely: "The outcome of this controversy will decide for future
decades whether blacks, Chicanos and other insular minorities are to have meaningful access to
higher education and real opportunities to enter the learned professions, or are to be penalized
indefinitely by the disadvantages flowing from previous pervasive discrimination." Brief of Peti-
tioner University of California, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-
8ii), available in 1977 WL 189474, at *13. In its Summary of Argument, the University of Cali-
fornia describes the historical growth of this remedial perspective:
One of the things in which the nation may take great pride since the end of World
War II has been its willingness to address in actions, rather than simply words, the ra-
cial injustices that are the unhappier parts of our legacy.... The commitment to relegate
the lingering burdens of the past to the past has run deeply and widely throughout the
country, among a great many of its institutions....
... [T]hose institutions that, in the exercise of their appointed roles, confront at
close range the enduring effects of what has been handed down to us have not shrunk
from the commitment when the unforeseen complexities began to reveal themselves.
Thus, when it became clear in the 196o's that dismantling of formal racial barriers did
not itself bring long-alienated minorities into the mainstream, the widespread response
was not abandonment of the commitment but effort to seek new ways to undo the con-
tinuing effects of past discrimination and to achieve the benefits of a truly open, racially
diverse society.
The response was not only widespread; it sprang from a broad range of independ-
ent and autonomous sources. No central authority directed this effort. Yet toward the
end of the last decade, many governmental and private institutions, including this Court,
came concurrently to the realization that a real effort to deal with many of the facets of
the legacy of past racial discrimination unavoidably requires remedies that are attentive
to race, that color is relevant today if it is to be irrelevant tomorrow. This discovery and
response was found in many sectors of society; the school desegregation area was a ma-
jor arena, but the same phenomenon was found in employment, housing, and many
other areas, including professional education.
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rately identifies these reasons. In the years since Bakke, elite universi-
ties have become ever more committed to the goal of achieving a ra-
cially diverse student body.2 9 1 Although they tend to justify this com-
mitment in terms of the educational benefits articulated by Powell,2 92
"diversity" nevertheless still chiefly functions as "a code word for rep-
resentation in enjoyment of social goods by major ethnic groups who
have some claim to past mistreatment."293
This case concerns access of minorities to professional education and careers, spe-
cifically in medicine. The experience of the professional schools in the 196o's mirrored
the picture elsewhere. The falling of formal racial barriers failed to lead to participation
by significant numbers of minorities. All but two medical schools in the nation re-
mained virtually all-white islands in a multiracial society. Indeed, in terms of the num-
bers of minorities entering medical schools, a threat of retrogression appeared.
Id. at 8-io; see also McGeorge Bundy, The Issue Before the Court: Who Gets Ahead in America?,
THE ATLANTIC, Nov. 1977, at 41, 42 ("[Tjhe deepest and most general objective [of affirmative
action] has been to ensure full and fair access to all parts of our social, economic, and professional
life for nonwhite Americans .... [T]here can be no blinking the enormous and unique set of
handicaps which our whole history, right up to the present, has imposed on those who are not
white."); Jerome Karabel, The Rise and Fall of Affirmative Action at the University of California,
J. BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC., Autumn 1999, at iog, Iio (arguing that the timing of the intro-
duction of affirmative action at the University of California "suggests that it was less the moral
claims of the civil rights movement than the palpable threat to the existing order posed by the
urban (and, to a lesser extent, the campus) uprisings of the late 196os that led to a rupture in long-
standing patterns of racial and ethnic exclusion not only at the University of California but at col-
leges and universities throughout the country").
291 See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2329 (noting that "[p]ublic and private universities across the Na-
tion have modeled their own admissions programs on Justice Powell's views" concerning permis-
sible race-conscious policies); Samuel Issacharoff, Can Affirmative Action Be Defended?, 59 OHIO
ST. L.J. 669, 679 (1998); Lawrence H. Summers & Laurence H. Tribe, Race Is Never Neutral, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2003, at Ai ("There is a broad consensus supporting the value of racial diver-
sity at our nation's universities [and affirmative action] is by now deeply woven into the fabric of
our society."); cf. Jeffrey Rosen, How I Learned to Love Quotas, N.Y. TIMES, June s, 2003, § 6
(Magazine), at 52 ("In both California and Texas, the political pressures to achieve racial diversity
proved so overwhelming that when each state's universities were forbidden to take race into ac-
count in the admissions process, they simply refused to accept the decline in black and Hispanic
enrollment that inevitably followed.").
292 Deborah Malamud writes:
As a rationale for affirmative action, diversity ... has become a popular alternative
to the remediation of socioeconomic disadvantage, for three reasons. The first reason is
that the Supreme Court rejects 'societal discrimination' as a constitutional rationale for
affirmative action but has accepted the rationale of diversity when that issue has come
before it. The second reason is that the diversity rationale solves the (perceived) prob-
lem of affirmative action for the black middle class.... The third reason ... is that the
goals of diversity and inclusion resonate with those of integration ... and, as embattled
in daily practice as it is, integration still carries a legitimacy that the concept of prefer-
ences does not.
Deborah C. Malamud, Values, Symbols, and Facts in the Affirmative Action Debate, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 1668, 1707-08 (997) (footnote omitted).
293 Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 573, 6os (20o0) (quoting Jack Balkin,
Professor of Law, Yale Law School); see also Randall Kennedy, Affirmative Reaction: The Courts,
the Right and the Race Question, 14 AM. PROSPECT 3, Mar. 2003, at A9 , AsI; Peter H. Schuck,
Affirmative Action Is Poor Public Policy, 34 CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. 49, May 2, 2003, at Bio,
B s ("In truth, plans like Michigan's are not really about diversity, but are instead crude efforts to
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Grutter endorses the practice of affirmative action for university
admissions in terms that closely correspond to the reasons that actually
sustain the practice. Grutter draws its analysis of the "compelling in-
terest" prong of strict scrutiny not from the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment, nor from the intentions of the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but from the values and beliefs of elite universities.1
94
The opinion is quite explicit about this. Grutter states that it will "de-
fer" to the "Law School's educational judgment that such diversity is
essential to its educational mission"2 9 and that it will presume "'good
faith' on the part of a university ... absent 'a showing to the con-
trary.' ' 296 Just so that no one would miss the point, the Court can-
didly supports its analysis by referring to the judgment of professional
educators that "diversity promotes learning outcomes";297 to the judg-
ment of "major American businesses ... that the skills needed in to-
day's increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through
remedy the continuing social disadvantages suffered by black people, with certain other favored
groups thrown in.").
294 Despite their belief in the autonomy of constitutional law, neither Scalia nor Thomas cites
the text of the Fourteenth Amendment or the original intent of its Framers in defense of their
view that racial classifications are virtually per se illegal. See Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action
and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (i985) (discussing
the compatibility of affirmative action with the original intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment); see also supra note 252. To the contrary, Scalia has candidly acknowledged:
I share the view expressed by Alexander Bickel that "[t]he lesson of the great decisions of
the Supreme Court and the lesson of contemporary history have been the same for at
least a generation: discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitu-
tional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic society."
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975)). It is clear, therefore, that when Scalia and Thomas argue
that "every time the government.., makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it
demeans us all," Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2352 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part), they are themselves also expressing a value that is ultimately derived from constitutional
culture. The division within the Court is thus not between those who embrace and those who
reject the autonomy of constitutional law, but instead between those who side with one position in
the contemporary debate about affirmative action and those who side with a different position.
295 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
296 Id. (quoting Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-i9 (1978) (opin-
ion of Powell, J.)). Grutter never explains how such deference or presumption of good faith is
compatible with strict scrutiny. See supra note 257.
297 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340 (citing Brief of American Educational Research Ass'n et al. as
Amici Curiae in support of Respondents, Grutter (No. 02-241), available in 2003 WL 398292, at
*3); WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS
(1998); COMPELLING INTEREST. EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE ON RACIAL DYNAMICS IN
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (Mitchell J. Chang et al. eds., 2003); and DIVERSITY
CHALLENGED: EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (Gary Orfield &
Michal Kurlaender eds., 2001)).
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exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints";2 98
and to the judgment of "high-ranking retired officers and civilian lead-
ers of the United States military" that a "highly qualified, racially di-
verse officer corps ... is essential to the military's ability to fulfill its
princip[al] mission to provide national security."2 99 There is no doubt
that Grutter interprets the Constitution in light of the beliefs of those
whom Justice Thomas in dissent disparagingly calls "the cogno-
scenti."300
This does not imply, however, that Grutter is merely a passive re-
production of elite views. To the contrary, the Court very much has its
own ideas of the constitutional values at stake in affirmative action,
and it is determined to craft legal doctrine to define and protect these
values. The Court makes this clear in its interpretation of the "nar-
298 Id. (citing Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses in Support of Respon-
dents, Grutter (No. 02-241), Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (No. 02-516), available in
2003 WL 399056, at *5; and Brief of General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Re-
spondents, Grutter (No. 02-241), Gratz (No. 02-5 I6), available in 2003 WL 399o96, at *3-4).
299 Id. (quoting Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Grutter (No. 02-241), Gratz (No. 02-5 16), available in 2003 WL 1787554,
at *5) (internal quotation marks omitted).
300 Id. at 2350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Brief of Harvard
University et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Grutter (No. 02-241), Gratz (No. 02-
516), available in 2003 WL 399220, at *3 ("Every major profession in America has made known a
desire for diversity within its ranks. Businesses demand that the graduates of highly selective
universities both be diverse and be prepared to work with colleagues from different back-
grounds."). There is a fascinating and sharp exchange on this point between Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Ginsburg in Gratz, the companion case to Grutter in which the Court
struck down the affirmative action program for undergraduates of the University of Michigan on
the ground that it was not narrowly tailored. In dissent, Justice Ginsburg argues that because
"[o]ne can reasonably anticipate ... that colleges and universities will seek to maintain their mi-
nority enrollment. . . whether or not they can do so in full candor through adoption of affirmative
action plans of the kind here at issue," the Court ought to interpret the narrow tailoring require-
ment to encourage the greatest degree of transparency, rather than a "resort to camouflage." Id.
at 2446 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In his opinion for the Court, Rehnquist labels Ginsburg's ar-
guments "remarkable for two reasons":
First, they suggest that universities - to whose academic judgment we are told in Grut-
ter v. Bollinger... we should defer - will pursue their affirmative-action programs
whether or not they violate the United States Constitution. Second, they recommend
that these violations should be dealt with, not by requiring the universities to obey the
Constitution, but by changing the Constitution so that it conforms to the conduct of the
universities.
Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 243o n.22. Ginsburg defends herself from Rehnquist's challenge by arguing:
Contrary to the Court's contention, I do not suggest "changing the Constitution so that it
conforms to the conduct of the universities." ... In my view, the Constitution, properly
interpreted, permits government officials to respond openly to the continuing importance
of race .... Among constitutionally permissible options, those that candidly disclose their
consideration of race seem to me preferable to those that conceal it.
Id. at 2446 n. i (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Notably, neither Rehnquist nor Ginsburg is willing to
endorse the candid way in which the Court in Grutter fashions constitutional law on the basis of
its incorporation of constitutional culture. Both maintain the fiction that the conduct of universi-
ties is categorically irrelevant to the construction of constitutional law.
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rowly tailored" prong of the strict scrutiny test, which the Court holds
has four components.3 0 1 A race-based affirmative action program (I)
must "not unduly harm members of any racial group";30 2 (2) can be
implemented only if there has been a "serious, good faith consideration
of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity the
university seeks";30 3 (3) "must be limited in time";30 4 and (4) must af-
ford each applicant "truly individualized consideration.
3 5
There is much to be said about each of these components, 30 6 but I
shall focus on the last, which is unquestionably the most important.
301 The Court explains that "[tihe purpose of the narrow tailoring requirement is to ensure that
'the means chosen "fit" ... th[e] compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that
the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype."' Grutter, 123 S.
Ct. at 2341 (omission and second alteration in original) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)).
302 Id. at 2345.
303 Id. (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 507).
304 Id. at 2346.
305 Id. at 2342.
306 The Court holds that the first component is satisfied by the individualized consideration
requirement of the fourth component. Id. at 2345-46 (quoting Regents of University of California
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)). It gives short shrift to the second com-
ponent. See id. at 2344 ("Narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-
neutral alternative. Nor does it require a university to choose between maintaining a reputation
for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide educational opportunities to members of all
racial groups." (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 509-io; and Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,
476 U.S. 267, 28o n.6 (1986);)). And it reasons that the third component is necessary because:
[R]acial classifications, however compelling their goals, are potentially so dangerous that
they may be employed no more broadly than the interest demands. Enshrining a per-
manent justification for racial preferences would offend this fundamental equal protec-
tion principle.
Id. at 2346. This reasoning, however, is faulty. It establishes only that race-based affirmative
action programs should be limited in time if such limitations correspond to "the interest[s]" served
by the program.
The requirement that affirmative action programs be limited in time originated in the con-
text of programs that purported to serve remedial interests. In the famous formulation of Justice
Blackmun, "[i]n order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other
way." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407 (opinion of Blackmun, J.). The very telos of a remedial program,
which is to "get beyond racism," defines a time horizon for the justification of the program. Vari-
ous Justices, however, including Justice Powell, became suspicious that purported remedies, "time-
less in their ability to affect the future," Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276, were in fact covert substantive
entitlements that distributed goods based upon race. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 5 Io-I i (opinion of
O'Connor, J.). Time limitations were one way to ensure that an affirmative action program was
truly remedial.
It is striking, therefore, that Powell's opinion in Bakke does not impose any time limitations
on affirmative action programs designed to achieve diversity. This is because the justification of
diversity, unlike remedy, has no built-in time horizon; if diversity is necessary for the quality of
education, it is necessary at any and all times. See Post, supra note 267, at 19-2o. The justifica-
tions for diversity offered by Grutter are also time-insensitive. If diversity is necessary in order to
train competent professionals, for example, it is necessary at any and all times; there is no intrinsic
time horizon when this need for diversity will disappear. The time-limitation requirement an-
nounced by Grutter, therefore, makes theoretical sense only if the justifications for diversity that it
announces are taken to be quasi-remedial.
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The requirement of individualized consideration originated in Powell's
opinion in Bakke, where the requirement followed more or less directly
from Powell's account of why diversity was a compelling interest.30 7
If education works best when students are forced to engage with per-
sons who are different from them, and if diversity is necessary to facili-
tate such engagement, then race is both a relevant dimension of diver-
sity and only one of a potentially infinite number of such
dimensions. 308 Powell concluded that a constitutional affirmative ac-
tion program would accordingly acknowledge the importance of race
as an element of diversity, but only in the context of considering all the
many different dimensions of diversity that might characterize any
single candidate. 30 9 Powell developed the individualized consideration
It is not clear, however, what that might mean. My best guess is that Grutter's requirement
that affirmative action programs be temporary - although logically disconnected from, and per-
haps even inconsistent with, the compelling interests served by such programs - should be un-
derstood in the context of an implicit conversation between the Court and the American public,
which remains committed to affirmative action programs primarily for remedial reasons. See su-
pra pp. 63-64. The requirement is thus yet another sign of how Grutter fashions its doctrine both
on the basis of, and in response to, constitutional culture.
The implicit logic of remedy actually pervades much of the rhetoric of Grutter. In its dis-
cussion of the necessity of time limitations, for example, the opinion quotes an article by Nathan-
iel L. Nathanson and Casimir J. Bartnik to the effect that "the acid test" of "programs of preferen-
tial treatment" is "their efficacy in eliminating the need for any racial or ethnic preferences at all."
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2346 (quoting Nathaniel L. Nathanson & Casimir J. Bartnik, The Constitu-
tionality of Preferential Treatment for Minority Applicants to Professional Schools, CHI. B. REC.,
May-June 1977, at 282, 293). Although this point resonates with latent remedial elements in the
Court's opinion, it seems perfectly irrelevant to the explicit reasoning of Grutter, which logically
implies that the "acid test" for the Law School's affirmative action program should instead be the
creation of competent professionals, informed and participatory citizens, and legitimate national
leaders. These contradictory impulses account for the strangely uncertain air of the Court's con-
clusion, which sounds more like a pious wish than a conclusion of law derived from the legal
premises of its opinion: "We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no
longer be necessary to further the interest approved today." Id. at 2347.
307 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315-18 (opinion of Powell, J.).
308 See id. at 314 ("Ethnic diversity, however, is only one element in a range of factors a univer-
sity properly may consider in attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student body.").
309 The kind of affirmative action program approved by Powell would deem "race or ethnic
background" a "'plus' in a particular applicant's file." Id. at 317. Race would "not insulate the
individual from comparison with all other candidates for the available seats." Id. Powell ex-
plained:
The file of a particular black applicant may be examined for his potential contribution
to diversity without the factor of race being decisive when compared, for example, with
that of an applicant identified as an Italian-American if the latter is thought to exhibit
qualities more likely to promote beneficial educational pluralism. Such qualities could
include exceptional personal talents, unique work or service experience, leadership po-
tential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming disadvantage, abil-
ity to communicate with the poor, or other qualifications deemed important. In short,
an admissions program operated in this way is flexible enough to consider all pertinent
elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to
place them on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according
them the same weight. Indeed, the weight attributed to a particular quality may vary
[Vol. I 17:4
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requirement in order to police the distinction between an affirmative
action program in which race was a legitimate (but not predominant)
element of difference, and an affirmative action program that was slid-
ing toward "the functional equivalent of a quota system.
'3 10
Grutter borrows "the requirement of individualized considera-
tion ''31 1 directly from Powell's opinion in Bakke. It makes no inde-
pendent effort to explain or justify the requirement.31 2 Instead, it sim-
ply decrees:
[A] university's admissions program must remain flexible enough to ensure
that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that
makes an applicant's race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her
application. The importance of this individualized consideration in the
context of a race-conscious admissions program is paramount.
3 13
Because Grutter does not embrace Powell's account of the importance
of educational diversity, however, the Court's imposition of the indi-
vidualized consideration requirement cannot be justified by its expla-
nation of the compelling interest standard.
In fact Grutter's explication of the compelling interest standard
seems to point in the opposite direction from an individualized consid-
eration requirement. It would be most natural to conclude that a law
school interested in attaining the degree of racial diversity necessary to
ensure that "participation ... in the civic life of our Nation" include
from year to year depending upon the "mix" both of the student body and the applicants
for the incoming class.
This kind of program treats each applicant as an individual in the admissions proc-
ess. The applicant who loses out on the last available seat to another candidate receiv-
ing a "plus" on the basis of ethnic background will not have been foreclosed from all
consideration for that seat simply because he was not the right color or had the wrong
surname. It would mean only that his combined qualifications, which may have in-
cluded similar nonobjective factors, did not outweigh those of the other applicant. His
qualifications would have been weighed fairly and competitively, and he would have no
basis to complain of unequal treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 317-18.
310 Id. at 318. Thus Powell argued that even if "the reservation of a specified number of seats
in each class for individuals from the preferred ethnic groups would contribute to the attainment
of considerable ethnic diversity in the student body," any such program would "misconceive[] the
nature of the state interest that would justify consideration of race or ethnic background." Id. He
also noted:
It is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of the stu-
dent body is in effect guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic groups, with the re-
maining percentage an undifferentiated aggregation of students. The diversity that fur-
thers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and
characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element.
Petitioner's special admissions program, focused solely on ethnic diversity, would hinder
rather than further attainment of genuine diversity.
Id. at 315.
311 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2343.
312 See id. at 2342-45.
313 Id. at 2343 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318 (opinion of Powell, J.)).
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"members of all racial and ethnic groups, '3 14 or to ensure that our
leadership is "inclusive of talented and qualified individuals of every
race and ethnicity,"'315 or to ensure that its students are better prepared
"for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, '3 16 should precisely
and decisively focus on race to the extent necessary to achieve these
objectives. The account of diversity embraced by Grutter does not
conceive of race as simply one element in a potentially infinite uni-
verse of differences. It instead points to the particular and unique
value of racial diversity.
The Court is nevertheless quite serious about using the "narrowly
tailored" prong of strict scrutiny to distinguish affirmative action pro-
grams that evaluate "each applicant ... as an individual" from those
programs that make "an applicant's race or ethnicity the defining fea-
ture of his or her application. '3 7 That is the lesson of Gratz v. Bollin-
ger,318 the companion case of Grutter, in which the Court used the in-
dividualized consideration requirement to strike down the Michigan
undergraduate affirmative action program, which awarded "20 points,
or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every sin-
gle 'underrepresented minority' applicant solely because of race. 319
Gratz offers two distinct accounts of the individualized considera-
tion requirement. It states, on the one hand, that the requirement is
inconsistent with any program in which "any single characteristic
automatically ensure[s] a specific and identifiable contribution to a
university's diversity. '320 But it also notes, on the other hand, that the
Michigan undergraduate affirmative action program is unconstitu-
tional because the "automatic distribution of 20 points has the effect of
making 'the factor of race ... decisive' for virtually every minimally
qualified underrepresented minority applicant. '321 The upshot is that
the Court never makes clear whether the Michigan undergraduate
314 Id. at 2340.
315 Id. at 2341.
316 Id. at 2340 (quoting Brief of American Educational Research Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in
support of Respondents, Grutter (No. 02-241), available in 2003 WL 398292, at *3).
317 Id. at 2343. Paradigmatic of prohibited programs are those that create "'quota[s]' ... in
which a certain fixed number or proportion of opportunities are 'reserved exclusively for certain
minority groups."' Id. at 2342 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496
(1989)).
318 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003). Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the Court's opinion in Gratz,
which was joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Justice Breyer joined the
Court's judgment. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter, dissented on grounds of standing,
and Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Souter and in part by Justice Breyer, dissented on the
merits.
319 Id. at 2427.
320 Id. at 2428.
321 Id. (quoting Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (978) (opinion
of Powell, J.)).
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program fails the individualized consideration requirement because it
quantifies the contribution of race to diversity by "a specific and iden-
tifiable" measure, or instead because the program employs a measure
that is "decisive. '32
2
Although Gratz leaves the precise meaning of the individualized
consideration requirement ambiguous, it nevertheless sends an unmis-
takable message to universities that the Court is prepared to use the
"narrowly tailored" prong closely to supervise affirmative action pro-
grams. Because the requirement that such programs treat "each appli-
cant ... as an individual" does not follow from the Court's exposition
of the compelling interest standard, it must instead have a different
theoretical foundation. The most likely candidate is the Court's un-
derstanding of the primary legal value protected by the Equal Protec-
tion Clause: "Because the Fourteenth Amendment 'protect[s] persons,
not groups,' all 'governmental action based on race - a group classifi-
cation long recognized as in most circumstances irrelevant and there-
fore prohibited - should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to
ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has not
been infringed.' 32 3 Grutter evidently demands individualized consid-
eration because it reads the Equal Protection Clause as establishing a
legal right to be treated as an individual, rather than as a member of a
racial group.
322 Justice O'Connor, the only member of the Court to join the Court's opinion in both Grutter
and Gratz, wrote separately in Gratz to explain her position. Her analysis, however, is similarly
ambiguous. At one point she observes that the constitutional vice of the undergraduate program
is that it employs a specific and identifiable measure:
[T]he selection index, by setting up automatic, predetermined point allocations for the
soft variables, ensures that the diversity contributions of applicants cannot be individu-
ally assessed. This policy stands in sharp contrast to the law school's admissions plan,
which enables admissions officers to make nuanced judgments with respect to the con-
tributions each applicant is likely to make to the diversity of the incoming class.
Id. at 2432 (O'Connor, J., concurring). At another point, however, O'Connor seems to emphasize
the decisive nature of the point system:
The law school considers the various diversity qualifications of each applicant, including
race, on a case-by-case basis. By contrast, the Office of Undergraduate Admissions re-
lies on the selection index to assign every underrepresented minority applicant the same,
automatic 2o-point bonus without consideration of the particular background, experi-
ences, or qualities of each individual applicant. And this mechanized selection index
score, by and large, automatically determines the admissions decision for each applicant.
The selection index thus precludes admissions counselors from conducting the type of
individualized consideration the Court's opinion in Grutter requires: consideration of
each applicant's individualized qualifications, including the contribution each individ-
ual's race or ethnic identity will make to the diversity of the student body, taking into
account diversity within and among all racial and ethnic groups.
Id. at 2431 (third emphasis added) (citations omitted).
323 Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2337 (2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)) (internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted).
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How Grutter expects the individualized consideration requirement
to protect this legal value is a genuinely puzzling question. Grutter
explicitly and repeatedly announces that universities can use affirma-
tive action programs to assemble "a critical mass of underrepresented
minority students, '324 which is defined as the number of minority stu-
dents necessary to achieve "the educational benefits that diversity is
designed to produce. '32 S Universities must thus be free to regard race
as an especially salient dimension of diversity, but this seems inconsis-
tent with the constitutional requirement that they treat applicants as
unique persons rather than as members of racial groups. 326  It is not
clear how universities can, on the one hand, create a "critical mass" of
minority students, and, on the other hand, refuse to treat "an appli-
cant's race or ethnicity [as] the defining feature of his or her applica-
tion. '327 It does not seem that universities can assemble a critical mass
of minority students unless race is the defining factor in a student's
application, even if it is "decisive" only at the margins. 32 8
324 Id. at 2343.
325 Id. at 2339. The Court appears to defer to the Law School's "experiences and expertise"
concerning the need for a "critical mass." Id. at 2341 ("The Law School has determined, based on
its experience and expertise, that a 'critical mass' of underrepresented minorities is necessary to
further its compelling interest in securing the educational benefits of a diverse student body.").
326 Justice Powell, of course, faced the same paradox, and, like the Court in Grutter, he explic-
itly permitted universities to design their affirmative action programs with "some attention" to the
number of minority students they admitted. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323. Although this concession
was inconsistent with Powell's account of diversity, see id. at 317-18, it did allow him to approve
affirmative action programs as they actually existed in most American universities.
327 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2343.
328 See supra p. 70. It is noteworthy that in Grutter Chief Justice Rehnquist does not dissent
on the ground that the goal of attaining a "critical mass" was inconsistent with the requirement of
individualized consideration. He instead dissents on the ground that the Law School's "alleged
goal of 'critical mass' [was] simply a sham." Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2367 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissent-
ing). Rehnquist argues:
[T]he ostensibly flexible nature of the Law School's admissions program that the Court
finds appealing ... appears to be, in practice, a carefully managed program designed to
ensure proportionate representation of applicants from selected minority groups.
I do not believe that the Constitution gives the Law School such free rein in the use
of race. The Law School has offered no explanation for its actual admissions practices
and, unexplained, we are bound to conclude that the Law School has managed its ad-
missions program, not to achieve a "critical mass," but to extend offers of admission to
members of selected minority groups in proportion to their statistical representation in
the applicant pool. But this is precisely the type of racial balancing that the Court itself
calls "patently unconstitutional."
Id. at 2369 (quoting Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339); see also id. at 2348 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("[Tihe University of Michigan Law School's mystical 'critical mass' justi-
fication for its discrimination by race challenges even the most gullible mind. The admissions
statistics show it to be a sham to cover a scheme of racially proportionate admissions."); id. at
2371 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe concept of critical mass is a delusion used by the Law
School to mask its attempt to make race an automatic factor in most instances and to achieve
numerical goals indistinguishable from quotas. An effort to achieve racial balance among the mi-
norities the school seeks to attract is, by the Court's own admission, 'patently unconstitutional."'
(quoting Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339)).
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This suggests that the individualized consideration requirement is
compatible with race being a decisive criterion so long as the use of
race in an affirmative action program is narrowly tailored to function
as a decisive criterion for the achievement of a constitutionally legiti-
mate purpose, like attaining a critical mass of minority students. 329 If
we ask, then, why Gratz struck down Michigan's undergraduate af-
firmative action program, it must be because the program accorded to
race the "specific and identifiable '330 value of twenty points. But be-
cause the Court approves the Law School's program, which assigns
race the specific value necessary to achieve a critical mass of minority
students, the fundamental defect of Michigan's undergraduate pro-
gram must be that this value is made "identifiable. '33' This implies
that if the undergraduate program and the Law School each assign the
same "specific" value to race - the value necessary to assemble a
critical mass of minority students - and if the undergraduate program
does so explicitly and the Law School implicitly, the former is uncon-
stitutional, but not necessarily the latter.332
The Court responds to Rehnquist's dissent by noting that even though the Law School may
admit minority students in proportion to their representation in the applicant pool, nevertheless,
"as [the Chief Justice] concedes, the number of underrepresented minority students who ultimately
enroll in the Law School differs substantially from their representation in the applicant pool and
varies considerably for each group from year to year." Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2343. Because the
Court's response does not meet the force of Rehnquist's objection, it clearly signals that the Court
is prepared to tolerate quite "decisive" considerations of race, so long as the visible manifestation
of these considerations - the number of minority students who actually enroll in a school - does
not convey the message that a school seeks to attain proportional representation for minority stu-
dents. On the importance of such appearances for the reasoning of Gratz and Grutter, see infra
PP- 74-75-
329 See supra note 328. Whether race is a decisive criterion for the purpose of attaining a criti-
cal mass is a different question from whether race is "a decisive factor" for the purpose, say, of
achieving proportional representation. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2441 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
330 Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2428.
331 Id. In his Gratz dissent, Justice Souter notes the inevitable necessity that an affirmative
action program assign some specific value to race:
The very nature of a college's permissible practice of awarding value to racial di-
versity means that race must be considered in a way that increases some applicants'
chances for admission. Since college admission is not left entirely to inarticulate intui-
tion, it is hard to see what is inappropriate in assigning some stated value to a relevant
characteristic, whether it be reasoning ability, writing style, running speed, or minority
race. Justice Powell's plus factors necessarily are assigned some values. The college
simply does by a numbered scale what the law school accomplishes in its "holistic re-
view"; the distinction does not imply that applicants to the undergraduate college are
denied individualized consideration or a fair chance to compete on the basis of all the
various merits their applications may disclose.
Nor is it possible to say that the 20 points convert race into a decisive factor compa-
rable to reserving minority places as in Bakke.
Id. at 2441 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2343).
332 In her separate concurring opinion in Gratz, Justice O'Connor appears to offer yet a third
reason why Michigan's undergraduate program fails the individualized consideration require-
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Why might the explicit, identifiable way in which the undergradu-
ate program specifies the value of race fail the "narrowly tailored"
prong of strict scrutiny? My best guess is that the twenty-point bonus
sends a message to applicants and to the world that being a member of
a racial group is worth a certain, named amount, and it therefore in-
vites members of that group to feel entitled to that amount. "In such
circumstances, the fear of racial 'balkanization' is most pro-
nounced.'33 3 The potential for balkanization is muted within the Law
School program, however, because the value assigned to race is camou-
flaged by an opaque process of implicit comparisons.33 4 Although
transparency is ordinarily prized in the law, the Court in Grutter and
Gratz constructs doctrine that in effect demands obscurity.335
The Court understands that "[b]y virtue of our Nation's struggle
with racial inequality"33 6 there are powerful social reasons for using
affirmative action programs to address the social dislocations of race.
Yet the Court is also terrified that the growth of racial entitlements
ment. She asserts that the program is unconstitutional because it "is a nonindividualized, me-
chanical one." Id. at 2433 (O'Connor, J., concurring). To the extent that this indictment differs
from the point that the program awards "specific and identifiable" value to race, it is not clear
what exactly the charge of being "mechanical" might mean. One possibility is that because the
undergraduate program assigns a fixed value to race, it can in particular cases overestimate the
value of race when measured against the value of race necessary to achieve a critical mass. But
this argument can establish the unconstitutionality of the twenty-point racial bonus only if
O'Connor actually demonstrates that the program does in fact operate in such an overly inclusive
fashion, which she does not attempt to do. Instead she writes as if the mere fixity of the value
assigned to race is enough to establish its unconstitutionality. O'Connor seems to believe that
race might be worth more with respect to one candidate, but less with respect to another, depend-
ing upon "the contributions each applicant is likely to make to the diversity of the incoming
class." Id. at 2432. This interpretation of the individualized consideration requirement, however,
would forbid a university from awarding to each candidate the same, fixed, minimum value nec-
essary to achieve a minimum critical mass, which might accord to race less overall influence in
the selection process than a program that allowed the value of race to fluctuate with the individ-
ual attributes of a candidate.
More importantly, however, it is unclear how requiring a university to assess the quality of a
person's contribution to diversity on the basis of his or her racial identity contributes to that per-
son being viewed as a unique individual, instead of as a member of a racial group. It is one thing
for the Equal Protection Clause to require that the positive potential contributions of all appli-
cants be assessed on an individual basis; it is quite another for the Clause to require that the value
of a particular applicant's racial identity be assessed on a sliding scale. The latter would entail
measuring the extent to which particular applicants exemplify racial stereotypes or embody values
of racial authenticity. Any such effort would seem to place an affirmative action program in
greater potential tension with the constitutional value that the Court is seeking to protect.
333 Issacharoff, supra note 291, at 691 (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647-48 (993)).
334 See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2446 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Law School's affirma-
tive action program as "achieving diversity through winks, nods, and disguises").
335 Justice Souter seems correct that under the Court's holdings "[e]qual protection [is] an exer-
cise in which the winners are the ones who hide the ball." Id. at 2442 (Souter, J., dissenting).
336 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2344. This passage is one of many examples where remedial logic
seems to suffuse the Grutter opinion, without ever rising to the level of explicit articulation. See
supra note 3o6.
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might lead "America to become a quota-ridden society, with each iden-
tifiable minority assigned proportional representation in every desir-
able walk of life. '337  It therefore interprets strict scrutiny so as to
minimize the likelihood of racial balkanization by requiring affirma-
tive action programs to accord symbolic priority to individuals, as dis-
tinct from racial groups, through the ideological assertion that each
candidate is receiving "individualized consideration." Even as it au-
thorizes universities to establish affirmative action plans that produce
a critical mass of minority students, the Court prohibits these plans
from utilizing procedures or rules that symbolically convey the mes-
sage that applicants are entitled to educational benefits by virtue of
their membership in a racial group. Here, as in other areas of equal
protection law, "appearances do matter. '338  Racial inequalities can be
addressed, but only in ways that efface the social salience of racial dif-
ferences.
337 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2346 (quoting Nathaniel L. Nathanson & Casimir J. Bartnik, The
Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment for Minority Applicants to Professional Schools, 58
CHI. B. ASS'N REC. 282, 293 (977) (internal quotation marks omitted).
338 Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647 (involving an equal protection challenge to a voting district reappor-
tionment scheme); see also Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict
Scrutiny, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1195, 1236 (2002) ("The Court prefers that, when states consider race,
their actions are ambiguous enough to be explained in other ways."); Issacharoff, supra note 291,
at 693 ("[Wlhere the racial considerations in student selection and assignment are too central, too
visible, and too at odds with longstanding community practices, they are almost certain to fail.");
Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the Redistrict-
ing Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 16oi (2002); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi,
Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appear-
ances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 5o6-07 (i993).
Powell was also sensitive to appearances in Bakke. The affirmative action program of the
UC Davis medical school at issue in the case explicitly set aside sixteen places for minority stu-
dents out of a class of one hundred. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 279 (0978)
(opinion of Powell, J.). Powell observed that in contrast to the kind of affirmative action program
that he would approve, which would give each applicant individualized consideration but which
would also pay "some attention" to the numbers of minorities admitted, see supra note 326, the
Davis program revealed a "facial intent to discriminate." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318. No such "facial
infirmity" would exist, Powell argued, in "an admissions program where race or ethnic back-
ground is simply one element - to be weighed fairly against other elements - in the selection
process." Id. Powell's focus on "facial" appearances is striking because by hypothesis an intent to
discriminate - to produce a certain number of minority students - would be present in either
kind of affirmative action program. The dissenting Justices in Bakke thus observed:
There is no sensible, and certainly no constitutional, distinction between, for example,
adding a set number of points to the admissions rating of disadvantaged minority appli-
cants as an expression of the preference with the expectation that this will result in the
admission of an approximately determined number of qualified minority applicants and
setting a fixed number of places for such applicants as was done here.
Id. at 378 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part). The constitutional distinction Powell sought to establish, however, was appar-
ently that between affirmative action programs that did and did not create the ideological ap-
pearance of individualized consideration.
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It is plain, then, that the content of the constitutional law an-
nounced by Grutter and Gratz makes sense almost entirely within the
context of a dialogue with the constitutional culture of the nation. The
Court is willing to interpret the Equal Protection Clause in light of the
constitutional convictions of those who believe that affirmative action
in higher education is necessary to redress continuing racial disloca-
tions. But the Court reserves authority to modify and regulate these
convictions to protect its own legal sense of the constitutional right to
be treated as an individual rather than as a member of a racial group.
The Court thus forces all affirmative action programs to minimize the
divergence between affirmative action and the ideal of individualized
consideration. As a result, the Court not only maintains a rough bal-
ance between constitutional law and constitutional culture, but it also
intervenes into a fierce controversy within constitutional culture about
the legitimacy of affirmative action in a way that recognizes and le-
gitimates concerns on both sides of the dispute.339
The Court engages in this dialogue in the heart of strict scrutiny, at
the core of its essential mission of protecting individual rights. Even
in this most sacred domain, the Court plainly views constitutional cul-
ture as a legitimate and necessary source for the creation of constitu-
tional law, both in the sense that the beliefs and convictions of that
culture importantly shape the content of the Court's understanding of
the equal protection principle, and in the sense that the Court crafts its
legal doctrine in ways specifically designed to engage and influence
those beliefs and convictions. 340 In Grutter and Gratz, we see before
our eyes the mysterious alchemy by which the historical dynamics of
constitutional culture are transformed from merely external constraints
on the legal judgments of the Court into the internal material of con-
stitutional law itself.
This suggests that constitutional culture is neither purely external
to constitutional law nor purely internal to it. Constitutional law
should instead be understood as continuously engaged with constitu-
tional culture. Constitutional law draws inspiration, strength, and le-
gitimacy from constitutional culture, which endows constitutional law
with orientation and purpose. There can be no constitutional law
without constitutional culture, but neither can constitutional law be
339 See, e.g., Statement on the Supreme Court Decision on the Michigan Affirmative Action
Cases, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 803 (June 23, 2003) ("I applaud the Supreme Court for
recognizing the value of diversity on our Nation's campuses.... Today's decisions seek a careful
balance between the goal of campus diversity and the fundamental principle of equal treatment
under the law." (statement of President George W. Bush)).
340 For a discussion of judicial protections for constitutional rights as a cultural form "function-
ing in a relation of mutual influence with other cultural forms in American society," see Kenneth
L. Karst, Constitutional Equality as a Cultural Form: The Courts and the Meanings of Sex and
Gender, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 513, 513 (2003).
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reduced to constitutional culture. This dialectical relationship is as
true from the external perspective of a historian charting the develop-
ment of constitutional law as it is from the internal perspective of a
judge seeking to make constitutional law. For both judges and histori-
ans, constitutional culture is the medium within which constitutional
law is fashioned.
III.
In Part II we considered the relationship of constitutional law to
constitutional culture, to the beliefs that nonjudicial actors hold about
the meaning of the Constitution. If we now widen our lens and con-
sider the relationship of constitutional law to culture more generally, to
the beliefs and values of nonjudicial actors, we can see that the conclu-
sions of Part II are simply a specific instance of a more general truth:
law is both a cultural product and a vehicle for the regulation and dis-
cipline of culture.
If we conceptualize culture as including the full repertoire of a soci-
ety's norms and meanings, it is difficult to imagine how a court could
ever decide a case without relying upon cultural ideas and constructs.
Whether a court is to determine "the fairness" of extending the statute
of limitations for a crime after the prior statute of limitations has ex-
pired, 341 or ascertain the various messages "conveyed" by the burning
of a cross,342 or decide whether "police conduct" has communicated "to
a reasonable person that he [is] not at liberty to ignore the police pres-
ence and go about his business,"3 4 3 or decide whether punitive dam-
ages are "both reasonable and proportionate to the amount of
harm, 3 44 or inquire whether police "methods . .. are 'so brutal and so
offensive to human dignity' that they 'shock[] the conscience,' '345 a
court must deliberate and judge within the categories of cultural
meaning that it shares with society at large. No other alternative
seems possible or desirable. Just as an American court must conceive
and convey its opinions within the medium of the English language, so
it must conceive and convey its judgments within the web of cultural
understandings that it shares with the society that it serves. 346
341 Stogner v. California, 123 S. Ct. 2446, 2455 (2003).
342 Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1546 (2003).
343 Kaupp v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 1843, 1845 (2003) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 5oi U.S. 429, 437
(iggi)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
344 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1524 (2003).
345 Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. i994, 2005 (2003) (opinion of Thomas, J.) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 174 (1952)).
346 Of course courts deploy these cultural understandings in ways designed to serve the prag-
matic horizon of the law, which means that their interpretations of these understandings are al-
ways shaped by the specific needs and purposes of the legal system. Cultural meaning is for this
reason never translated transparently into legal doctrine, but rather is always rendered into forms
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Consider, for example, the Court's decision last Term in United
States v. American Library Ass'n (ALA), 347 in which the Court consid-
ered the constitutionality of the Children's Internet Protection Act
(CIPA).348 CIPA provides that libraries can receive federal funds to
offset the costs of accessing the Internet only if they install "software to
block images that constitute obscenity or child pornography, and to
prevent minors from obtaining access to material that is harmful to
them. '34 9 As Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion frames the is-
sue,350 Congress can attach conditions to federal funding to induce be-
havior it deems desirable, but not to induce behavior that is unconsti-
tutional.35 I The question, therefore, is whether libraries would violate
the First Amendment were they to install filters preventing patrons
from accessing Internet sites that are obscene or that contain material
that is harmful to minors.35 2
The answer to this question, Rehnquist argues, depends upon "the
role of libraries in our society. '353  Rehnquist concludes that because
the "traditional" mission of a library is "to provide materials 'that
would be of the greatest direct benefit or interest to the commu-
suitable for legal administration. See, e.g., Hugh Baxter, Autopoiesis and the "Relative Auton-
omy" of Law, I9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1987, 2046-57 (1998) (discussing differences between legal
and nonlegal understandings of property).
347 123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003).
348 Pub. L. No. io6-554, tit. XVII, 114 Stat. 2763A-3 3 5 (2000).
349 ALA, 123 S. Ct. at 2301 (plurality opinion).
350 Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion was joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and
Thomas. Justices Kennedy and Breyer wrote separately to concur in the judgment. Justices Ste-
vens, Souter, and Ginsburg dissented.
351 ALA, 123 S. Ct. at 2303 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987)).
352 Id. Rehnquist also considered and rejected the argument "that CIPA imposes an unconsti-
tutional condition on the receipt of federal assistance." Id. at 2307. The argument fails, in
Rehnquist's view, because "when the Government appropriates public funds to establish a pro-
gram it is entitled to define the limits of that program," id. at 2307-08 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173, 194 (199I)) (internal quotation marks omitted), and "CIPA simply reflects Congress'
decision not to subsidize" the provision of unfiltered Internet access, id. at 2308.
Rehnquist's reasoning, however, is incomplete. The constitutionality of funding conditions
depends in part upon whether these conditions are understood to be rules that government applies
to itself or instead rules that government uses to regulate the speech of persons outside govern-
ment. See Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, io6 YALE L.J. 151, 176-8o (1996). If the federal
government were to bar indecent magazines from receiving second-class mailing subsidies, for
example, we would not likely view the prohibition as a "simple" decision to define the scope of a
subsidy program. We would instead evaluate the program as if it were a direct regulation of the
speech of persons using the mail. Id. at 178-8o. Rehnquist's argument thus presupposes that we
have already deemed the conditions contained in CIPA to be rules that government applies to it-
self to define the scope of its own programs. But this assumption is controversial, as can be seen
from Justice Stevens's dissent, which characterizes the inevitable overblocking of information un-
der CIPA's requirements as the "equivalent of a host of individual decisions excluding hundreds of
thousands of individual constitutionally protected messages from Internet terminals located in
public libraries throughout the Nation." ALA, 123 S. Ct. at 2313-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
353 ALA, 123 S. Ct. at 2303.
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nity,"'' 354 and because the fulfillment of this mission requires "broad
discretion to make content-based judgments in deciding what private
speech to make available to the public," 35 5 libraries would not violate
the First Amendment if they were to exercise this same discretion to
filter access to Internet sites:
A library's need to exercise judgment in making collection decisions de-
pends on its traditional role in identifying suitable and worthwhile mate-
rial; it is no less entitled to play that role when it collects material from the
Internet than when it collects material from any other source. Most li-
braries already exclude pornography from their print collections because
they deem it inappropriate for inclusion. We do not subject these deci-
sions to heightened scrutiny; it would make little sense to treat libraries'
judgments to block online pornography any differently, when these judg-
ments are made for just the same reason.356
Justice Souter disagrees. He does not regard the use of Internet fil-
ters as involving the kind of discretion that libraries exercise when
they decide to acquire materials for their collections. Souter argues
that the imposition of Internet filters should instead be compared to a
library exercising discretion to deny patrons access to existing collec-
tions. 35 7 On that question, Souter observes, the "[i]nstitutional history
of public libraries in America discloses an evolution toward a general
rule, now firmly rooted, that any adult entitled to use the library has
access to any of its holdings. '358 This "understanding that a librarian's
job was to guarantee that 'all people had access to all ideas"' 3 9 "be-
speaks an American public library that gives any adult patron any ma-
terial at hand, and a history without support for the plurality's reading
of the First Amendment as tolerating a public library's censorship of
its collection against adult enquiry. '360
I reproduce this debate to emphasize the obvious point that it does
not turn on the text of the First Amendment, or on the intentions of
the Framers, or on the constitutional beliefs of nonjudicial actors, or
even on the interpretation of legal materials. Instead it concerns how
the cultural practice of librarianship is to be understood, and also how
the new technology of Internet filters should be regarded. Rehnquist
and Souter seem to agree that if libraries are institutions that routinely
354 Id. at 2304 (quoting American Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 421
(E.D. Pa. 2002)).
355 Id.
356 Id. at 2306.
357 Id. at 2321 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he choice to block is a choice to limit access that has
already been acquired.").
358 Id. at 2322. "That is," Souter continues, "libraries do not refuse materials to adult patrons
on account of their content." Id. at 2322 n.4.
359 Id. at 2322 (quoting EVELYN GELLER, FORBIDDEN BOOKS IN AMERICAN PUBLIC
LIBRARIES, 1876-1939, at 156 (1984)).
360 Id. at 2323-24.
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exercise content-based discretion in deciding what material to make
available to their patrons, CIPA does not violate the First Amendment.
But if libraries follow a norm of providing material to patrons without
exercising such discretion, at least in circumstances that are relevantly
analogous to the installation of Internet filters, there is a strong argu-
ment that CIPA is unconstitutional. Resolving the constitutional in-
quiry depends upon how the Court characterizes the social meaning of
libraries and Internet filters.
Constitutional law typically depends upon such cultural judgments.
This is because constitutional law seeks to protect constitutional val-
ues, and the fulfillment of these values depends upon the social land-
scape in which they are to be realized. Whether or not a library vio-
lates the First Amendment by selectively withholding material from its
patrons depends, in the first instance, on what a library is and how it
is understood to function. CIPA would endanger constitutional values
if ordinary Americans regarded libraries as a resource that was rou-
tinely available to be used at their discretion, like the mail.36 I But the
constitutional picture would look quite different if Americans believed
that patrons could not access library collections without the prior and
discretionary approval of librarians. In that case, CIPA would seem
simply to reinforce existing social practices. In ALA, therefore, the ful-
fillment of the constitutional value of freedom of speech does not turn
on legal material alone, but also on cultural meanings that the Court
can discern only by drawing upon its knowledge as a literate partici-
pant in American culture.
Courts routinely characterize social significance in this way. Judge-
made law is constantly interpreting ambient culture to separate the
reasonable from the unreasonable, the offensive from the inoffensive,
the private from the public, and so forth.3 61 Such characterizations are
commonplace in the enforcement of common law torts,363 and they are
also commonplace in the enforcement of statutes. Justice Scalia, for
example, recently noted that Title VII sexual harassment law requires
courts to distinguish "between simple teasing or roughhousing among
members of the same sex, and conduct which a reasonable person in
the plaintiff's position would find severely hostile or abusive." 364 He
361 See Seth F Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive
State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1351-74 (1984); Post, supra note 352, at 178-8o; Kathleen M. Sul-
livan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1490 (1989).
362 For a discussion in the context of the common law tort of invasion of privacy, see Robert C.
Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL.
L. REV. 957, 959-68, 979-87 (1989).
363 See id.
364 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998). Scalia was concerned to dis-
tinguish a coach smacking a professional football player "on the buttocks as he heads onto the
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observed that this distinction can be made only by exercising "an ap-
propriate sensitivity to social context," to the full "constellation of sur-
rounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships. '365 Title VII
could not be enforced unless courts were willing and able to determine
the contextual cultural meaning of particular actions in this way.
Constitutional law, like common law or the application of statutes
like Title VII, also requires courts to draw upon their understanding of
cultural practices. Without making such judgments, courts could not
apply equal protection doctrine to determine which sex-based classifi-
cations are "reflective of 'archaic and overbroad' generalizations about
gender or based on 'outdated misconceptions concerning the role of
females.' ' 366 They could not identify the communications that are
constitutionally unprotected "fighting words," which, "as ordinary men
know, are likely to cause a fight. '367 They could not decide whether
speech is "obscene" under relevant "community standards. '368
Consider, for example, how the Court came to determine whether
movies were protected by the First Amendment.3 69 In 1915 the Court
concluded that movies were not a protected form of communication.
Justice Joseph McKenna, born in 1843, characterized the genre of film
as a spectacle like a "circus" that did not come within the ambit of the
First Amendment. 370 McKenna reached this conclusion based upon
field" from the same gesture applied to "the coach's secretary (male or female) back at the office."
Id. at 81.
365 Id.
366 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB., 5ii U.S. 127, 135 (i994) (citations omitted) (quoting Schle-
singer v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 0975); and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198-99 (1976)); see
also Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 745 (1984) (condemning "old notions and archaic and
overbroad generalizations about the rules and relative abilities of men and women" (quoting Cali-
fano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 21 (I977)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982) (condemning "archaic and stereotypic notions"). For a
theoretical account of the relationship between legal norms of equality and culture, see POST ET
AL., supra note 176, at 22-41.
367 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (942); see also Post, Constitutional Con-
cept, supra note 222, at 638-39 ("[Cultural norms of civility] that distinguish appropriate from in-
appropriate ways of speaking ... tend to define a point (although certainly not the only point) at
which speech shades into conduct, at which a community subordinates speech to the regulatory
schemes that it imposes upon action generally. This is explicitly true with respect to the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, which enforces a standard that makes no distinction at
all between speech and conduct; but it is also characteristically true of the other dignitary torts,
which carry the strong sense of a defendant having used 'words as instruments of aggression and
personal assault."' (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 412 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting))).
368 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973) (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230
(972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
369 For a discussion on this topic, see Post, supra note 221, at 1252-53.
370 Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 243-44 (1915). "The first impulse
of the mind," McKenna wrote, "is to reject the contention" that movies deserve First Amendment
protection. "We immediately feel that the argument is wrong or strained which extends the guar-
anties of free opinion and speech to the multitudinous shows which are advertised on the bill-
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his apprehension of the social significance of film. "The judicial sense
supporting the common sense of the country," McKenna wrote, "is
against the contention" that movies enjoy a "practical and legal simili-
tude to a free press and liberty of opinion. '371 By 1952, however, the
common sense of the country had so radically changed that Justice
Tom Clark thought it obvious that cinema deserved First Amendment
protection due to "[t]he importance of motion pictures as an organ of
public opinion. '37 2 Because the constitutional status of movies de-
pends on the relationship between the genre of film and the values of
communication safeguarded by the First Amendment, the constitu-
tional law of film depends on cultural judgments about the signifi-
cance of that genre in American life.
This does not imply that constitutional law is simply a form of cul-
tural interpretation. The primary sources of constitutional law are
specifically legal. The text of the Constitution is of course paramount.
The text controls whenever its meaning is apparent, as for example
when it directs that each state shall have two senators. But if the
meaning of constitutional text is uncertain, courts must look outside
the text in order to make constitutional law. They can look to various
legal sources, like the original meaning of the Constitution, or the
original intent of its Framers or ratifiers, or, most commonly, judicial
precedents. But when, as frequently happens, these sources do not set-
tle a question - as in 1952 they did not settle the question whether
movies should be protected by the First Amendment - and when in
such circumstances it becomes necessary to understand contemporary
cultural practices in order to protect constitutional values, courts must
interpret the significance of these practices in order to make constitu-
tional law.
I take this point to be relatively uncontroversial. Even the strictest
originalists, those who believe that the "meaning" of the Constitution
"is changeless, '37 3 must find some way to account for the indisputable
fact of constitutional evolution. The most typical explanation is that
"[t]he provisions of the Federal Constitution, undoubtedly, are pliable
in the sense that in appropriate cases they have the capacity of bring-
ing within their grasp every new condition which falls within their
boards of our cities and towns and which .. .seeks to bring motion pictures and other spectacles
into practical and legal similitude to a free press and liberty of opinion." Id.
371 Id. at 244. Films, McKenna concluded, were not "organs of public opinion." Id.
372 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952). Clark concluded that movies "are
a significant medium for the communication of ideas." Id. "It is not without significance," he
explained, "that talking pictures were first produced in 1926, eleven years after the Mutual deci-
sion." Id. at 502 n.12.
373 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 45 (934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
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meaning. '37 4  Changing cultural norms and practices quintessentially
constitute "new conditions" that justify such constitutional pliability.
That is why even the strictest originalists would be willing to accept
that the First Amendment might properly be interpreted not to protect
movies in 1915, but might nevertheless properly be interpreted to pro-
tect movies in 1952. The social significance of movies may have al-
tered so as to bring film within the ambit of an otherwise "changeless"
constitutional protection. It is precisely because constitutional law is
not autonomous from culture that constitutional law properly evolves
as culture evolves.
This point has important implications. Because, as we have seen,
culture is always dynamic and contested, 37S constitutional law will
necessarily also be dynamic and contested. At what point in time the
communicative significance of movies sufficiently changed as to bring
film within the protection of the First Amendment, for example, will
be an inevitably disputed question. Because culture is always in mo-
tion, because its meaning is never entirely stable or fixed, there will
always be differences of cultural interpretation.3 1 6 There is simply no
way to escape such controversy.3 7  There is no Archimedean point
above the flux, no neutral or objective position. There are only con-
tending interpretations within culture.
The point can be most plainly seen when cultural disagreement is
caused not by the gentle logic of evolutionary change, but instead by
outright and manifest dispute, like that between Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Souter in ALA. Rehnquist and Souter each of-
fers his own interpretation of the nature of libraries and Internet fil-
ters. The argument between them does not turn on any simple matter
of fact. The only way to decide which Justice is correct is to make an
independent interpretation of the relationship between Internet filters
and accepted library practices. Disputes over the nature of cultural
significance typically cannot be definitively settled by reference to "ob-
jective" indicia; they are at root normative. There is no dictionary in
which cultural significance can be decisively ascertained.37 8
374 Id. This explanation essentially assumes that constitutional rules remain constant, and "it is
only their application which is extensible." Id. One problem with this kind of explanation is that,
for reasons already canvassed, it is not easy to distinguish the substance of a rule from the scope
of its application. See supra pp. 46-48.
375 On the dynamic and contentious nature of culture, see supra notes 241 and 245.
376 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2ooo), which concerns the substantive due process rights of
parents to prevent grandparents from visiting their grandchildren, exemplifies the tension that
can arise when the Court struggles to interpret cultural norms in the context of "changing reali-
ties." Id. at 64; see also id. at 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
377 See Friedman & Smith, supra note 155, at 83-85.
378 For a discussion of the role of law as an institution used to impose stability upon evolving or
contested cultural norms, see Robert C. Post, Between Democracy and Community: The Legal
Constitution of Social Form, in NOMOS XXXV: DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY 163, 168-69
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Last Term in Virginia v. Black,37 9 for example, Justice Thomas
concluded that because "[i]n our culture, cross burning has almost in-
variably meant lawlessness, '380  a statute penalizing cross burning
"prohibits only conduct, not expression. ' '38 1 The Court, however, dis-
agreed, advancing its own understanding that cross burning can some-
times constitute "proscribable intimidation" and sometimes "core po-
litical speech," 3 2 depending upon circumstances. In debating these
questions, the Justices reflect differences of opinion in society at large,
which has its own conflicting constructions of the significance of cross
burning. 383  Because the Court must interpret the meaning of cross
burning in order to make constitutional law, and because whatever in-
terpretation it offers will be contestable, the Court can decide Virginia
v. Black only by taking sides in a cultural controversy. There is no in-
nocent position.
This consequence is an important reason why Justice Scalia be-
lieves that constitutional law must be autonomous from culture. In a
memorable dissent last Term in Lawrence v. Texas,384 Scalia scored the
Court for taking "sides in [a] culture war, departing from its role of as-
suring, as neutral observer, that the democratic rules of engagement
are observed."38 5  The plausibility of Scalia's position depends upon
whether constitutional law can meaningfully proceed without making
cultural judgments. If, as I have argued, it cannot, then neither can
constitutional law be autonomous from culture, nor can the Court be
merely a "neutral observer. '38 6 Brown and Frontiero both intervened
in culture wars, and neither opinion can properly be criticized for do-
ing so. Instead of pursuing the chimerical objective of neutrality, the
Court would do better to analyze the conditions under which courts
should properly make cultural judgments.
(John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds., 1993) [hereinafter Post, Between Democracy and Commu-
nity]; Robert C. Post, Community and the First Amendment, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473, 476-78 (0997);
and Post, supra note 239, at 485-94.
379 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003).
380 Id. at 1564 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1562 ("In every culture, certain things
acquire meaning well beyond what outsiders can comprehend. That goes for both the sacred and
the profane. I believe that cross burning is the paradigmatic example of the latter." (citations
omitted)).
381 Id. at 1566.
382 Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1551.
383 See Steven A. Holmes, Klan Case Transcends Black vs. White, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1998,
at A2o; Dahlia Lithwick, Virginia Burning: Are Cross-Burnings Speech or Violence?, SLATE, Dec.
I1, 2002, at http://slate.msn.com/id/2o753o.
384 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
385 Id. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2498 (charging that the Court has cast
"aside all pretense of neutrality").
386 See supra pp. 77-80.
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There is no area of constitutional law where these issues are more
fraught than substantive due process, where the Court interprets the
Due Process Clause387 to prohibit certain forms of substantive state
regulation. Because substantive due process doctrine has historically
engaged in remarkably candid efforts to interpret and apply cultural
values, Scalia would abandon the doctrine altogether, viewing it as an
improper "springboard[] for judicial lawmaking. '38 8  But his view has
not prevailed, and the doctrine has occasioned fierce debates about the
proper relationship of the Court to cultural controversy.
These debates are fueled by ferocious divisions within the Court
about the constitutional values that substantive due process is meant
to protect. Although the Court seems to agree that "[t]he Due Process
Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the 'liberty' it protects
includes more than the absence of physical restraint, '38 9 the Justices
bitterly disagree about the constitutional function of the doctrine. 390
Modern substantive due process began with Justice Harlan's magiste-
387 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies to the states, pro-
vides: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § i. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which
applies to the federal government, provides: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
388 SCALIA, supra note 134, at 25, 142-43.
389 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997) (citing Collins v. City of Harker
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). Even Scalia, in his capacity as a Justice, seems to agree with
this point. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 470-71 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (acknowledging that the Fourteenth Amendment "incorporates cer-
tain substantive guarantees specified in the Bill of Rights"). Justice Thomas explained his view of
substantive due process in Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003): "[T]he Due Process Clause
... protects certain 'fundamental liberty interest[s.]' . . Only fundamental rights and liberties
which are 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' and 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty' qualify for such protection." Id. at 2005--o6.
390 When asked about the function or purpose of substantive due process, the Court has a dis-
turbing tendency to respond by reproducing an undigested list of the "fundamental rights and lib-
erty interests" to which the Due Process Clause "provides heightened protection":
In a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected
by the Bill of Rights, the "liberty" specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes
the rights to marry, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); to have children, Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); to direct the education and upbring-
ing of one's children, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1023); Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); to marital privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); to use contraception, [id.]; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); to bodily in-
tegrity, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), and to abortion, [Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)]. We have also assumed, and
strongly suggested, that the Due Process Clause protects the traditional right to refuse
unwanted lifesaving medical treatment. [Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health, 497 U.S. 26i, 278-79 (1990)].
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720; see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. i86, 19o (1986); Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 0973).
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rial dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 391 in which he conceived the doctrine as
marking "the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of re-
spect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty
391 367 U.S. 497, 539 (96i) (Harlan, J., dissenting). For a short history of the doctrine, see
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 755-65 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). The origins of substan-
tive due process lie in Lochnerism, which refers to the Court's expansive interpretation of due
process protections for property and freedom of contract during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. See Robert C. Post, Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive Due Process in the
Taft Court Era, 78 B.U. L. REV 1489, 15o8, 1535 (1998) [hereinafter Post, Defending the Life-
world]. Lochnerism collapsed in the crisis of the New Deal, when a "face-off between the Execu-
tive and the Court in the 1930's .. .resulted in the repudiation of much of the substantive gloss
that the Court had placed on the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194-95. Although substantive due process revived after World War II, recon-
stituted on the seemingly solid foundation of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), it
never lost the taint of its original connections to Lochnerism. On the foundational importance of
Griswold, see Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 526
(1989); Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., The Legacy of Griswold, i6 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 511, 511, 543
(i989); and William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Consti-
tutional Law in the Twentieth Century, ioo MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2242 (2002).
As an instrument of Lochnerism, substantive due process protected from unnecessary regu-
lation forms of "liberty" that were associated with "those privileges long recognized at common
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923) (citations omitted). In the pre-New Deal era, common law was understood to
"spring[] from custom" that embodied "the experience of free men," Charles E. Hughes, President
Hughes Responds for Association, Speech Before English, Canadian, and American Lawyers at
Westminster Hall (July 21, 1924), in American Lawyers Welcomed in Historic Westminster Hall,
io A.B.A. J. 565, 567, 569 (1924), while the liberty protected by due process was understood to
follow "[tihe common law rule ... by which each individual [is] given independence in his action,
so long as that independence did not infringe the independence of another," William H. Taft, The
Social Importance of Proper Standards for Admission to the Bar, in REPORT OF THE THIRTY-
SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 924, 931 (0913). The re-
quirements of substantive due process were thus conceptualized as "an education in reasonable-
ness after the essential method of the common law." Hughes, supra, at 569. For a discussion of
the relationship between common law and pre-New Deal substantive due process, see Robert
Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era: Can It Be "Revived"?, 5i DUKE L.J. 1513, 1591-92, 1602
(2002); and Post, Defending the Lifeworld, supra, at 1536-41.
Substantive due process doctrine functioned to resist regulatory "interference ... with the
ordinary trades and occupations of the people," which the Court at the time of Lochner believed
was "on the increase." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 63 (1905). Regulatory statutes, in con-
trast to the organic freedoms and obligations of common law, tended to be conceived as "insidious
encroachments upon liberty which take the form of an uncontrolled administrative authority -
the modern guise of an ancient tyranny, not the more welcome to intelligent free men because it
may bear the label of democracy." Hughes, supra, at 569. Substantive due process was in this
sense connected to the traditional principle that statutes in derogation of the common law should
be narrowly construed. On this principle, see, for example, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL.,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 33 1-35 (2ooo); and David L. Shapiro, Con-
tinuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 948-49 (1992). Although
substantive due process did not protect all common law rights, or only common law rights, its
scope of application was, like the common law itself, thought to spring organically from the his-
tory and experience of the nation, and to protect "principle[s] of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105 (934).
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and the demands of organized society. '392 Harlan portrayed the Court
as continuously reassessing this balance:
The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country,
having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it de-
veloped as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a
living thing. A decision of this Court which radically departs from it
could not long survive, while a decision which builds on what has sur-
vived is likely to be sound. No formula could serve as a substitute, in this
area, for judgment and restraint.39 3
The contemporary significance of tradition was for Harlan a matter
of normative evaluation, 394 so there could be no "mechanical yard-
stick," no "mechanical answer" to the questions posed by substantive
due process. 395  Because "the compendious notion of 'liberty' em-
braced in the Fourteenth Amendment"396 was not "a series of isolated
points," but instead "a rational continuum" in which "certain interests
require[d] particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to
justify their abridgment, '397 substantive due process required courts to
weigh the value of "the 'ordered liberty' assured against state action
by the Fourteenth Amendment."398
392 Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
393 Id.
394 On the normative nature of tradition, see Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103
YALE L.J. 177, 181-82 ('993).
395 Poe, 367 U.S. at 544 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 147
(1954) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("Each new claim to Con-
stitutional protection must be considered against a background of Constitutional purposes, as they
have been rationally perceived and historically developed. Though we exercise limited and
sharply restrained judgment, yet there is no 'mechanical yard-stick,' no 'mechanical answer.'
The decision of an apparently novel claim must depend on grounds which follow closely on well-
accepted principles and criteria. The new decision must take 'its place in relation to what went
before and further [cut] a channel for what is to come."' (alteration in original)).
396 Id.
397 Id. at 543. Perhaps because of the debacle of Lochnerism, Harlan himself steered clear of
identifying protected liberty interests with traditional common law rights. See, e.g., id. at 543-44
(identifying the liberty to educate children freely with the guarantee of freedom of expression in
the First Amendment). Harlan even cited Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), in a way that
specifically excised McReynolds's references to the common law. See Poe, 367 U.S. at 543-44
(Harlan, J., dissenting). For a relatively recent decision that maintains the older alliance between
the liberty protected by substantive due process and common law rights, see Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277-78 (199o). See also Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 725 0997) ("The right assumed in Cruzan ... was not simply deduced from abstract
concepts of personal autonomy. Given the common-law rule that forced medication was a battery,
and the long legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment, our as-
sumption was entirely consistent with this Nation's history and constitutional traditions.").
398 Poe, 367 U.S. at 549 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For opinions influenced by Harlan's method-
ology, see Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 752, 765-73 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849-50 (1992); Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plu-
rality opinion); and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring).
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Harlan's approach derived from the orientation of pre-New Deal
substantive due process, which sought to assess whether liberty inter-
ests were "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental. '3 99 Within a relatively short period of
time, however, the Court began to drift into a very different approach.
Instead of identifying constitutionally protected liberty interests by ref-
erence to the contemporary significance of tradition, it began to iden-
tify such interests by directly evaluating the intrinsic value of liberty
itself.400
This tendency became more pronounced as the Court came to focus
on liberty interests in sexuality, an area that traditionally had been
highly regulated. 40  The Court began to speak of a freestanding "right
of privacy '40 2 that was only tenuously connected to traditional values.
The trend culminated in Roe v. Wade, 40 3 where the Court held that in
the teeth of historical regulation "[t]his right of privacy ... founded in
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty ... is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy. '40 4 Roe used substantive due process to protect a lib-
erty interest that the Court believed was constitutionally valuable,
even if that interest was not immanent in the history and tradition of
the nation.40 5
Roe raised the question why the Court would protect some liberty
interests, but not others. The Court has never offered a definitive ex-
planation, but the leading candidate is that substantive due process
protects those forms of liberty that are necessary to preserve "the abil-
ity independently to define one's identity that is central to any concept
of liberty. '40 6 "At the heart of liberty," we are told, "is the right to de-
fine one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not de-
399 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, io5 (1934); see also supra note 391.
400 The tendency to drift in this direction was held in check in pre-New Deal substantive due
process because of the doctrine's intense focus on common law rights. See supra note 391.
401 By contrast Harlan had emphasized the values of "marital privacy" and "intimacy," which
turned on "the institution of marriage, an institution which the State not only must allow, but
which always and in every age it has fostered and protected." Poe, 367 U.S. at 553 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). Liberty to engage in sexual conduct was therefore comparatively unimportant to
Harlan. Compare id., with Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (focusing on the individ-
ual right of privacy in a case relating to the legality of the distribution of contraceptives to unmar-
ried persons).
402 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
403 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
404 Id. at 153.
405 See id. at 17-18, 118 n.2, 147-50.
406 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 6o9, 619 (1984).
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fine the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion
of the State. '40 7
The upshot of these developments is that by the I98os the Court
had adopted two distinct approaches to defining the scope of substan-
tive due process. The first, which I shall call the "traditional" ap-
proach, focused on a hermeneutics of history and tradition; the second,
which I shall call the "autonomy" approach, focused on the forms of
liberty prerequisite for "personal dignity and autonomy. '408 Each ap-
proach required the Court independently to ascertain the value of lib-
erty interests, either by reference to the immanent significance of such
interests in American tradition, or by reference to the role of such in-
terests in the self-definition of persons.
Both approaches justified substantive due process by a particular
account of the nature of the Constitution. Because the traditional ap-
proach conceived the Constitution as the reflection of the "whole ex-
perience" 40 9 of the American people, it held that the Constitution pro-
tected those liberty interests that were "fundamental ... as they have
been understood by the traditions of our people and our law. '410 Be-
cause the autonomy approach conceptualized the Constitution as a
framework for democratic self-determination, it held that the Constitu-
tion protected the autonomy of citizens to define their own identities in
a manner that would allow them to remain sufficiently independent
from the state as to preserve the legitimacy of democratic consent.4 11
These two accounts of substantive due process collided in Bowers
v. Hardwick,41 2 which upheld a Georgia anti-sodomy statute.41 3 Jus-
tice White's opinion for the Court adopted the traditional approach. It
asked whether the right of "homosexuals to engage in sodomy" 4 14 was
407 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) ("[T]he liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment [encompasses] the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy.").
408 Id.
409 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
410 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also supra pp. 36-
37.
411 See Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE L.J. iii9, 1169 (1995);
Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 8o5-07 (1989). The consent of citi-
zens can hardly confer democratic legitimacy on the state if that consent is itself the product of
state regulation. See Post, Between Democracy and Community, supra note 378, at 174-75; Post,
Defending the Lifeworld, supra note 391, at 1533-39. To the extent that consent flows from iden-
tity, and to the extent that identity is constructed by the state, the state cannot claim democratic
legitimacy. See id. at 175. But because the state shapes the identity of citizens in so many ways,
the locus of identity that must remain independent of state regulation must be conceptualized as a
moral construction that evolves in time as cultural conceptions of the self change.
412 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
413 See id. at 189.
414 Id. at igo.
2003]
HeinOnline -- 117 Harv. L. Rev. 89 2003-2004
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. 4 15  Justice
Blackmun's dissent, by contrast, adopted the autonomy approach, ask-
ing whether the Georgia statute infringed "the fundamental interest all
individuals have in controlling the nature of their intimate associations
with others. '41 6 Blackmun argued that these associations merited con-
stitutional protection because they "form so central a part of an indi-
vidual's life" as to be necessary to "an individual's self-definition. '4 17
Although Justices White and Blackmun used distinct forms of con-
stitutional doctrine to identify and protect distinct constitutional val-
ues, 41 8 we should not miss the common ground that underlay their dis-
agreement. Both White and Blackmun assumed that the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause could not be identified unless the
Court determined for itself the significance of relevant liberty inter-
ests. 4 19 Both White and Blackmun also understood that such a deter-
mination could not be settled by reference merely to legal sources, but
would require forms of normative evaluation that would entail poten-
tially controversial cultural judgments.4 20
It is true that White's opinion in Bowers reviewed the historical re-
cord in so flat and disdainful a manner as effectively to efface the
Court's own normative involvement in evaluating the present worth of
the nation's tradition.4 2 I This disdain expressed White's manifest
skepticism about substantive due process doctrine itself, which he re-
garded as chiefly reflecting the Court's effort "to assure itself and the
415 Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opin-
ion)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
416 Id. at 206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
417 Id. at 204-05.
418 On the possible theoretical convergence of these approaches, see Post, Defending the Life-
world, supra note 391, at 1530-39, which postulates that "the very independence from state
managerial control required by constitutional democracy can in fact be understood as embodied
in specific historical social practices." Id. at 1533-34.
419 White was required by the traditional approach to determine if the asserted liberty interest
in sodomy was "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191 (quoting
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Blackmun
was required by the autonomy approach to determine if the asserted liberty interest in sodomy
was essential to the construction of the self. See supra note 411.
420 Blackmun's argument in his Bowers dissent that "individuals define themselves in a signifi-
cant way through their intimate sexual relationships with others" committed him to a host of con-
troversial cultural judgments about the relationship between sexuality and identity. Bowers, 478
U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). White's argument in his majority opinion that the freedom
of private sexual conduct between consenting adults was not a liberty interest that was so imma-
nent in the nation's tradition as to be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" entailed an
equally controversial assortment of cultural judgments. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92 (quoting
Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (plurality opinion); and Palko, 302 U.S. at 325) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
421 White concluded that "to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is 'deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best, face-
tious." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194.
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public that announcing rights not readily identifiable in the Constitu-
tion's text involves much more than the imposition of the Justices'
own choice of values on the States and the Federal Government. 42 2
White indicated that he was loathe to exercise the Court's "authority
to discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process
Clause," because he believed that the "Court is most vulnerable and
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitu-
tional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design
of the Constitution. '423 He concluded that "[tihere should be . . . great
resistance" to expanding the protections of substantive due process, lest
"the Judiciary necessarily take[] to itself further authority to govern the
country without express constitutional authority. '"424
White's hostility to the very project of substantive due process an-
ticipated yet another shift in substantive due process doctrine. Justices
who shared White's skepticism began in the years after Bowers to
craft decisions that fundamentally modified both the traditional and
the autonomy approaches. 4 5 These decisions culminated in Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's far-reaching opinion for the Court in Washington v.
Glucksberg,42 6 which proposed a profound reconceptualization of sub-
stantive due process. 427  Glucksberg collapsed all of substantive due
process doctrine into the traditional approach, arguing that the Court's
past decisions focusing on "personal autonomy" were in reality merely
efforts to identify "personal activities and decisions . . . so deeply
rooted in our history and traditions, or so fundamental to our concept
of constitutionally ordered liberty, that they are protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. '"428
Glucksberg then fashioned a "restrained methodology '429 that im-
posed a straitjacket on the traditional approach. It held that the Due
Process Clause protected only carefully described and specific liberty
422 Id. at 191.
423 Id. at 194.
424 Id. at 195.
425 See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-o6 (1993) (holding that children without guardi-
ans and in government custody do not have a fundamental right to be placed in private custody
rather than in government institutions); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121-30 (1989)
(holding that a natural father's interest in a parental relationship with a child born into an exist-
ing marriage between the mother and another man is not a fundamental right); United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-52 (1987) (holding that the government interest in community safety
can "outweigh an individual's liberty interest" and thus justify pretrial detention).
426 521 U.S. 702 (997). Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion was joined by Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.
427 See id. at 719-28.
428 Id. at 727. The Court pointedly observed: "That many of the rights and liberties protected
by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion
that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected." Id.
429 Id. at 721.
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interests that could, "objectively," be found to be so "deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition" as to be termed "fundamental. '430
Glucksberg ruled that the government could not infringe fundamental
liberty interests "at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state inter-
est. '43 1  Conversely, the government could freely regulate non-
fundamental liberty interests so long as there was "a reasonable rela-
tion to a legitimate state interest to justify the action. '432
Glucksberg modified the traditional approach in three principal
ways. First, it eliminated the "rational continuum" of liberty and sub-
stituted a strict bifurcation between liberty interests that were "fun-
damental" and all other liberty interests. This bifurcation prevented
courts from evaluating the unique strength of particular liberty inter-
ests. Second, Glucksberg established a rigid dichotomy between regu-
lations of fundamental liberty interests, which would be subject to
strict scrutiny, and regulations of all other liberty interests, which
would be subject only to some variant of rational basis review. 43 3 This
dichotomy prevented the Court from balancing the force of particular
liberty interests against the strength of particular regulatory inter-
ests.43 4 It is significant that at the very moment that Glucksberg cre-
ated a strong incentive for courts to avoid classifying liberty interests
as "fundamental," because fundamental liberty interests were virtually
immune from state regulation, Glucksberg also prevented courts from
restraining the regulation of non-fundamental liberty interests.
Third, and most pertinent to our inquiry, Glucksberg profoundly al-
tered the nature of the Court's encounter with American history. The
traditional approach had contemplated a dialogue between the Court
and a "living tradition," in which the Court independently evaluated
the significance of liberty interests immanent in American history. No
"mechanical yard-stick" could substitute for the necessity of this inde-
430 Id. (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
431 Id. at 720-21 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (I993)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
432 Id. at 722.
433 See id. at 721-22. "All other liberty interests may be abridged or abrogated pursuant to a
validly enacted state law if that law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Lawrence
v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2492 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
434 Some previous decisions had adopted this balancing approach. See Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852-53, 869-77 (1992) (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter, JJ.) (balancing the personal liberty of a woman in choosing to terminate a pregnancy
against the state's interest in protecting the fetus); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982)
(balancing personal liberty in the context of confinement conditions against the state interest in
the safety of others); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685-86 (1977) (balancing the
personal liberty to make choices regarding contraception against state interests in health, medical
standards, and protecting unborn life).
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pendent evaluation. In sharp contrast to this approach, Glucksberg in-
structed courts to categorize liberty interests as "fundamental" on the
basis of "objective" facts. Courts were to protect narrowly defined and
specific liberty interests if and only if they had actually been protected
in American history. Historical facts thus functioned precisely as the
mechanical yardstick rejected by Harlan in Poe, for they served auto-
matically to determine whether a particular liberty interest was fun-
damental, and they did not require the Court itself independently to
assess the significance of that interest.
By collapsing substantive due process into a question of historical
fact, Glucksberg transformed the Court from an institution engaged in
cultural judgments into an institution that enforced the cultural judg-
ments of others.435 The whole point of Glucksberg's doctrinal innova-
tion was to prevent "the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause"
from being "subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the
Members of this Court, '436 which is to say to prevent the Court from
exercising independent judgment about the constitutional significance
of the liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause. 437  Formu-
lated in this way, substantive due process doctrine did not require the
Court to embroil itself in the controversies that necessarily attend cul-
435 The origins of this approach lie in Justice Scalia's opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. 110, 124 (1989) (plurality opinion). For a discussion of Justice Scalia's approach, see supra
note 244; Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 15 13-14 (1999);
and David A. Strauss, Tradition, Precedent, and Justice Scalia, I2 CARDOZO L. REV. 1699,
170-o8 (I99i). I should note that Glucksberg does not advance a version of substantive due
process doctrine that is autonomous from culture, because it contemplates that the beliefs of non-
judicial actors are a proper source for determining the scope of constitutional law.
436 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
437 Glucksberg formulates the question as though the identification of protected liberty interests
requires a choice between relying on "objective" facts or instead on the subjective "preferences" of
judges. See id. at 720-22. Given this choice, of course, doctrine must appeal to objective facts,
for it would be quite unacceptable to authorize unelected judges to impose their subjective prefer-
ences on the nation. Glucksberg thus seeks to "rein in the subjective elements that are necessarily
present in due process judicial review." Id. at 722.
The thrust of the traditional approach, however, was to avoid this choice between objective
facts and subjective preferences by formulating substantive due process doctrine in a way that
directed courts to decide cases by reference to the intersubjective norms implicit in the "living"
tradition of the nation. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (i96i) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Thus
Harlan had argued that substantive due process doctrine does not permit judges to "draw on
[their] merely personal and private notions," but instead requires them to exercise "judgment" by
applying "considerations deeply rooted in reason and in the compelling traditions of the legal pro-
fession." Id. at 544-45 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. i65, I70-7I (1952)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). The distinction between intersubjective norms and subjective preferences is
fundamental to the law and is discussed in Post, Constitutional Concept, supra note 222, at 624-
26. Rehnquist, however, has consistently formulated his jurisprudence in a manner designed to
deny this distinction. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988); supra pp. 30-
31.
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tural judgments. In effect, Glucksberg modified the doctrine so as to
make it compatible with Scalia's standard of neutrality.438
This neutrality was purchased at a high price, however, for Glucks-
berg's doctrinal modifications effectively stripped substantive due
process of its basic purpose and function. Before Glucksberg, substan-
tive due process doctrine, in both its traditional and autonomy
branches, protected liberty interests because the Court itself regarded
those interests as constitutionally valuable and therefore worthy of ju-
dicial protection. In contrast, Glucksberg would have the Court inter-
vene to protect cultural values merely because others in the past have
deemed these values to be important. We may ask, however, why the
Court should be required to do this. 439 What constitutional purpose is
served if the Court is instructed to invalidate state actions on the basis
of values which the Court itself may not even believe are significant?
Glucksberg's formulation of substantive due process doctrine is so
strangely alienated that its chief purpose seems to be to eliminate the
doctrine altogether.440 Glucksberg thus poses a stark choice: either the
438 Of course the question whether the "objective" facts warrant identifying a right as funda-
mental is itself a question of judgment, but it is not the kind of judgment that need be inconsis-
tent with Scalia's concern that the Court remain neutral in cultural controversies.
439 David Strauss observes that the kind of traditionalism advanced by Scalia and embodied in
Glucksberg "looks very much like the exact position that Holmes called revolting - that there is
no reason to uphold a practice other than that it dates from Henry IV, or George IMl." Strauss,
supra note 435, at 17 10. Strauss concludes that traditionalism of this kind "is just not an accept-
able creed. At bottom neither Justice Scalia nor anyone else arguably within the legal mainstream
today accepts its implications." Id. at 17 11-12.
440 This purpose may also be inferred from the shrewd way in which the "restrained methodol-
ogy" imposed by Glucksberg reduces substantive due process into a doctrine that is for all practi-
cal purposes toothless. See supra pp. 91-94. Conservative hostility to substantive due process
doctrine has a number of distinct sources. Sometimes, as in White's Bowers opinion, this hostility
focuses on the charge that substantive due process protects "rights not readily identifiable in the
Constitution's text." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986); see also John Harrison, Sub-
stantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV 493, 494-95 (997) (suggesting
that because substantive due process comes from beyond the text of the Constitution, its "prece-
dential authority . . . is less than it might seem"); Rehnquist, supra note i6, at 702-04 (describing
the way in which the understanding of substantive due process has evolved beyond the text of the
Constitution). I have always found this charge to be unconvincing, however, because the word
"liberty" in the Due Process Clause seems to provide at least as much meaningful guidance as
does the word "equal" in the Equal Protection Clause.
If the objection is instead that the text of the Clause warrants providing only protections of
process rather than protections of substance, see, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 134, at 24-25, it is strik-
ing that even those Justices who are most theoretically opposed to substantive due process, like
Scalia and Rehnquist, are also nonetheless enthusiastic about applying the equal protection com-
ponent of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the federal government. See, e.g.,
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213-31 (1995). That component is both sub-
stantive and without textual foundation. The incorporation doctrine, moreover, which reads the
substantive content of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, is also irredeemably substantive, yet it is virtually immune from criticism. Objections to
substantive due process doctrine sometimes invoke the distinct idea that substantive due process
protects liberty interests that are without "cognizable roots in the ... design of the Constitution."
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Court can preserve its neutrality by refraining from exercising cultural
judgments, thereby effectively ceasing to protect the constitutional
values traditionally associated with substantive due process, or the
Court can continue to safeguard those values at the cost of embroiling
itself in cultural controversy. It cannot have it both ways.
This was the doctrinal landscape onto which, on the last day of the
Term, Lawrence v. Texas441 exploded. At issue in Lawrence was a
Texas statute that imposed criminal penalties on sodomy committed
between members "of the same sex. ' '44 2 Justice Kennedy, in an opinion
joined by four other Justices, 443 held that the statute was unconstitu-
tional on substantive due process grounds, and he took deliberate care
to rule:
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194. But for the reasons stated above, supra p. 89, I also find this claim im-
plausible.
My best guess, therefore, is that the chronic suspicion that plagues substantive due process
doctrine derives not from the doctrine's lack of connection to the text or to the design of the Con-
stitution, but instead from the fact that these connections are operationalized in vague and inde-
terminate ways. Both the traditional and autonomy approaches to substantive due process de-
pend upon doctrinal tests that are abstract and underspecified, so that their application depends
to a very large degree on unstated assumptions that neither are nor can be rendered fully explicit.
The doctrine accordingly reposes a good deal of faith in the common sense and statesmanship of
judges, which is a reason for many to distrust it. As even the most liberal Justices concede:
[T]he Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process
because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce
and open-ended .... The doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the ut-
most care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (Stevens, J.).
In the eyes of conservative Justices like Rehnquist or Scalia, the doctrinal vagueness of sub-
stantive due process invites the Court to be seen as enforcing the personal preferences of Justices
instead of the intersubjective norms of the nation, see supra note 437, and the potential for this
slippage argues for the elimination of the doctrine altogether. The force of this argument depends
upon balancing the costs of leaving unprotected the liberty interests that would otherwise be safe-
guarded by substantive due process against the costs of involving the Court in cultural controver-
sies that may lead the public to regard constitutional law as the imposition of the Justices' own
personal views.
The tack taken by Justice Scalia and other conservative Justices, and also in essence by de-
cisions like Glucksberg, is to assess this balance categorically, effectively requiring the Court to
withdraw altogether from the field of substantive due process. A different tack would be to assess
this balance on a case-by-case basis, so that the danger to judicial legitimacy of particular sub-
stantive due process decisions would be weighed against the importance of particular liberty in-
terests. The right wing of the Court seems unwilling to endorse this approach, no doubt regard-
ing it as a slippery slope.
441 23 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
442 Id. at 2476.
443 Justice Kennedy's opinion was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id.
at 2475. Kennedy's opinion was all the more dramatic because he himself had joined the Court's
opinion in Glucksberg. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 704 (I997). Justice O'Connor
concurred separately in the judgment, holding that the Texas statute should have been struck
down under the Equal Protection Clause. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring in the judgment). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented. Id.
at 2488 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today.
It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be
and now is overruled.4 4 4
Kennedy's opinion is extravagant and passionate. It simply shat-
ters, with all the heartfelt urgency of deep conviction, the paralyzing
carapace in which Glucksberg had sought to encase substantive due
process. Lawrence ignores Glucksberg's sharp bifurcation between
"fundamental" liberty interests and other liberty interests. It instead
focuses on the particular liberty interests endangered by the Texas
statute, savoring their unique valence and exploring their particular
significance, as Harlan had urged more than forty years ago in his Poe
opinion. Kennedy's opinion also ignores Glucksberg's rigid dichotomy
between strict scrutiny and rational basis review. It instead balances
the strength of Texas's regulatory interests against the specific liberty
interests threatened by the Texas statute. Lawrence concludes that the
"Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual. '445
Finally, and most importantly, Lawrence does not turn on objective
facts or on the value judgments of others. Instead the Court unabash-
edly engages the values it perceives to be at stake in the case. The
opinion observes that although "times can blind us to certain truths[,]
... later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and
proper in fact serve only to oppress. '44 6 Lawrence plainly expresses its
own vision of such truths; it articulates the Court's own understanding
of what is "of fundamental significance in defining the rights of the
person. '447 And because it directly makes value judgments of this
kind, Lawrence necessarily implicates itself in cultural controversy.
Scalia is therefore right to accuse the Court of losing its neutrality.
But this loss is an inevitable consequence of the Court's making the
evaluative judgments necessary to fulfill the purpose of substantive
due process doctrine, which is to identify and protect liberty interests
that the Court deems constitutionally valuable.
Lawrence is a strikingly innovative opinion. Although it nods in
the direction of the traditional approach, noting "in the past half cen-
tury" an "emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection
to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in mat-
444 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
445 Id. at 2484 (emphasis added). Justice Scalia, in dissent, furiously condemns Lawrence's re-
fusal to be bound by Glucksberg's methodological innovations. Id. at 2488, 2491-92 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
446 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
447 Id. at 2477.
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ters pertaining to sex, ' 448 Lawrence uses these observations more to
chip away at Bowers's historical references than to establish the consti-
tutionally protected nature of a liberty interest in private sodomy be-
tween consenting adults.449  Although the Court in Lawrence also re-
peatedly invokes the autonomy approach to substantive due process, 4 0
announcing at the beginning of its opinion that "[liberty presumes an
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression,
and certain intimate conduct,"'4 5 ' it makes no focused effort to link the
behavior regulated by the Texas statute to a specifically constitutional
dimension of autonomy, like the self-definition that was so important
to Blackmun's dissent in Bowers. Instead the theme of autonomy
floats weightlessly through Lawrence, invoked but never endowed
with analytic traction.
Lawrence thus breaks with both the traditional and autonomy ap-
proaches to substantive due process. Its legal and rhetorical energy
seems directed elsewhere, at a concern for the dignity of enduring in-
timate relationships 452 and a refusal to permit "stigma" to be imposed
because of those relationships. 45 3 Lawrence notably refers to "the due
process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substan-
tive guarantee of liberty, '4 54 and it affirms that the "petitioners are en-
titled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their
existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual con-
duct a crime. '45 5 Themes of respect and stigma are at the moral center
of the Lawrence opinion, and they are entirely new to substantive due
process doctrine. 45 6 They signal that the Court is concerned with con-
448 Id. at 2480. Lawrence also notes the decreasing number of states that prohibit sodomy and,
in those states that do prohibit it, a "pattern of nonenforcement with respect to consenting adults
acting in private." Id. at 2481.
449 See id. at 248o-84. It should also be noted that Lawrence's holding that "Bowers was not
correct when it was decided," id. at 2484, is in some tension with interpreting Lawrence as turning
on an "emerging awareness," id. at 2474.
450 See id. at 2478, 2481-82.
451 Id. at 2475. Lawrence cites with approval Justice Stevens's dissent in Bowers to the effect
that "neither history nor tradition could save a law" that infringes the "liberty" of "unmarried
... persons" to make "intimate choices." Id. at 2483 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
452 See id. at 2478.
453 Id. at 2482.
454 Id. Lawrence also refers to "the respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy of the
person in making [protected] choices." Id. at 2481.
455 Id. at 2484. Lawrence's condemnation of the state for seeking to "control" the destiny of the
petitioners is consistent with the autonomy branch of substantive due process.
456 Egalitarian concerns had, however, surfaced in previous substantive due process opinions,
most notably in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856
(1992). For a discussion of these concerns, see Karst, supra note 340, at 533-34. See also Reva B.
Siegel, Abortion as a Sex Equality Right: Its Basis in Feminist Theory, in MOTHERS IN LAW:
FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD, 43, 66-67 (Martha A.
Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995).
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stitutional values that have not heretofore found their natural home in
the Due Process Clause.
The notion that persons are "entitled" to "demand respect" for their
"private lives" must be parsed with some care. It is unlikely that Law-
rence intends to authorize persons to demand from the state affirma-
tive indicia of respect, both because this would impose an unusual
positive obligation on the state,457 and because it is entirely unclear
what such indicia might be. It is therefore more plausible to interpret
Lawrence as prohibiting the state from stigmatizing or demeaning the
private lives of persons.
Conceiving due process rights in this way marks a point of depar-
ture from the autonomy approach to due process, which focuses on the
deprivations that persons experience when they are unable to perform
conduct that is constitutionally protected. Lawrence does not empha-
size such deprivations; it does not focus on the injuries that persons
would suffer were they unable to practice sodomy. It instead focuses
on the stigma that the Texas statute inflicts on persons whom the pub-
lic associates with the practice of sodomy.458 This association defines a
group that anti-sodomy laws cause to be demeaned in the eyes of oth-
ers.
Not all prohibitions of private sexual conduct inflict disgrace in this
way. Because the use of contraceptives is not associated with any par-
ticular group, the anti-contraceptive statute that was at issue in Gris-
wold could not have been analyzed in terms of the paradigm of stigma
and respect that preoccupies Lawrence.459 The perception that the
Texas anti-sodomy statute imposes second-class citizenship on an iden-
tifiable class of persons, by contrast, is at the core of Lawrence's analy-
sis. Lawrence thus seeks to redress harms that are traditionally associ-
ated with equal protection analysis, rather than with substantive due
process. 460 This renders Scalia's dissent, which condemns the Court
for inventing out of whole cloth "a brand-new 'constitutional right'
457 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. I8q, 195 (1989)
(holding that the Due Process Clause is a "limitation" on government that cannot fairly be read as
imposing an "affirmative obligation" on states).
458 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
459 At issue in Griswold was a Connecticut statute that imposed criminal penalties on the use of
"any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception." Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
460 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT
257, 271-75 (1996) (discussing the role that "stigma" has played in the Supreme Court's equal pro-
tection jurisprudence); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2411-
12 (1994) (conceptualizing equal protection doctrine in terms of the position of subordinate groups
in society). For a discussion of the stigma inflicted by prohibitions of sodomy, in the context of a
consideration of equal protection principles, see Kenji Yoshino, Covering, I I I YALE L.J. 769, 814-
15 (2002).
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S.. impatient of democratic change, '461 somewhat off the mark, for the
Court has been using the Equal Protection Clause to recognize and re-
pair such harms for more than two generations. Although Lawrence's
conclusions may be attacked on the merits, the Court is plainly not in-
tervening to protect some heretofore unknown constitutional value.
The relevant question is why Lawrence chooses to protect the value of
equal citizenship with the Due Process Clause.
The question deepens when it is seen how closely Lawrence comes
to explicitly melding the concerns of equal protection with those of due
process. "Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand
respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty,"
the Court states, "are linked in important respects, and a decision on
the latter point advances both interests. '462 The Court explains that it
will not narrowly strike down the Texas statute under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause for prohibiting homosexual but not heterosexual sod-
omy, because such an approach would be insufficient. States might re-
spond by prohibiting all sodomy, and "[i]f protected conduct is made
criminal and the law which does so remains unexamined for its sub-
stantive validity, its stigma might remain even if it were not enforce-
able as drawn for equal protection reasons. '463 Lawrence concludes:
When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that
declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons
to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres. The cen-
tral holding of Bowers has been brought in question by this case, and it
should be addressed. Its continuance as precedent demeans the lives of
homosexual persons.
4 64
This passage sounds almost entirely in equal protection. It does
not state that a law prohibiting sodomy should be struck down be-
cause it would deprive all persons of the valuable liberty of engaging
in sodomy, but instead asserts that such a statute is unconstitutional
because it will invite "discrimination both in the public and in the pri-
vate spheres" against the class of persons who are publicly associated
with sodomy, which constitutes the group of "homosexual persons."
If Lawrence turns on values usually associated with antidiscrimina-
tion law, why does the Court not use the Equal Protection Clause to
overrule Bowers? To do so would require the Court to hold that stat-
utes prohibiting sodomy are, in effect, classifications based upon sexual
orientation. 465  Assuming the Court could overcome this hurdle, it
461 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
462 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
463 Id.
464 Id.
465 Such a holding could prove quite tricky in the context of anti-sodomy laws that are written
in a facially neutral way to prohibit all sodomy. To pierce this facial neutrality would require the
20031
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would have to determine whether classifications based upon sexual
orientation should receive elevated scrutiny or merely rational basis
review. If the former, the Court would instantly render constitution-
ally suspicious all state laws that discriminate based upon sexual orien-
tation, including those dealing with marriage, 466 children, 467 and the
military.468 If the latter, the Court could overrule Bowers only by
holding that anti-sodomy laws are the result of mere "animus. ' '469 In
effect, the Court would have to intervene into the national controversy
over the status of homosexuality by branding supporters of anti-
sodomy laws as prejudiced bigots.4 10
By using the Due Process Clause, however, the Court can avoid
these difficulties. It need not address the question of facial classifica-
tions. Because Lawrence builds on due process decisions attributing
special constitutional value to "the personal and private life of the in-
dividual, 47 1 the Court need not confront the entire range of state stat-
Court to hold either that anti-sodomy laws are actually based upon sexual orientation or that all
such laws are the result of an intent to harm persons based upon their sexual orientation.
466 Courts have upheld state marriage laws against challenges by same-sex couples. See, e.g.,
Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 333 (D.C. 1995) (holding that same-sex marriage is
not a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause); Storrs v. Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d
286, 287-88 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (holding that a gender-based classification that prohibits the state
from authorizing same-sex marriages serves a valid public purpose and is not in violation of the
Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause); De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952, 955-56
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (holding that two persons of the same sex cannot enter into a common law
marriage).
467 See, e.g., Ex parte H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 26 (Ala. 2002) (Moore, C.J., concurring specially)
("[Tlhe homosexual conduct of a parent - conduct involving a sexual relationship between two
persons of the same gender - creates a strong presumption of unfitness that alone is sufficient
justification for denying that parent custody of his or her own children or prohibiting the adop-
tion of the children of others."); S v. S, 6o8 S.W.2d 64, 65 (Ky. Ct. App. i98o) (holding that the les-
bian mother's "deviate practice is sufficient, in this case, to warrant the change" in custody rights
from mother to father (emphasis omitted)); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985) ("The [gay]
father's continuous exposure of the child to his immoral and illicit relationship renders him an
unfit and improper custodian as a matter of law.").
468 See, e.g., Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3 d 1126, 1137 (9 th Cir. 1997) (upholding
a federal statute banning from military service those who admit their homosexuality); Belier v.
Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788. 812 (9th Cir. i98o) (upholding "the Navy's blanket rule requiring dis-
charge of all who have engaged in homosexual conduct").
469 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (holding that an amendment to a state consti-
tution prohibiting all legislative, executive, or judicial action designed to protect homosexual per-
sons from discrimination violates equal protection for "the amendment seems inexplicable by any-
thing but animus toward the class it affects").
470 In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor effectively opts for the second of these alterna-
tives. O'Connor concludes that "[t]he Texas sodomy law 'raise[s] the inevitable inference that the
disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected."' Lawrence v.
Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2486 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (second alteration
in original) (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 634).
471 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484. The origin of the focus on this special constitutional value in
substantive due process doctrine seems to lie in the traditional approach articulated by Justice
Harlan's dissent in Poe. In his opinion, Harlan viewed a Connecticut law prohibiting the use of
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utes that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. It need only
commit itself to striking down those state statutes that intrude into this
protected realm. 47 2 And because Lawrence interprets substantive due
process doctrine as balancing state regulatory interests against consti-
tutionally protected liberty interests, the Court need conclude only that
"[t]he Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can jus-
tify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual. '473
The Court can avoid inflammatory accusations of bigotry by acknowl-
edging the "profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and
moral principles" that support condemnations of "homosexual conduct
as immoral. '47 4
These advantages are considerable, because they enable the Court
to enter into the national debate about the status of homosexuality in a
manner that stresses the positive value of nondiscrimination while pre-
serving the Court's options in deciding how far it is willing to go in
striking down legislation adversely affecting homosexuals. This flexi-
bility allows the Court to calibrate its future decisions to the strength
and quality of the public response to its opinion in Lawrence. Law-
rence will undoubtedly provoke controversy, both within culture about
the status of homosexuality and within constitutional culture about the
validity of regulations based on sexual orientation.47 5  The Court will
have to orient its future decisions to this debate, just as in Grutter it
had to orient itself to public disagreements about affirmative action.
Just as the Court in Grutter fashioned an innovative and flexible doc-
contraceptive devices as violating "what, by common understanding throughout the English-
speaking world, must be granted to be a most fundamental aspect of 'liberty,' the privacy of the
home in its basic sense, and it is this which requires that the statute by subjected to 'strict scru-
tiny."' Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (ig6i) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). The
Court in Griswold later took this point to postulate a "zone of privacy created by several funda-
mental constitutional guarantees" that protects "the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms." Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). The notion of the private realm, however, has al-
ways fit awkwardly with the abortion decisions, which concern an act that can be viewed as
either public or private.
472 Lawrence is explicit that in its view the "present case ... does not involve whether the gov-
ernment must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter."
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
473 Id.
474 Id. at 2480.
475 Opposition to the extension of the logic of Lawrence to marriage is predictable. See Defense
of Marriage Act, i U.S.C. § 7 (2000) (defining "marriage" as "only a legal union between one man
and one woman as husband and wife," and "spouse" as "a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife"). About a month before Lawrence, a constitutional amendment was proposed
in the House of Representatives providing that "[m]arriage in the United States shall consist only
of the union of a man and a woman." H.R.J. Res. 56, io8th Cong. (2003). A little more than a
month after the decision, in response to "social conservatives" who were "seething" over Law-
rence, President Bush stated that he was proposing official action, which might include a constitu-
tional amendment, that would define marriage as a union between a man and a woman. Neil A.
Lewis, Bush Backs Bid To Block Gays From Marrying, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2003, at Ai.
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trinal response to public controversy, so the Court will want to reserve
for itself the option of engaging public controversy in equally creative
and supple ways in decisions subsequent to Lawrence.
The difficulty, however, is that the logic of Lawrence undercuts the
public-private distinction that Lawrence uses to underwrite the space
for this flexibility. Although Lawrence turns on the claim that "[t]he
petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives, '47 6 it cannot
plausibly mean that all conduct committed in "private" is entitled to
immunity from stigmatizing criminal penalties. Lawrence must there-
fore distinguish forms of private conduct that can be publicly stigma-
tized from those that cannot. The Court comes closest to explaining
such a distinction when it slaps Bowers for framing the "issue pre-
sented" as "whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental
right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy. ' 47 7  Lawrence argues
that this statement of the question participates in the very stigmatiza-
tion that due process exists to prevent: "To say that the issue in Bowers
was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the
claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married
couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have
sexual intercourse. '4 78
The constitutional liberty interests recognized in Lawrence do not
concern particular sexual acts, but instead the ability to form "a per-
sonal relationship" without the government defining "the meaning of
the relationship" or setting "its boundaries absent injury to a person or
abuse of an institution the law protects. '4 79 Lawrence explains:
It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this
relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and
still retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt ex-
pression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but
one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty pro-
tected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make
this choice. 480
Lawrence interprets the Due Process Clause as attributing constitu-
tional value to "enduring" personal relationships that are free from the
control or stigmatization of the state.4 l The state cannot prohibit
sodomy, because sodomy is understood to be essential to a personal re-
lationship that has constitutional value. This suggests that the state
could, by contrast, penalize the private sexual practice of bestiality, be-
476 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.




481 Id. By framing the question in this way, Lawrence stresses the similarity between hetero-
sexual and homosexual relationships.
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cause bestiality is not an integral dimension of a constitutionally valu-
able relationship.
If enduring personal relationships have constitutional value, how-
ever, it is not clear why the Due Process Clause protects them only
when the state seeks to regulate "the most private human conduct,
sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. '48 2 Rela-
tionships are both public and private. They do not consist solely in
how persons relate to each other in the home or in the course of sexual
intimacies. Enduring personal relationships are also made up of how
persons relate to each other in the performance of public roles and ob-
ligations. If Bowers was incorrect in asking whether constitutional
value should be attributed to the private, sexual aspects of a relation-
ship, and if Bowers should instead have accorded constitutional pro-
tection to the relationship itself, then it is the entire relationship, in
both its public and private dimensions, that constitutes a protected lib-
erty interest. Although past substantive due process opinions might
have taken the position that private sexuality deserves greater protec-
tion because it is most intimately tied to the constitutional value of
self-definition, 48 3 this tack does not seem available to Lawrence,
48 4
which stresses the importance of interpersonal connection rather than
private sexual behavior.48 5
Not only does Lawrence's reasoning undermine the special value of
private liberty, but it also undercuts the notion that the state may have
particularly compelling reasons to regulate the public aspects of homo-
482 Id.
483 See supra note 420.
484 I should note in this regard that Lawrence's opening paragraph seems specifically designed
to subordinate the theme of privacy to the theme of liberty:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwell-
ing or other private places. In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home.
And there are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State
should not be a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and
certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spa-
tial and more transcendent dimensions.
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475. The liberty stressed by Lawrence, which "extends beyond spatial
bounds," thus does not seem limited to specifically private conduct. Id.
485 Because Lawrence places constitutional value in personal relationships, its logic cannot be
limited by reference to the form of privacy stressed by Justice Harlan's seminal dissent in Poe,
which is the origin of the public-private distinction in modern substantive due process doctrine.
See supra note 471. Harlan used privacy as a heuristic device to stress the impropriety of the
state bringing "the full power of the criminal law" to bear on the regulation of behavior in the
home. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Unlike the Court in Lawrence,
Justice Harlan was not particularly concerned with protecting from general legal regulation either
intimate sexual acts or even the marriage relationship itself. See id. at 545-48 ("The laws regard-
ing marriage .. .as well as the laws forbidding adultery, fornication, and homosexual practices
... form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social life that any Constitutional
doctrine in this area must build upon that basis.").
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sexual relationships. It surely demeans and stigmatizes homosexual
relationships when the state does not endow their public manifestation
with the same indicia of respect that it accords to heterosexual rela-
tionships. If Lawrence believes that the function of the Due Process
Clause is "to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive
guarantee of liberty, '48 6 if the constitutional guarantee of liberty at-
taches to homosexual relationships, and if legislation denying homo-
sexual relationships official recognition relegates them to second-class
status, state discrimination against the public dimensions of homosex-
ual relationships would seem to violate the very essence of the consti-
tutional guarantee. 48 7
The logic of Lawrence thus has exceedingly far-ranging implica-
tions. It would seem to render constitutionally suspicious at least as
broad a range of legislation adversely affecting homosexuals as would
a decision grounded explicitly on the Equal Protection Clause. 488
These implications are effaced, however, because Lawrence
deliberately retains, and even emphasizes, the rhetoric of the public-
private distinction, with its attendant implication that liberty is to be
especially protected within the private realm. By retaining this
distinction, the Court reserves the option in future decisions to decline
to use substantive due process to invalidate official refusals to accord
public recognition to homosexual relationships.
The best interpretation of this internal tension is to view Lawrence
as the opening bid in a conversation that the Court expects to hold
with the American public. The Court has advanced a powerful and
486 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
487 It is also noteworthy in this regard that the egalitarian logic employed by Lawrence, which
uses the Due Process Clause to create an "equality of treatment" that prevents "discrimination
both in the public and in the private spheres," id., is generally suspicious of public-private distinc-
tions. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 643 (2000) (holding unconstitutional the
application of a state antidiscrimination law to the realm of private expressive association); Will
Kymlicka, Civil Society and Government: A Liberal-Egalitarian Perspective, in CIVIL SOCIETY
AND GOVERNMENT 79, 88 (Nancy L. Rosenblum & Robert C. Post eds., 2002) (arguing that the
inculcation of egalitarian norms should not be restricted by traditional public-private distinc-
tions). When egalitarian logic does recognize a public-private distinction, moreover, it typically
accords higher priority to eliminating discrimination in public than to eliminating discrimination
in private. See, e.g., Marie A. Failinger, Remembering Mrs. Murphy: A Remedies Approach to the
Conflict Between Gay/Lesbian Renters and Religious Landlords, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 383, 383-85
(2OO1) (describing the "Mrs. Murphy exemption" by which certain types of private housing units
are exempt from the public accommodation and fair housing provisions of the Civil Rights Act);
Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Four-
teenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. I, 46 (1977) (explaining that while equal treatment is re-
quired in "public life," it may not apply to the same extent in the private sphere). That is the
structure of Title VII and of most antidiscrimination laws.
488 Indeed, due process analysis may be more far-reaching than equal protection analysis, be-
cause the framework of due process does not have to work through the doctrinal thicket of facial
classifications, disparate impact, and discriminatory purpose, which the Court has established to
hedge the enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause.
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passionate statement that is plainly designed to influence the ongoing
national debate about the constitutional status of homosexuality.48 9
But the Court has not committed itself to the full consequences of its
position. It has crafted its opinion so as to allow itself flexibly to re-
spond to the unfolding nature of public discussion. If the public be-
comes inflamed by the implications of the Court's intervention, refus-
ing to ameliorate its deep-seated opposition to same-sex marriage and
therefore adamantly resisting the logic of Lawrence's reasoning,4 90 the
Court retains the option of invoking the public-private distinction as a
rationale for further inaction.
In Lawrence, therefore, as in Grutter, the Court has shaped the
substance of constitutional law to meet the demands of a dialectical re-
lationship to constitutional culture. But whereas Grutter is relatively
clear about the constitutional values at stake in its intervention into
the public debate over affirmative action, the same cannot be said
about Lawrence, which creates genuine uncertainty whether the consti-
tutional values at issue in the question of sexual orientation should in-
volve liberty of private conduct or instead equality of public respect.
If Lawrence's ambiguity accurately captures the essential ambiva-
lence of American constitutional culture on the question of sexual ori-
entation, 4 9 1 the Court will likely not be pressed to extend or defend the
logic of its decision. The internal tensions that fracture Lawrence will
remain latent, hidden by the correspondence between the Court and
the public. But these tensions will become overt if the Court is called
upon seriously to justify its decision, as for example if the public were
to mobilize against Lawrence as it did against Roe,492 or if the Court
489 For a sample of that debate, see Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
490 See, e.g., Frank Bruni, Vatican Exhorts Legislators To Reject Same-Sex Unions, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. i, 2003, at Ai (discussing religious opposition to same-sex unions); supra note 475.
491 On that ambivalence, see Karst, supra note 34o, at 543-44.
492 A campaign has already been launched "calling for the impeachment of the six Supreme
Court Justices who paved the way for 'homosexual marriage' in Lawrence v. Texas." Randall
Terry, Founder of Operation Rescue, Launches Plan To Oppose 'Homosexual Marriage'. Stop 'Gay
Marriage,' Impeach the Twisted Six, U.S. NEWSWIRE, July 31, 2003, available at 2003 WL
5566o839. Information on the campaign may be found at http://www.twistedsix.com. There is
some evidence of popular mobilization against Lawrence. See, e.g., Carolyn Lochhead, Foes of
Gay Marriage Renew Push for a Ban, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 13, 2003, at Ai ("Religious conserva-
tives pledge an all-out drive to enshrine a ban on same-sex marriage in the U.S. Constitution, call-
ing it the last line of defense against an inevitable court-led destruction of a fundamental institu-
tion."); see also, e.g., Alan Cooperman, Sodomy Ruling Fuels Battle Over Gay Marriage, WASH.
POST, July 3i, 2003, at Ai. Cooperman writes:
When the Supreme Court struck down a Texas law against sodomy a month ago,
religious conservatives viewed the decision as a terrible defeat. But now, they increas-
ingly think it has handed them a winning political issue: opposition to gay marriage.
In an unexpected shift in the electoral landscape, polls show that public support of
gay rights in general, and of "civil unions" for same-sex couples in particular, has fallen
about io percentage points since the court's June 26 ruling.
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were to decide in future cases to build upon Lawrence to reshape the
values of American constitutional culture. 493
In such circumstances the challenge facing the Court will be to de-
fend the specifically legal authority of Lawrence. Because Scalia is no
doubt correct to read Lawrence as informed by the changing views of
sexual orientation within elite culture, 494 the Court will be vulnerable
to the charge that it is improperly appropriating the authority of law
to enforce a partisan cultural perspective. 495  The Court will not be
able to defend against this charge by pointing to the text of the Consti-
tution, or to the intent of the Framers, or even to the immanent values
of American history and tradition. It will instead have to defend itself
by articulating with clarity and integrity the constitutional values that
inform its judgment. This will commit the Court to a substantive ac-
count of the specific constitutional provisions on which it chooses to
rely, which will function to dispel the ambiguity that now envelops
Lawrence. The Court will have to develop either the logic of private
liberty or the logic of public respect. And it will have to vouchsafe for
the legality of whichever logic it chooses by embedding it within the
practices that make up the institution of law, which is to say by en-
Leaders of the Christian Right say this is because Americans have realized that the
legalization of gay marriage, which once seemed remote, is suddenly a real possibility.
Id.; see also Elisabeth Bumiller, Why America Has Gay Marriage Jitters, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. io,
2003, § 4 (Week in Review), at i; Richard Morin & Alan Cooperman, Majority Against Blessing
Gay Unions, WASH. POST, August 14, 2003, at AI.
493 For a fascinating study of the relationship between the regulation of sexual orientation and
constitutional culture in the context of state constitutions, see Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitu-
tionalism: Toward a Theory of State Constitutional Meanings, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 871 (iggg). Reed
traces how two forms of political activity, public interest litigation and ballot initiatives, have
"profoundly structured the law on gay rights and same-sex marriage" in Oregon and Hawaii. Id.
at 875.
494 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Kenneth Karst has observed:
When the Supreme Court held the Colorado amendment invalid in Romer v. Evans,
the influence on constitutional law of other cultural forms seemed evident. In a dissent
that rivals his previous personal high for anger, Justice Scalia recognized - accurately, I
believe - that the majority Justices had bought into the cultural shift that had been go-
ing on since the 197os. He accused the majority of siding with the elites (such as lawyers
and academics), who supported gay and lesbian Americans' claim to equal citizenship,
rather than with the common folk (he called them "villeins") who wanted to preserve a
social morality that denied "full social acceptance" of homosexuality. The part about
siding with the elites rings true - and a similar characterization would have been ap-
propriate for Brown v. Board of Education, or New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, or -
how the canker gnaws! - Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
Karst, supra note 340, at 548 (footnote omitted). Justice Thomas, one might add, was equally cor-
rect to read Grutter's vision of the law of affirmative action as deeply informed by the views of
the "cognoscenti." See supra p. 66.
495 It is because it fears the strength of this charge that the right wing of the Court advocates
abandoning the project of substantive due process altogether. See supra note 44o. This proposed
solution implicitly reveals the rather low value that the right wing places on the liberty interests
that substantive due process exists to protect. See id.
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dowing it with the attributes of administrability, consistency, stability,
predictability, and so forth.
IV.
The pressure the Court will experience to justify Lawrence, should
it ever be required to explain or to build upon the decision, reveals a
fundamental truth about the structure that binds together constitu-
tional law and culture. The Court is authorized to regulate culture
only insofar as it speaks with the authority of law. But the Court's le-
gal authority is subject to challenge whenever it must craft its legal
judgments out of the same beliefs and values that are available to all
literate members of the culture. Although the Court can stand on its
official prerogative as the duly constituted head of the third branch of
government, this prerogative will carry the Court only so far if the
public comes to believe that the Court is using its decisions as a screen
to advance a nonlegal, cultural agenda. That is why, should contro-
versy engulf the Court, the legitimacy of a controversial and ambigu-
ous decision like Lawrence will ultimately have to be understood dia-
chronically, as a temporal process in which legal authority will develop
in time.
The legal authority of Lawrence will evolve along two distinct
tracks. The first is substantive. Because the legitimacy of constitu-
tional law is rooted in constitutional culture, the Court can transform
the content of constitutional law in controversial ways only by simul-
taneously transforming constitutional culture. The nation must come
to believe that the Court's distinct vision of constitutional law also ex-
presses the country's fundamental convictions and beliefs. The Court
is vulnerable in this process, for the nation may follow the Court's
lead, as in Brown, or it may turn against the Court, as at the time of
Dred Scott or the New Deal.496 The impassioned rhetoric of Lawrence
suggests that the Court well understands that the opinion's legal au-
thority is connected to the Court's success in influencing public opin-
ion. Despite his embrace of the autonomy of constitutional law, Scalia
also plainly understands this dynamic, for he uses his dissent to deni-
grate Lawrence as the mere "product of a law-profession culture[] that
has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda, '497 and to
mobilize political resistance to Lawrence on the ground that the deci-
sion "dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted
496 Alexander Bickel puts the matter well when he observes that "[t]he Court is a leader of
opinion, not a mere register of it, but it must lead opinion, not merely impose its own; and - the
short of it is - it labors under the obligation to succeed." BICKEL, supra note 68, at 239.
497 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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a distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual un-
ions. " 4 98
The second track is institutional. The legal authority of Lawrence
will evolve as the Court integrates the opinion into the practices that
define the ongoing conventions of constitutional adjudication. 499 We
may call these practices the "rule-of-law virtues." Lawrence will in-
creasingly acquire an aura of legality as it is imbricated within a chain
of judicial decisions that treat Lawrence as a legitimate judgment. It
will grow in legal authority as future decisions manifest respect for
Lawrence's principles, as the Court appeals to the logic of those prin-
ciples to control the outcome of cases, and as Lawrence's logic is used
to orient the ongoing development of the law. Lawrence will progres-
sively shed its ambiguity as the incorporation of its principles into the
ordinary practice of constitutional adjudication endows these princi-
ples with precision and force.
The substantive and institutional tracks are interconnected. The
Court will clarify the legal principles of Lawrence in the context of
changes in constitutional culture produced by the popular debate pro-
voked by Lawrence. There will no doubt be an extended period of
controversy and confusion as various factions struggle to shape the
substance of constitutional culture, and as the Court remains corre-
spondingly uncertain about exactly how to unfold the doctrinal impli-
cations of Lawrence. No doubt there will also eventually emerge some
period of relatively secure equilibrium, in which the beliefs and values
of the nation regarding the regulation of sexual orientation will
roughly correspond to the constitutional standards regarding such
regulation enforced by the Court. When we conceive the content of
constitutional law as fixed and stable, as a set of clear and reliable
black-letter rules, we typically have in mind the law that obtains in
such periods of equilibrium. 00
There is a tendency to hypostatize such law as representing the
"real" constitutional law, the kind that can be confidently summarized
in textbooks. There is also a tendency to imagine that Lawrence's le-
498 Id. at 2498.
499 It was the Court's strong signal that it would refuse to engage in such a diachronic process
that ultimately rendered Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), such a distressingly arbitrary opinion.
See Robert Post, Sustaining the Premise of Legality: Learning to Live with Bush v. Gore, in
BUSH v GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 96, 98-99, io8-o9 (Bruce Ackerman ed.,
2002).
500 So, for example, the elevated scrutiny that constitutional law applies to classifications based
upon sex is today taken as a stable and fixed black-letter rule of constitutional law. This is most
probably because the rule roughly corresponds to the current beliefs of constitutional culture. We
entirely forget, however, the period of turmoil and controversy that led to the creation of this
black-letter law, in which the content of constitutional culture was transformed in ways that al-
tered national perceptions of sex discrimination. See Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism,
supra note 43, at 1980-2005.
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gal authority must derive entirely from its fidelity to this kind of "real"
law. From this perspective, the Court endangers its legitimacy when-
ever, as in Lawrence, it departs from black-letter law. The difficulty
with this way of understanding legal authority, however, is that it
takes "real" law as given, and it consequently lacks any explanation of
how such law comes to be or how it changes. It offers no account of
the periods of flux and uncertainty that commonly produce black-letter
law, and into which such law can dissolve as it drifts out of touch with
constitutional culture. Conceptualizing judicial authority in terms of
fidelity to an antecedent and fixed law thus cannot explain the legal
authority necessary both to make and to alter black-letter law.
An account of constitutional law that must suppress the historical
processes by which constitutional law comes into being cannot be ade-
quate. An account of legal authority that focuses entirely on fidelity to
a set of determinate and uncontroversial legal rules, immune from the
tumultuous push and pull of history, cannot be acceptable. We instead
need a theory of legal authority capable of guiding the Court as it
passes through processes of historical contestation. The point is fun-
damental, because disagreement and debate, even if unobtrusive and
inconsequential, pervade constitutional law. Just as culture is intrinsi-
cally controversial,50 1 so the periods of equilibrium that sustain our
perception of black-letter law are at most matters of degree. The con-
fusion and uncertainty that Lawrence will undoubtedly inspire is un-
usual chiefly in its salience and intensity. This implies that legal au-
thority cannot depend merely on the logical manipulation of received
rules, but must instead be conceived as a living connection between
the Court and the nation, the result of a certain relationship of trust
that the Court works to establish with the American public.
If we inquire into the conditions of that trust, we shall find that at
a minimum it requires public confidence that the Court will justly bal-
ance its obligation to maintain fidelity to rule-of-law virtues against its
obligation to align its judgments with constitutional culture. How the
Court navigates between these competing demands is not a theoretical
question. We know that the Court can neither create constitutional
law that is indistinguishable from culture, nor create constitutional law
that seeks unilaterally to subordinate constitutional culture to the in-
dependent dictates of legal practice. But apart from these extreme po-
sitions, the Court must be guided by its practical tact and judgment,
which Brandeis called statesmanship.5 0 2 Debate about how much
weight should be assigned to rule-of-law virtues, as opposed to consti-
tutional culture, is a persistent feature of constitutional adjudication.
501 See supra note 245.
502 See supra note 181.
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Such debate reflects not only differences of general jurisprudential
orientation, but also substantive disagreements about the stakes that a
specific case might raise when viewed either from the perspective of
professional practice or from that of constitutional culture. Because
the Court in Brown was deeply committed as a matter of professional
belief to the constitutional value of nondiscrimination, it was willing to
undertake extraordinary efforts to transform constitutional culture.
But because some Justices evidently do not place a high legal value on
the constitutional objective of protecting liberty, they view potential
public criticism of the Court as a reason to abandon substantive due
process doctrine.5 0 3  Because highly consequential public opposition
would surely result were the Court to hold that Congress could not use
Title VII to prohibit state sex discrimination, the Court in Hibbs was
willing to modify its professional allegiance to the principle of the
autonomy of constitutional law. But the Court was willing to maintain
its commitment to that principle in the face of what it evidently (and
correctly) anticipated would be relatively minor public opposition to a
decision in Garrett holding that Congress could not use the ADA to
prohibit state disability discrimination.
To those who think exclusively in terms of the autonomy of consti-
tutional law, the pragmatic accommodation of Hibbs is a positive be-
trayal of judicial obligation. As can be seen from his dissents in Hibbs,
Grutter, and Lawrence, Scalia takes indifference to popular reaction
almost as a point of affirmative pride, an attitude that flows directly
from his avowedly unconditional embrace of the autonomy of constitu-
tional law. Scalia's attitude cannot be easily dismissed, because it re-
flects the logical extension of viewing law as categorically distinct from
culture, or, as it is more frequently said, of viewing law as completely
divorced from politics.
There is unquestionably a history of heroism associated with this
vision of law, a history of standing up for fundamental legal principles
against a lynch mob of public opposition. Even if the jurisprudential
claim of autonomy is theoretically unsustainable, therefore, Scalia's
position remains nettlesome precisely because this conception of the
law-politics distinction is deeply ingrained and pervasively regarded as
a necessary foundation for the maintenance of judicial independence.
It is no accident that the Court characteristically appeals to this image
of the law-politics distinction whenever it feels called upon explicitly to
defend its legal authority.5 0
4
503 See supra notes 440, 495.
504 Such appeals are of course characteristic of the Court's Section 5 decisions, but they are also
evident elsewhere. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. i, 18 (i95o) (emphasizing the judiciary's
authority to say "what the law is").
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Close attention to decisions like Hibbs, Grutter, and Lawrence sug-
gests that this defense is primarily ideological, and that constitutional
adjudication does not actually proceed on the assumption that law and
politics are mutually exclusive. When it comes to deciding cases,
courts conceive politics as the medium within which, and out of
which, they construct law. The difficulty, however, is that this cannot
be frankly acknowledged without simultaneously undermining the
Court's authority to speak as the "instrument[]"50 5 of a law that is
known and fixed, in which "principle and logic" entirely determine
"the decisions of this Court. '50 6 What is ultimately at stake in appeals
to the autonomy of constitutional law, therefore, is the form of judicial
authority thought necessary to sustain the institution of judicial review.
This suggests that although generations of legal scholars have demon-
strated the empirical and theoretical deficiencies of modeling constitu-
tional law as categorically distinct from politics, courts cannot escape
the grip of imagining constitutional law as autonomous until they are
able to embrace an alternative account of judicial authority.
It would be most useful to develop such an alternative account
from the relatively uncontroversial insight that respect for the integrity
and independence of the judiciary depends upon public confidence
that courts are competently performing their task of articulating con-
stitutional law. If, as I have argued in this Foreword, constitutional
law emerges from a continual renegotiation of the competing demands
of the rule-of-law virtues and the constitutional convictions of the na-
tion, courts must conceptualize effective constitutional law not as the
ground of this confidence, but rather as its consequence. In Hibbs,
Grutter, and Lawrence, the Court folds its recognition of constitutional
culture into the substance of constitutional doctrine, and by this proc-
ess of craft summons constitutional law into existence. The authority
of that law does not, and cannot, depend upon the exercise of purely
professional logic, but rather upon public support for the Court that
fashions it.
So long as the Court continues to believe that judicial review can
be justified only by a form of authority that determines in advance the
outcome of judicial decisionmaking, it shall remain haunted by the
chimerical ideal of an autonomous constitutional law. To move be-
yond the paralyzing influence of that ideal, the Court must begin to
reconceive judicial authority as the consequence of a relationship of
trust that it continuously strives to establish with the nation. It must
come to believe that the institution of judicial review will remain le-
505 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824) ("Courts are the
mere instruments of the law .... ).
506 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2498 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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gitimate to the extent that the Court retains the warranted confidence
of the country, conferred in recognition of a judiciary that is deeply
loyal to "the compelling traditions of the legal profession" 50 7 appre-
hended with due regard for the constitutional convictions of the
American people.
507 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171 (1952).
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